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General Introduction
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12 Chapter 1
1.1 Overview and Structure of the Dissertation
Security analysts are prominent figures of stock markets. They interpret public information and
collect private information useful in determining the fair price of the stocks they cover. Having
long been seen as sophisticated processors of financial information, they are presumed to help
investors allocate their resources in a more efficient and rewarding way (Ramnath, Rock, and
Shane 2008). Prior literature investigates financial analysts in an extensive way. Researchers
seek to identify the financial analysts who manage to produce more accurate forecasts (Clement
1999; Jacob, Lys, and Neale 1999; Kini et al. 2009) and influential recommendations (Michaely
and Womack 1999; Bradley, Jordan, and Ritter 2008; Sorescu and Subrahmanyam 2006; Loh
and Stulz 2011) than their peers. They find that heterogeneity in analysts’ performance is partly
determined by factors such as analysts’ forecasting ability, availability of corporate information
and portfolio complexity.
Gender issues, however, have not been fully investigated in the context of financial analysts,
due to data limitation. Prior literature on gender issues of financial analysts essentially underlines
the under-representation of female analysts and some gender-based difference in analysts’ behav-
ioral patterns. Green, Jegadeesh, and Tang (2009) find that earnings forecasts issued by female
analysts are less accurate than those of male analysts. However, contrary to the findings of Green,
Jegadeesh, and Tang (2009), Kumar (2010) shows that female analysts have a superior forecast-
ing ability. They issue bolder and more accurate earnings forecasts than their male counterparts.
Kumar (2010) further provides evidence for investors’ perception about forecasts issued by fe-
male analysts: abnormal stock returns are stronger for bold earnings forecasts of female analysts.
Instead of investigating gender heterogeneity in earnings forecast, Li et al. (2013) focus on recom-
mendations revisions and find that abnormal stock returns associated with stock recommendations
of female analysts are similar to those associated with male analysts’ recommendations, but with
lower idiosyncratic risks. Consistent with Green, Jegadeesh, and Tang (2009), they find that fe-
male analysts are more likely to be designated as “All-stars" analysts by Institutional Investor
magazine, which confirms job performance of female analysts. Furthermore, stock recommenda-
tions of female analysts are less likely to be optimistic, all other things equal (Bosquet, Goeij, and
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Smedts 2014). In a recent work, Fang and Huang (2017) extend the gender observation of financial
analysts to analysts’ connections with corporate boardroom and document a gender-based differ-
ence in exploring alumni ties with corporate boards. Analysts’ private connection with corporate
managers improves analysts’ forecast accuracy and recommendation informativeness. However,
such an effect is two to three times larger for male analysts than for female analysts.
In light of prior research, my PhD dissertation aims to investigate gender issues relating to
financial analysts in the context of European countries. It consists of three studies. The first study
investigates the impact of culture on female representation among financial analysts. The second
study analyzes gender heterogeneity in issuing innovative stock recommendations. The third study
focuses on gender difference in market reactions to innovative stock recommendations. The titles
of three papers are presented as follows:
• “The Influence of National Culture on Cross-country Gender Diversity in the European
Financial Analyst Industry"
• “Innovation in Financial Analysts’ Recommendations: Does Gender Matter?"
• “Analyst Overconfidence and Market Reactions to Innovative Recommendations"
In a first essay, I investigate the relation between national culture and female representation
among financial analysts. National culture is characterized by the Hofstede (2001)’s cultural sub-
regions and cultural dimensions. The study first explores the female representation of financial
analysts in European countries. Further, it investigates the explanatory power of national culture
in explaining the cross-country variation of female representation among financial analysts.
The second essay investigates innovation in analyst’s recommendations. Innovative recom-
mendations are important to investors because they are often more informative than less innova-
tive recommendations. The study aims to explore whether there are gender differences in issuing
innovative stock recommendations. My conjecture is that female analysts’ lower overconfidence
(superior ability) leads to less (more) innovative stock recommendations.
The third essay deals with market reactions to innovative recommendations. I investigate
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whether there is gender difference in abnormal stock returns and abnormal trading volumes asso-
ciated with innovative recommendations. The primary hypothesis is that investors discount more
innovative recommendations of male analysts than those of female analysts due to men’s system-
atically higher overconfidence.
The three essays use quantitative research methods and merge data from different sources.
Both commonly available databases and hand-collected data are used to address the research ques-
tions discussed in the three studies. This dissertation makes several contributions given the existing
research gap in gender issues of financial analysts.
The first study contributes to the literature by shedding light on female representation of fi-
nancial analysts in Europe and providing evidence of strong variation across countries. By docu-
menting women representation in the financial analyst industry, my research findings complement
the growing body of research in finance that addresses the gender issue in different areas such
as corporate boardroom directors (Burgess and Tharenou 2002; Farrell and Hersch 2005; Adams
and Ferreira 2009). Furthermore, This study also complements the research relating to the eco-
nomic relevance of culture. The analysis of the impact of national culture on gender diversity
among financial analysts adds to prior literature by introducing national culture as an important
country-level factor in financial research in an international setting.
The second study contributes to the literature by shedding light on the mechanism behind an-
alysts’ innovation in recommendation revisions. My empirical evidence shows that male analysts
are more innovative than their female counterparts. This contributes to the gender literature by
confirming that women have different behavioral patterns than men in the world of financial an-
alysts. Further, regarding the financial analyst literature, the higher level of innovation in male
analysts’ recommendations evidenced in this study leads to consider that innovative stock recom-
mendations are more likely to be driven by overconfidence than by forecasting skills. Indeed,
prior literature provides evidence suggesting that men are systematically more overconfident than
women and that female analysts exhibit superior forecasting ability than their male counterparts.
The last study proposes an analysis of market reactions to innovative recommendations. The
main contributions of the third essay to prior literature are threefold. First, it complements prior
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literature with empirical evidence for the relationship between innovation in recommendation re-
visions and recommendations’ informativeness, by showing that innovative recommendations are
more informative than non-innovative recommendations. Second, this study relates to literature
on gender-based difference among financial analysts. In line with the findings of Li et al. (2013),
it rejects the gender heterogeneity in market reactions to stock recommendations, regardless of
recommendations’ innovation level. Third, this study contributes to prior research on the impact
of overconfidence on innovation in financial market settings. It analyzes investors’ perception
about innovative recommendations issued by overconfident male analysts, which is an extension
of prior studies relating to market reactions to corporate financial decisions of overconfident CEOs
(Malmendier and Tate 2008; Huang and Kisgen 2013).
The remaining of this introductory chapter presents the theoretical background of my research
in Section 2. I discuss the research motivations of this dissertation in Section 3. In Section 4, I
provide a more detailed summaries of the three papers.
Subsequently, the three papers are presented as individual chapters. A final chapter of this
dissertation summarizes the main findings, provides a discussion of the limitations of the research
and suggests directions of future research.
1.2 Theoretical Background
Traditional finance assumes that individuals are rational. According to the efficient market hypoth-
esis, financial markets are efficient and stock prices immediately incorporate all available infor-
mation on firm’s value (Malkiel and Fama 1970). Market participants are sophisticated and trade
only on available information. However, researchers observe numerous anomalies that sharply
violate the efficient market theory. In light of the findings in psychology and sociology, behavioral
finance, “that is, finance from a broader social science perspective including psychology and so-
ciology", seeks to address some financial phenomena that cannot be understood using the rational
expectations advocated by traditional financial theory (Shiller 2003). The theoretical background
of this dissertation relates essentially to the implication of culture and gender difference in behav-
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ioral finance studies.
Culture is often defined as the collective mental programming that leads to patterned ways of
thinking, feeling and acting. National culture influences economic activities both by condition-
ing formal institutions and by shaping human actors’ incentives and subjective perceptions of the
external world (Zheng et al. 2012). The cultural dimensions defined by Hofstede (2001) charac-
terize the patterns of national cultures and features prominently in business studies dedicated to
the impact of culture on financial activities. The Hofstede classification is based on five cultural
dimensions: power distance, individualism vs collectivism, masculinity vs femininity, uncertainty
avoidance and long-term vs short-term orientation. Based on these five dimensions, prior litera-
ture provides evidence on the economic relevance of national cultures on diverse issues related to
accounting and finance decisions (Kanagaretnam, Lim, and Lobo 2011; Han et al. 2010; Shao,
Kwok, and Zhang 2013).
Apart from the implication of culture, an emerging literature is dedicated to the role of gender
in financial market decisions. Research in psychology finds evidence of gender difference in
individual’s personal dispositions. Women are more risk-averse and less efficient in competitive
environments than men. They also attach more importance to ethic values. In addition, men
are systematically more overconfident than women, overconfidence being a behavioral bias that
causes individuals to overestimate their knowledge or ability to perform well under uncertainty.
Such dispositional differences originated from gender impel individuals to have specific behavioral
patterns when they are involved in social activities. Analyses of the common stock investment
strategies for men and women, for example, suggest that overconfident men are more engaged in
excessive stock trading than women (Barber and Odean 2001). Nonetheless, empirical evidence
also suggests that gender stereotypes cannot be applied to a professional environment due to a
self-selection process in the entry of labor market. Gender difference in personal dispositions, for
instance overconfidence, may disappear when women choose to pursue a career, especially in a
male-dominated industry (Kumar 2010).
In this dissertation, I investigate gender issues among financial analysts in light of prior litera-
ture on the impact of culture and gender on financial activities.
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1.3 Research Motivations
This dissertation is motivated by the current research gap in gender issues of financial analysts.
Prior studies dedicated to gender issues mainly cluster in the business field: the presence of women
figures in the boardroom (Adams and Ferreira 2009; Krishnan and Parsons 2008; Campbell and
Mínguez-Vera 2008), performance of female loan managers (Beck, Behr, and Guettler 2013), audit
fees for female auditors (Ittonen and Peni 2012). The current lack of systematic investigation on
women financial analysts leaves a research gap to fulfill, especially for countries outside the U.S.
1.3.1 Culture & Female Representation among Financial Analysts
Greater interests should be paid to the European countries. A high-level of standardization has
been achieved in institutional settings since the foundation of the European Union in 1993, but
a wide variety persists in cultural and social dimension. This is why I gave priority to descrip-
tive statistics on the presence of female financial analysts (the percentage of women financial
analysts, percentage of financial institutions having one or more women financial analysts etc)
to check whether female analysts’ representation was the same in all European countries under
study. In the United States, women are constantly underrepresented in the world of financial
analysts. Roughly 15% of all American analysts are female (Kumar 2010; Green, Jegadeesh,
and Tang 2009). Female representation of financial analysts outside the United States remains
unexplored. I, therefore, provide in this dissertation statistics for European female analysts and
investigate the impact of culture on female representation of financial analysts. The analysis of the
impact of cultural values on female representation in the European financial industry is motivated
by prior literature on the economic relevance of national culture. Kanagaretnam, Lim, and Lobo
(2011) indicate that cultures that encourage higher risk-taking experienced more bank troubles
in the form of larger losses or larger loan loss provisions. Han et al. (2010) find that uncertainty
avoidance and individualism explain managers’ earnings discretion across countries. Shao, Kwok,
and Zhang (2013) show that firms in individualistic countries invest more in long-term (risky) than
in short-term (safe) assets.
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1.3.2 Gender & Innovation in Stock Recommendations
This dissertation focuses on gender-based differences in analysts’ recommendations, more specif-
ically in innovative recommendations. The reason to distinguish innovative recommendations
from less innovative recommendations in the study of gender difference among financial analysts
is threefold.
First, analysts’ recommendation revisions are not all equally useful to investors (Loh and
Stulz 2011). The cross-sectional difference in recommendations’ informativenss emanates par-
tially from the innovation level of recommendations. Gleason and Lee (2003) find that highly
innovative earnings forecasts, i.e., forecasts away from the analysts’ consensus and forecasts that
significantly diverge from the analyst’s own prior estimate for the same stock, trigger larger market
reactions. Prior research has not studied innovation in recommendations as comprehensively as
innovation in forecasts. Nonetheless, prior empirical findings still confirm that recommendations
with the same characteristics as innovative forecasts are more informative to the markets. For ex-
ample, research relating to the informativeness of recommendation revisions finds that abnormal
price returns increase with the distance of stock recommendation to the analysts’ consensus (Je-
gadeesh and Kim 2006) and the change strength in recommendation relative to the analyst’s prior
revision for the same stock (Sorescu and Subrahmanyam 2006).
Second, innovation is closely associated with one personal attribute: overconfidence, for which
there is a well-documented gender difference. Men are expected to be more engaged in innovation
than women because of their relatively higher overconfidence. Overconfident individuals tend
to under-estimate the probability of failure under uncertainty and, therefore, are more likely to
undertake innovative projects. Literature clearly shows that overconfident CEOs are more likely
to pursue patent-based innovation (Galasso and Simcoe 2011). The existing gender difference in
overconfidence suggests a potential gender difference in the level of innovation in recommendation
that is worth being investigated.
Third, conditionning gender effect on innovation in recommendations allows to determine
whether innovation resulting from overconfidence is discounted by investors. Prior literature doc-
1.4. OVERVIEW OF THE THREE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 19
uments that overconfidence is associated with higher propensity to innovate but provides no evi-
dence for whether innovation motivated by overconfidence is rational. Investors are found to be
more suspicious about mergers and acquisitions undertaken by overconfident CEOs (Malmendier
and Tate 2008; Huang and Kisgen 2013) because they systematically over-estimate their ability
and are over-optimistic about the outcome of undertaken M&A. Market reactions at M&A an-
nouncements are significantly more negative for overconfident CEOs, suggesting that investors
discount projects undertaken by overconfident agents in corporate financial decisions. If the same
story holds for analysts, innovation in recommendations of overconfident analysts, i.e. male ana-
lysts, should be discounted by investors.
The above-mentioned motivations lead me to study gender-based difference among financial
analyst by targeting innovation in recommendation more specifically.
Overall, in the next three chapters of the dissertation, I answer the following three research
questions:
• Does national culture affect female representation among financial analysts?
• Do female financial analysts issue more or less innovative recommendations compared to
their male counterparts?
• Do investors discount innovative recommendations issued by male analysts, due to their
relatively higher overconfidence?
1.4 Overview of the Three Empirical Research
In this section I summarize the three empirical studies that compose this PhD dissertation.
1.4.1 First Research
The first study is entitled “The Influence of National Culture on Cross-country Gender Diversity
in the European Financial Analyst Industry". In this study, I investigate the impact of culture
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on female representation among financial analysts. This study uses European recommendation
data from I/B/E/S to examine the extent to which financial analysts’ gender diversity in Europe is
affected by the national culture that characterizes each European country. I choose the Hofstede
(2001)’s cultural sub-regions and cultural dimensions as a proxy for national cultural because of
its dominating position in most cultural frames applied to accounting and finance research.
Consistent with prior research in the United States (Green, Jegadeesh, and Tang 2009; Kumar
2010), I document an under-representation of female financial analysts for European countries.
Women account for 16.15% of financial analysts in Europe during the period under study with
significant country-level variations. Female financial analysts represent 40% of all financial ana-
lysts in Italy, however, in Denmark only 4.17% of them are female. Furthermore, though female
analysts are broadly distributed in all economic sectors, I find that they are more inclined to work
in specific industries such as “Apparel" and “Restaurant", while keeping distance from “Rubber
and Plastic Products" and “Electrical Equipment" market segments. Differences in female rep-
resentation are also remarkable among the different cultural sub-regions identified by (Hofstede
2001). Descriptive statistics show that Anglo countries, i.e. Ireland and United Kingdom, enjoy
the highest proportion of female financial analysts. Meanwhile, the highest proportion of rec-
ommendations issued by females are found among Latin countries, i.e. Belgium, France, Italy,
Portugal and Spain. In Nordic countries, i.e. Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, Norway and Swe-
den, the proportion of female analysts and the proportion of recommendations issued by female
analysts are significantly lower than in Anglo and Latin countries.
Further, regression models at country level and at analyst level respectively have been con-
ducted to investigate the impact of national culture on female representation among financial ana-
lysts. The incremental influence of national culture, proxied by the Hofstede cultural sub-regions
and cultural dimensions successively, persists when I control for variables that are likely to be
related to gender diversity, such as analysts’ workload, the density of analysts’ influential stock
recommendations, financial market size, etc. The multivariate analyses suggest that Nordic coun-
tries have, all things equal, the lowest female representation among financial analysts relative to
countries in other cultural sub-regions. Furthermore, additional regression results using cultural
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dimensions rather than cultural sub-regions show that female representation is higher in countries
where people have more acceptance for unequal distribution of power. This finding is consis-
tent with the lower female representation observed in Nordic countries, countries that have lower
tolerance about unequal power distribution (Hofstede 2001).
1.4.2 Second Research
The second essay is entitled “Innovation in Financial Analysts’ Recommendations: Does Gen-
der Matter?". This essay analyzes gender difference in innovation of recommendation revisions.
Based on previous literature on gender difference showing that men are more overconfident than
women and male analysts less skill than female analysts, my primary hypotheses are that female
financial analysts issue less (more) innovative stock recommendations due to lower overconfi-
dence (superior forecasting ability). To test my hypotheses, I examine the innovation level in
stock recommendations issued by female and male analysts by creating an innovation index.
Investment recommendations are usually reported along with the last revision date, the recent
analyst consensus and analyst’s own prior recommendation on the same stock. Therefore, diver-
gence from analyst consensus, revision from prior recommendation, and recommendation timing
are three benchmarks that I use to determine innovation in stock recommendations. I refer stock
recommendations that diverge from the analyst consensus, that are much revised relative to the
analyst’s own prior recommendation and that are ahead in time of other recommendations, as
innovative recommendations. Using these three criteria, I define an innovation index for recom-
mendation revisions. Based on this index, a recommendation is innovative if it falls in the first
quartile of at least two out of the three above-mentioned criteria sorted by descending order.
My final sample contains 89,312 recommendations issued by European analysts from 2006 to
2013. According to the innovation index, innovative recommendations represent about 16.6% of
stock recommendations issued during the sample period. The statistics at analyst level suggest that
female analysts are less likely to issue innovative recommendations, compared to male analysts.
More precisely, I find that female analysts issue stock recommendations that diverge less from
their prior investment advice and from the analyst consensus. Stock recommendations issued
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by women also are less ahead in time. Empirical results from multivariate tests confirm that
gender heterogeneity in analysts’ recommendations cannot be attributed to differences in analysts’
characteristics and covered stocks’ characteristics.
I conclude from these findings that overconfidence exerts larger marginal effect on equity ana-
lyst decision of issuing innovative stock recommendations than forecasting ability, which leads to
higher (lower) innovative recommendation issued by overconfident male (skillful female) analysts.
1.4.3 Third Research
The third essay is entitled “Analyst Overconfidence and Market Reactions to Innovative Recom-
mendations". This study analyzes gender difference in market reactions to innovative recommen-
dations. Overconfidence leads to more engagement in innovation because overconfident individu-
als under-estimate the probability of failure. Empirical evidences for corporate financial decisions
suggest that investors are skeptic about projects undertaken by male CEOs, due to their relative
overconfidence (Huang and Kisgen 2013; Malmendier and Tate 2008). I posit that investors should
discount innovative recommendations issued by male analysts, compared to innovative recommen-
dations issued by female analysts.
Using a comprehensive sample of sell-side analyst investment recommendations, I find that
abnormal stock returns around innovative recommendations are significantly higher, holding other
factors constant. This finding is consistent with prior literature that shows that innovative outputs
of financial analysts are more informative to investors (Gleason and Lee 2003). Further, I investi-
gate the potential gender difference in market reactions to innovative recommendations. I consider
a battery of analyst, recommendation, and firm variables. The multivariate results show that in-
vestors do not discount the innovative recommendations issued by overconfident male analysts.
The cumulative abnormal returns associated with innovative recommendations of female analysts
are similar to those of male analysts, suggesting that male analysts are not unduly overconfident
to the detriment of investors who follow their stock recommendations. I find similar results for
abnormal trading volume around recommendation dates.
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Chapter 2
The Influence of National Culture on
Cross-country Gender Diversity in the
European Financial Analyst Industry
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28 Chapter 2
Abstract: I explore the relation between na-
tional culture and female representation among
financial analysts. National culture is charac-
terized by the Hofstede (2001)’s cultural sub-
regions and cultural dimensions. The main
analyses, based on a sample of 3579 financial
analysts from 2006 to 2013 for 28 European
countries, indicate that women only account for
16.15% of financial analysts with strong cross-
country variations. The proportion of female
analysts ranges from 4% in Denmark as the low-
est to 40% in Italy as the highest. With regard to
the Hofstede’s cultural sub-regions, multivari-
ate tests show that Nordic and Germanic coun-
tries have the lowest proportion of female an-
alysts. In contrast, Latin countries exhibit the
highest proportion of female analysts. Further,
the exploratory analyses of the effects of na-
tional culture on analyst gender diversity indi-
cate that cultures with more tolerance toward
unequal power distribution experience higher
female representation among financial analysts.
Keywords: financial analysts, gender, Europe,
national culture
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2.1 Introduction
Financial analysts are important intermediaries in financial markets, because of their efforts to
information dissemination and their expertise in investment decision. However, gender issues are
barely discussed in the context of financial analysts. Studies dedicated to gender issues mainly
cluster in the business field: the presence of women figures in the boardroom (Adams and Ferreira
2009; Krishnan and Parsons 2008; Campbell and Mínguez-Vera 2008), performance of female
loan managers (Beck, Behr, and Guettler 2013), audit fees for female auditors (Ittonen and Peni
2012). The studies of Kumar (2010) and Green, Jegadeesh, and Tang (2009) are, nonetheless, two
remarkable exceptions. Using a sample from the United States, they show that women are con-
stantly underrepresented in the world of financial analysts and that female analysts issue bolder
and more influential recommendations than their male counterparts. Taking advantage of the cul-
tural diversity that characterizes European countries, I extend these studies by investigating the
role of national culture in explaining cross-country differences in gender diversity among finan-
cial analysts.
The analysis of the influence of national culture is motivated mainly by Aggarwal and Goodell
(2014), who emphasize the economic relevance of national culture and summarize the sparse
use of cultural dimensions in accounting and finance. Extant arguments in the literature suggest
that national culture, which is very stable over time, is an important factor influencing financial
activities as it shapes both the institutional environment within a country and the way human actors
react to the institutions around them.
This study uses European recommendation data from I/B/E/S to examine the extent to which
financial analysts’ gender diversity in Europe is affected by the national culture that characterizes
each European country. I choose the Hofstede (2001)’s cultural sub-regions and cultural dimen-
sions as a proxy for national culture because of its dominating position in most cultural frames
applied to accounting and finance research.
The research sample consists of 125 908 recommendations issued by 3 579 European analysts
over the 2006-2013 period. Consistent with prior research in the United States (Green, Jegadeesh,
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and Tang 2009; Kumar 2010), I document an under-representation of female financial analysts for
European countries. Women account for 16.15% of financial analysts in Europe during the period
under study with significant country-level variations. Female financial analysts represent 40% of
all financial analysts in Italy, however, in Denmark only 4.17% of them are female. Furthermore,
though female analysts are broadly distributed in all economic sectors, I find that they are more
inclined to work in specific industries such as “Apparel" and “Restaurant", while keeping distance
from “Rubber and Plastic Products" and “Electrical Equipment" market segments. Differences in
female representation are also remarkable among the different cultural sub-regions identified by
Hofstede (2001). Descriptive statistics show that Anglo countries, i.e. Ireland and United King-
dom, enjoy the highest proportion of female financial analysts. Meanwhile, the highest proportion
of recommendations issued by females are found among Latin countries, i.e. Belgium, France,
Italy, Portugal and Spain. In Nordic countries, i.e. Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, Norway and
Sweden, the proportion of female analysts and the proportion of recommendations issued by fe-
male analysts are significantly lower than in Anglo and Latin countries.
Further, regression models at country level and at analyst level respectively have been con-
ducted to investigate the impact of national culture on female representation among financial ana-
lysts. The incremental influence of national culture, proxied by the Hofstede cultural sub-regions
and cultural dimensions successively, persists when I control for variables that are likely to be
related to gender diversity, such as analysts’ workload, the density of analysts’ influential stock
recommendations, financial market size, etc. The multivariate analyses suggest that Nordic coun-
tries have, all things equal, the lowest female representation among financial analysts relative to
countries in other cultural sub-regions. Furthermore, additional regression results using cultural
dimensions rather than cultural sub-regions show that female representation is higher in countries
where people have more acceptance for unequal distribution of power. This finding is consis-
tent with the lower female representation observed in Nordic countries, countries that have lower
tolerance about unequal power distribution (Hofstede 2001).
By shedding light on gender observations for financial analysts working in Europe, I expand
the existing literature about gender concerns in the business area into the world of financial an-
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alysts in countries other than the United States. My research findings contribute to the growing
body of research in finance that addresses the gender issue in different areas such as corporate
boardroom directors (Burgess and Tharenou 2002; Farrell and Hersch 2005; Adams and Ferreira
2009). Furthermore, I also complement the research about female financial analysts by focusing
on European countries and their cultural specific features. The analysis of the impact of national
culture on gender diversity adds to the culture and business literatures by introducing national
culture as an important country-level factor in financial research in an international setting.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the existing literature
about gender issues and the implication of national culture in the finance field. The data and
research methodology are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 provides descriptive statistics for
female European financial analysts at both country and industry levels. Section 5 displays the
main results about the impacts of national culture on gender diversity in the European financial
analysis industry. The final section contains conclusions and discussions.
2.2 Prior Literature
Only a few studies examine gender concerns among financial analysts. Notable exceptions are
Green, Jegadeesh, and Tang (2009), Kumar (2010), Li et al. (2013), and Bosquet, Goeij, and
Smedts (2014) which investigate the gender difference among financial analysts in the U.S. con-
text. Our main research question aims to determine whether and how national culture influences
gender diversity among financial analysts in an international setting. In this section I present a
synthesis of the extant literature on the influence of national culture on finance and accounting
systems.
Hofstede (2001) defines culture as the collective mental programming that leads to patterned
ways of thinking, feeling and acting and that "distinguishes the members of one category of people
from those of another". National culture influences economic activities both by conditioning for-
mal institutions and by shaping human actors’ incentives and subjective perceptions of the external
world (Zheng et al. 2012). In addition, national culture also shapes the way human actors react to
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the institutions that are in place or are being shaped around them (Aggarwal and Goodell 2014).
The economic relevance of national culture has been highlighted by researchers in business and
corporate management. In the field of accounting and finance, several studies investigate the role
and impacts of cultural dimensions, given that national cultural dimensions can provide additional
perspectives on financial and accounting research concerns (Aggarwal and Goodell 2014).
Hofstede (2001) defines five key dimensions to characterize national culture, namely power
distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism v.s. collectivism, masculinity v.s. femininity, and
long-term v.s. short-term orientation. These dimensions capture different attributes of national
culture. Each of these cultural dimensions is defined extensively in Appendix A. Power dis-
tance refers to the extent to which the less powerful members of institutions and organizations
within a country expect and accept that power is distributed unequally. Uncertainty avoidance
pertains to the stress perceived by people who are in uncertain or unknown situation. Individual-
ism/Collectivism refers to the patterns of inter-personal links shared by the members of a society.
Masculinity/Femininity refers to the extent to which the emotional gender roles are distinct. Long-
term/Short-term orientation stands for the preference of fostering virtues oriented towards future
or towards past. Long-term/short-term orientation accounts mainly for the difference between ori-
ental and occidental countries. Asian countries have the highest scores for long-term orientation.
Using these cultural dimensions, Hofstede (2001) divides nations into sub-regions based on
similarities in national cultural profiles. He defines five country clusters in Europe labeled Anglo,
Germanic, Latin, Near Eastern and Nordic. Anglo includes Ireland, United Kingdom; Germanic
refers to Austria, Germany, and Switzerland; Latin stands for Belgium, France, Italy, Portugal, and
Spain; Near Eastern includes Greece; Nordic represents Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, Norway,
and Sweden. Nordic countries tend to have a lower power distance than other countries. Anglo
and Nordic nations have a stronger attachment to individualism. Latin countries express a greater
intolerance towards changes and uncertainty. Nordic countries have the most feminist cultures.
Recent studies provide evidence on the impact of national cultural on diverse issues in the
accounting and finance field. Kanagaretnam, Lim, and Lobo (2011) indicate that cultures that
encourage higher risk-taking experienced more bank troubles in the form of larger losses or larger
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loan loss provisions. Han et al. (2010) find that uncertainty avoidance and individualism explain
managers’ earnings discretion across countries. Shao, Kwok, and Zhang (2013) show that firms
in individualistic countries invest more in long-term (risky) than in short-term (safe) assets. In
this paper, I investigate whether national culture can explain the cross-country variation in female
representation among financial analysts.
2.3 Data and Research Design
This study is based on recommendations issued by European analysts, i.e. analysts located in the
28 European countries under study; namely, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithua-
nia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom. Countries outside the European Union, such as
Switzerland, Norway and Russia, have been included in the research sample because, first, they
belong to the same economic region, second, their inclusion in the sample increases the cultural
variety at country level.
Analysts’ stock recommendations are collected from the I/B/E/S database of Thomson Finan-
cial. Useful data are composed of 1) the International Securities Identification Number (hereafter,
ISIN) code of targeted firms, 2) the date when the recommendations were issued (Recommenda-
tion date), 3) the level of recommendations1, 4) the identification code of the analyst who issued
the stock recommendation and 5) the identification code of the broker for which the analyst works.
The data cover a eight-year period from January 2006 to December 2013. The beginning
of the sample period is coincident with the date when the European Union countries finished
transposing the Market Abuse Directive (generally referred to as MAD) into their local legislation
(Dubois, Fresard, and Dumontier 2014). The Market Abuse Directive (Directive 2003/6/EC),
hereafter MAD, adopted in 2003 by the European Commission to curb insider dealing and market
manipulation states that
1A five-level recommendation scale is adopted by I/B/E/S: namely, Strong Buy, Buy, Hold, Underperform, and Sell.
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“The identity of the producer of investment recommendations, his conduct of busi-
ness rules and the identity of his competent authority should be disclosed, since it may
be a valuable piece of information for investors to consider in relation to their invest-
ment decisions.”
Since the implementation of MAD, analysts are therefore required to disclose their identification,
i.e. first name and last name, when publishing their reports, which makes our study feasible.
Since I/B/E/S does not provide information about the analyst’s gender, gender is identified by
the analyst’s first name. However the I/B/E/S database only provides a brief identity code for each
analyst, which is composed of the analyst’s last name and the initial letter of his/her first name.
For example, an analyst named “Joe Black" is coded as “J Black" in the I/B/E/S database. Thus,
complementary information about analysts’ complete first name and their workplace (at the coun-
try level) is obtained from the official website of Thomson One2. Thomson One provides more
detailed and thorougher information about analysts from whom it collects financial data. Analyst
first name, last name, employer, workplace, contact coordinates can all be found in the website.
After merging the recommendation data from I/B/E/S with data about analyst identities, I deter-
mine the gender of each analyst in the database using a list of 22,345 unique first names3. Thus
according to the outcome of gender identification, analysts are separated into three categories:
male, female and undefined. Some analyst’s gender is undefinable due to the following facts: 1)
unisex first name, some first names, such as “Alex", could be used as a first name for both male
and female; 2) duplicate last name and first initial, there are more than one analyst identification
that could be matched with an analyst identity code, for example, “Julia Smith" and “John Smith"
could both be abbreviated as “J Smith"; or 3) undisclosed analyst code: some analyst identity
codes are deliberately veiled by the data provider and thus turn out to be “Undisclosed" during the
data collection.
The final sample consists of 3 579 analysts from 28 European countries. They have issued
2www.thomsonone.com
3The data mainly come from in the following sites: www.behindthename.com/, www.babynameindex.com/,
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Masculine_given_names, and en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:
Feminine_given_names
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a total of 125 908 recommendations for 10 676 companies around the world over the eight-year
period under study (2006-2013).
Following prior research on the economic relevance of national culture, I use two approaches
to investigate how national culture affects gender observation among financial analysts in Euro-
pean countries. First, I test whether the percentages of female financial analysts per country are
different across different cultural sub-regions defined by Hofstede (2001). Second, I test whether
national culture affect female representation at both the analyst level and recommendation level.
To investigate whether the proportion of female analysts differs across cultural sub-regions, I esti-
mate the following model at country level:
GenderObservationi,t = α0+
5
∑
i=1
βiSubRegionsi+α2dFemaleIn fi
+α3(
Rec
Firm
)i,t +α4In f luReci,t +α5FemaleIn f lui,t
+α6(
MarketCap
GDP
)i,t +α7IndustryMi,t +α8IndustryFi,t
+α9Und f Analyst+α10LocalBrokeri,t
+Year Fixed Effects+ εi,t (2.1)
Dependent variable: The measurement for gender diversity is successively the proportion of
female analysts in a given country i for year t (FemAnalyst%i,t) and the proportion of recommen-
dations issued by female analysts in a given country i for year t (FemRec%i,t).
Independent variables of interest: I identify sources of differences in gender observations
among financial analysts across European countries that are related to national culture. They
are captured by the five cultural sub-regions of Hofstede (2001), i.e., Anglo, Germanic, Latin,
Near Eastern, Nordic. Anglo includes Ireland, United Kingdom; Germanic refers to Austria,
Germany, and Switzerland; Latin stands for Belgium, France, Italy, Portugal, and Spain; Near
Eastern includes Greece; Nordic represents Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden.
I create a dummy for each of the five subregions. The dummy variable Anglo is set to one for a
country labelled as anglo countries, idem for dummy variables of other cultural sub-regions.
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Independent control variables: Gender diversity in the financial analysis industry may also
be affected by factors other than national cultures. Hereafter are discussed three factors that are
considered to be influential to female representations among financial analysts, namely, the im-
portance of capital markets, the importance of financial analysts, and the industrial preferences of
financial analysts.
First, the activity of financial analysts is closely linked to stock markets. Therefore, the size of
capital markets may affect the demand for financial analysis. The proxy used for the importance
of capital markets, MarketCap/GDPi,t , is calculated as the ratio of total market capitalization of
all listed firms over GDP for country i in year t.
Besides, the characteristics of the financial analysis industry in a given country may also affect
the gender diversity among financial analysts in this country. The importance of financial analysts
in the financial market is measured by two proxies. First, I assume that the usefulness and there-
fore importance of financial analysts increases with the number of recommendations they issue.
The quantity of recommendations issued by financial analysts, Rec/Firmi,t , is the number of rec-
ommendations issued by analysts in country i divided by the number of listed firms in country i
during year t. Next, I assume that the usefulness of analysts depends on how influential to stock
markets they are. The quality of recommendations is used to capture the analysts’ importance.
In f luReci,t measures the percentage of influential recommendations issued by financial analysts
of country i in year t. f emaleIn f lui, t measures the percentage of influential recommendations
issued by female analysts of country i in year t. Following Loh and Stulz (2011), I use a standard
event-study methodology to identify influential recommendations. Daily stock prices are collected
from Thomson One. The event window includes the day an analyst issues a recommendation, as
reported by I/B/E/S, and the day that follows. A recommendation is classified as influential if it
triggers a two-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR) in the event window that is in the correct di-
rection of recommendation change, and statistically significant. Following the existing literature, I
define CARi =
0
∏
t=−1
(1+ARit)−1, where ARit is the daily abnormal return estimated by the market
model. The estimation period for the market model parameters covers the three months prior to the
recommendation announcement date. I check whether the CAR accords with the direction of the
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associated recommendation change, i.e. a positive (negative) CAR is associated with an upgrade
(downgrade) in recommendation levels. I also check whether the CAR is statistically significant.
According to the central limit theorem, the mean value of a random sample follows the normal
distribution N ∼ (µ,σ/√n), where µ is the population mean, σ is the population standard devi-
ation and n is the number of observations in the random sample. Therefore, the mean abnormal
returns in the two-day time window around the recommendation date, AR, follows the normal dis-
tribution with µ that equals the population mean of daily abnormal returns and σ that equals the
standard deviation of daily abnormal returns. I use the idiosyncratic volatility, σε , to calculate the
standard deviation of daily abnormal return. This is the standard deviation of the residuals from a
daily time-series regression of firm returns against market returns for the estimation period. The
critical value at the 0.95 confidence level is 1.96 for the standard normal distribution. Under the
null hypothesis that µ = 0, the hypothesis is rejected at the 0.95 confidence level if
|AR|> 1.96×σε ÷
√
2
The
√
2 accounts for the fact that AR is a two-day mean abnormal return. Therefore, the two-day
CAR is statistically significant if
|CAR|> 1.96×σε ÷
√
2×2
which can be simplified as follows,
|CAR|> 1.96×σε ×
√
2
The industrial preferences of financial analysts affect their choice of covered firms. Constrained
by information availability, financial analysts tend to cover firms that share certain commonali-
ties. Thus they tend to be sector specialized (Kini et al. 2009; Salva and Sonney 2010). Kumar
(2010) suggests that female analysts concentrate in certain industries while keeping distance from
others. Thus, countries with more industries favored by female analysts should exhibit a higher
female representation among financial analysts. The proxy IndustryFi,t measures the percentage
of firms in the five industries where female representation in financial analysts is the highest for
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country i in year t. IndustryMi,t refers to the percentage of firms in the five industries where male
representation in financial analysts is the highest for country i in year t.
I control for year fixed effects and for the percentage of undefined analysts, UndAnalysti,t ,
which refers to the percentage of analysts whose gender cannot be determined for country i in
year t. I also control for the internationalization of brokerage houses. LocalBrokeri,t refers to the
percentage of recommendations issued by analysts working in a local brokerage house in country
i and year t. I exclude observations for countries with less than 1% of the financial analysts in the
sample.
To test whether national culture affect female representation among financial analysts at indi-
vidual level and recommendation level respectively, I use the following probit model:
Femalei/FemReci = γ0+
5
∑
i=1
δiSubRegioni+ γ2NbReci,t
+ γ3(BrokerSize)i,t + γ4NbFirmFoli,t
+ γ5(
MarketCap
GDP
)i,t + γ6NbCountryi,t + γ7In f lCARpi,t
+ γ8AnalystExpGi,t +Year Fixed Effects+ εi,t (2.2)
where the dependent variable is either Female or FemRec. Female is a dummy variable equal to one
if an analyst is identified to be female, zero otherwise. FemRec is a dummy variable equal to one
if a stock recommendation is issued by a female analyst, zero otherwise. The variables of interests
are the five dummy variables characterizing the cultural sub-regions, i.e., Anglo, Germanic, Latin,
Near Eastern, and Nordic.
I include several analyst-specific variables as control variables in Equation (2), but I do not of-
fer directional prediction on their coefficients. First, I control for the number of recommendations
issued by an analyst (NbRec), which is a proxy for the analyst’s workload. I use the number of
companies covered by an analyst (NbFirmFol) as another proxy for the analyst’s workload. Prior
literature documents an association between analyst job performance and geographic distance be-
tween analysts and covered companies. Following this stream of research, I control for the number
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of countries in which followed firms are located (NbCountry). The potential gender difference in
terms of analyst credibility is also taken into account. I include the percentage of influential recom-
mendations issued by an analyst (InflCARp) into the regression model as an additional variable.
Analyst’s general experience (AnalystExpG) is another important personal attribute of financial
analysts, which is measured by the number of years between the recommendation announcement
date and the date when the analyst issues his/her first recommendation recorded by I/B/E/S. Green,
Jegadeesh, and Tang (2009) find that female analysts are more likely than men to work at large
brokerages. Therefore, I control for the size of brokerage house where the analyst works (Broker-
Size), which is measured by the number of analysts working in a given brokerage house in a given
year. The size of capital market at country level ( MarketCapGDP ) may also affect female representation
among financial analysts. Finally, I control for the year fixed effects when estimating the probit
model at stock recommendations level and at analyst level at well.
A common approach in empirical research is to model dichotomous variables (y∈ [0,1]) using
a generalized linear model (GLM) with a binomial distribution, either a logistic (logit) distribution
or a standard normal cumulative (probit) distribution. The advantage of this approach is that it
restricts the predicted dependent variable to range between zero and one, unlike ordinary least
squares regression (OLS). Here, I estimate coefficients using the probit model. A major differ-
ence between the GLM approach and the ordinary least square approach is that the estimated
coefficients do not provide marginal effects, as in OLS, but multiplicative effects. Fortunately,
transforming these coefficients into marginal effects is a reasonably straightforward procedure.
I use the average of the sample marginal effects to proxy for marginal effects from our binary
dependent variable models. The average of the sample marginal effects is calculated as follows:
∂y
∂xk
= βk×
∑ni=0 g
(
XT βˆ
)
n
(2.3)
where n is the number of observations in the dataset and g is the probability density function for the
normal distribution. The marginal effect for continuous (dummy) explanatory variables represents
the change in the predicted probability when the independent variable changes by one standard
deviation (changes from zero to one).
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The residuals from the regression models may be serially correlated. I therefore use OLS/probit
regressions with clustered robust errors to account for serial correlations. For all tests, I report the
clustered standard errors after correcting for serial correlation in the residuals at country level. To
mitigate the influence of extreme values, I winsorize all the variables at 0.01 level. For the multi-
variate tests, I eliminate the observations if 1) they are issued by analysts who issue less than ten
recommendations in a given year, 2) they are for firms covered by less than ten analysts in a given
year.
2.4 Breakdown of Female Representation in Europe
Based on the above-mentioned sample, discussion about gender composition and recommendation
style for European analysts is presented in detail in this section. The statistics based on stock
recommendations indicate that female financial analysts are much less represented than their male
counterparts. 78.35% of the 3 579 European analysts included in the sample period (2006-2013)
are male analysts. On average, for the eight years under consideration, 16.15% of all the identified
European analysts are female, which is comparable to the proportion documented in the United
States: 15.6% for Green, Jegadeesh, and Tang (2009) from 1995 to 2005 and 16.03% for Kumar
(2010) from 1983 to 2005. Between 2006 and 2013, 125 908 recommendations have been issued
by European analysts for 10 676 firms. However, among the 10 676 firms, only 2 501 of them
have been covered by both male and female European analysts, representing roughly 23% of all
firms.
〈 Insert Table 2.1 about here 〉
Table 2.1 suggests4 that the 2 804 male analysts from the European countries issued 101 442
recommendations for 9 217 firms, which reflects an average of 36.46 recommendations per male
analyst. In contrast, the 578 female financial analysts issued 18 386 recommendations on 3 282
firms. On average, female analysts produced each 31.98 recommendations only. A closer look at
4All tables are presented at the end of the chapter to allow for easier reading.
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the stocks for which analysts provide recommendations indicates that, on average, female analysts
issued 3.40 recommendations per firm, which is roughly the same as the number of recommen-
dations per firm recorded for their male counterparts: 3.45 recommendations per firm. Finally, at
the individual level, female analysts followed less firms than male analysts: on average, nine firms
were covered by each female analyst, compared to ten firms per male analyst.
2.4.1 Variations across Countries
In order to clarify the country-level comparisons, all countries with less than 1% of all financial
analysts are grouped into one category labeled as “others". These countries include Bulgaria,
Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Ireland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Portugal,
Romania, and Slovenia. Table 2.1 provides summary statistics for analysts and analysts’ recom-
mendations across European countries. In terms of gender composition, an average of 16.15%
is observed for women financial analysts across the 28 European countries with a remarkable
country-level variation. The proportion of female analysts reaches 40.00% for Italy, which is the
highest record among the European countries under study. In contrast, the lowest proportion of
women figures is recorded in Denmark, 4.14%. Countries in Northern Europe do not report a
high proportion of women analysts: Denmark, Norway and Switzerland all have a proportion of
female financial analysts lower than the average one, with the exception of Finland, where women
financial analysts occupy more than one-fifth of the positions. Regarding stock recommendations,
women analysts issued only 14.6% of all recommendations, which is relatively low compared to
their representation among European financial analysts (16.15%). This suggests that each female
analyst issued on average fewer recommendations relative to each male analyst. However, France
is an interesting exception, since French female analysts have on average issued more recommen-
dations than male analysts. The standard deviation for both the proportion of female analysts
and the proportion of recommendations issued by female analysts are high, 9.39% and 10.11%
respectively, which suggests a high volatility in gender observation across countries.
Further, I investigate the difference between the two genders with regard to the financial an-
alyst’s workload, i.e., the number of stocks followed per capita, the number of recommendations
42 Chapter 2
issued per capita, and the number of recommendations issued for each covered company. Table 2.2
shows that the difference between genders is the largest in Belgium, where, on average, one male
analyst followed 4 more companies than a female analyst. The largest difference in the number
of recommendations per capita is also observed in Belgium: each male analyst in Belgium issued
twice more recommendations than each female. In contrast, in France, each female analysts is-
sued significantly more recommendations compared to their male counterparts, consistent with
the findings of Table 2.2 which show that the proportion of recommendations issued by French
female analysts is higher that that of French male analysts. The findings also suggest that in coun-
tries such as Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Netherlands, Switzerland, and United
Kingdom, female analysts issued less recommendations per stock than male analysts. According
to the t-tests, the differences are all significant at the 0.01 level. Nonetheless, in Germany, male
analysts issued significantly less recommendations per stock than women. Furthermore, in Italy,
female analysts are those who have issued the highest number of recommendations for the compa-
nies they followed compared to female analysts from other European countries. In Finland, male
analysts had the highest recommendations per stock ratio.
〈 Insert Table 2.2 about here 〉
2.4.2 Evolution across Years
Table 2.3 describes the evolution of gender observations among European financial analysts over
the sample period. First, from the full sample, I find that despite a remarkable decline in the num-
ber of analysts after the peak observed in 2011, women representation reaps a steady increase from
14.66% in 2007 to 16.26% in 2012. Regarding stock recommendations, after a steady increase
recorded from 2006 to 2008, I notice a dramatic decline of more than 13% in the number of stock
recommendations in 2009. This is probably due to the 2008 financial crisis. Accordingly, the
proportion of recommendations issued by female also declined from 14.54% in 2008 to 13.53%
in 2009. However, in the subsequent year, the proportion of their recommendations enjoyed a
promising increase. In 2013, 15.47% of all the recommendations were issued by women, slightly
lower than the proportion recorded in 2012 (15.71%).
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〈 Insert Table 2.3 about here 〉
Data from the restricted sample with only active analysts and firms are given in Panel B of Ta-
ble 2.3. The percentage of female analysts peaked in 2008 (16.15%) before a three-year decrease.
Despite the recent rebound observed in 2011-2012, women representation declined again in 2013.
In terms of percentage of recommendations issued by female analysts, a remarkable decline can
be observed in 2013 subsequent to a peak in 2011 and 2012, when female analysts issued more
than eighteen percent of all the recommendations.
2.4.3 Industrial Preference
Because of the complexity in getting information and understanding benchmarks for firms in dif-
ferent economic sectors, financial analysts are often specialized in specific economic sectors. In
accordance with analysts’ industrial specialization, extant literature confirms a negative relation-
ship between the number of industries followed by an analyst and the analyst’s performance as
captured by earning forecast accuracy or recommendation profitability, e.g. Clement (1999) and
Salva and Sonney (2010). With regard to gender differences in industrial specialization, Kumar
(2010) documents that the distribution of female analysts in different market segments is not ran-
dom. Female analysts in the U.S. are concentrated in economic sectors such as retail and clothing.
I analyze the gender composition of financial analysts working for each market segment to ex-
amine whether female analysts in Europe have a preference for certain economic sectors. The
classification is based on two-digit SICs and I categorize companies according to the 48 Fama
and French industry list (Fama and French 1997). The p-values from chi-square tests suggest that
neither male nor female analysts are equally distributed in the listed industries.
〈 Insert Table 2.4 about here 〉
Results in Table 2.4 suggest that despite the fact that women analysts cover all industries,
they are concentrated in specific sectors categorized as “Apparel", “Restaurants, Hotels, Motels",
“Food Products". In these industries, female financial analysts represent more than one-fifth of all
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the analysts covering the industry. In contrast, for “Rubber and Plastic Products" and “Electrical
Equipment"industry, women figures are relatively under-represented: less than 10% of analysts
working in these market segments are female.
2.4.4 Statistics for Cultural Sub-regions
Sub-regions that differ in their cultural profiles also differ systematically in gender diversity among
financial analysts. After grouping European countries into homogeneous cultural sub-regions us-
ing the Hofstede cultural model (see Table 2.5), I find that Latin countries, which include Bel-
gium, France, Italy, Portugal and Spain, record the highest proportion of female analysts (24.31%),
whereas Germanic countries (i.e. Austria, Germany, and Switzerland) have the lowest. Contrary
to the common sense of highly achieved gender equality in Nordic countries, these nations have
the second lowest percentage of female analysts. Regarding statistics for stock recommendations,
although most recommendations are issued by analysts working in Anglo countries (i.e. Ireland
and United Kingdom), the highest proportion of recommendations issued by female analysts is
recorded in Latin countries (26.27%), consistent with the results for the proportion of female ana-
lysts.
〈 Insert Table 2.5 about here 〉
The statistics for the comparisons among different cultural sub-regions suggest that the dif-
ferences in female representation among financial analysts across sub-regions are statistically
significant. With regard to the proportion of female financial analysts, the results of the Pear-
son’s chi-squared tests (See Panel A of Table 2.6) reveal that Latin countries have significantly
more female financial analysts than Anglo, Germanic and Nordic countries. Regarding the rec-
ommendations issued by female financial analysts (See Panel B in Table 2.6), the proportion of
stock recommendations issued by female analysts in Latin countries is significantly higher than
in countries classified in the other four cultural sub-regions: Anglo, Germanic, Near Eastern and
Nordic countries, consistent with the results observed for the proportion of female analysts in each
sub-region. The Pearson’s chi-squared tests suggest that the differences among the five cultural
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sub-regions are highly significant.
〈 Insert Table 2.6 about here 〉
Finally, I compare the situation of 2006 with that of 2013 in order to shed light on the variation
over time. The comparison for analysts in the Hofstede’s cultural sub-regions between 2006 and
2013 is presented in the Panel A of Table 2.8. I observe an increase in the number of financial
analysts from 2006 to 2013 in Anglo and Nordic countries only. Regarding the proportion of
female financial analysts, Anglo and Germanic countries show an increase while the proportion
of female analysts has dramatically declined in Near Eastern countries and Nordic countries, from
26.92% to 4.76% and from 13.36% to 7.92%, respectively.
〈 Insert Table 2.8 about here 〉
In addition, by comparing the recommendations issued by financial analysts between 2006
and 2013 (See Panel B in Table 2.8), I find that all cultural sub-regions, especially Germanic
countries, have suffered from a decline in the number of stock recommendations made by financial
analysts, except Nordic countries where the number of recommendations increased dramatically
from 1 771 analysts in 2006 to 2 066 analysts in 2013. As for the proportion of recommendations
issued by female financial analysts, Germanic and Latin countries enjoyed a remarkable increase
over the sample period. Anglo countries did not benefit from their increase in the proportion of
female analysts from 2006 to 2013: the proportion of recommendations issued by female has
declined from 12.87% to 10.84% in 2013. For the other countries, a shrink in the proportion of
recommendations issued by female analysts is also documented for both Near Eastern and Nordic
countries, which is probably due to the sharp decline in female representation among financial
analysts.
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2.5 Impacts of Culture on Female Representation among Financial
Analysts
2.5.1 Summary Statistics of the Variables in the Regressions
Table 2.10 presents descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables for the re-
gression model. The average proportion of female analysts is 17.6% and female analysts issued
16.3% of all recommendations in the regression sample. This observation is similar to the results
obtained by Green, Jegadeesh, and Tang (2009) and Kumar (2010) in the United States. The per-
centage of analysts for whom I did not manage to identify his/her gender remains modest for all
the country-year observations: the average percentage of analysts with undefined gender is 2.7%.
In all, 5.3% of firms belongs to industries favored by female analysts, while firms in masculine
industries account for 3.4% of all firms in our sample. On average, only 7.3% of all stock rec-
ommendations are influential because of a statistically significant two-day cumulative abnormal
return around the recommendation issue date. About 42.3% of brokerage houses employ only lo-
cal financial analysts. Financial analysts issue on average three recommendations per year for the
publicly-listed companies. The size of capital markets in European countries on average represents
64.7% of the GDP value.
〈 Insert Table 2.10 about here 〉
2.5.2 Regression Results of Cultural Sub-regions
In this section, I discuss the regression results for the Hofstede cultural sub-regions.
Regression results at country level: Table 2.11 provides the regression results for the differ-
ence in gender diversity among financial analysts across cultural sub-regions. In the first speci-
fication, the dependent variable is the percentage of female analysts (FemAnalyst%) (columns 1
and 2). The percentage of recommendations issued by female analysts (FemRec%) is used as de-
pendent variable for the second specification (columns 3 and 4). To study the incremental effect of
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cultural sub-regions on female representation, I include the five dummy variables for five cultural
sub-regions in column 2 and 4, in addition to the variables presented in the partial models. The
effect related to countries not categorized into either of the five Hofstede sub-regions (labeled as
“unclassified") is captured in the intercept. It is worth noticing that the adjusted R2 is higher for
regression models with the sub-region variables (in columns 2 and 4), suggesting that the Hofstede
sub-regions have a strong explanatory power for the proportion of female analysts and for the pro-
portion of recommendations issued by female analysts as well. The adjusted R2s for regressions
of female analysts increase from 0.225 to 0.416 depending on whether the dummy variables for
sub-regions are included in the regression models or not. In the same vein, the adjusted R2s for
regressions of recommendations issued by female analysts increase from 0.165 (when the dummy
variables for sub-regions are omitted) to 0.363 (when I include the sub-region dummies into the
regression model).
Regarding the dummy variables for cultural sub-regions, the model specification of column
2 shows that the coefficients for Germanic and Nordic are significantly negative. This indicates
that countries in Germanic and Nordic have less female representation among financial analysts.
The comparison of coefficients presented in Panel B confirms the difference across sub-regions.
Nordic and Germanic countries have the least percentage of female analysts. Other factors hold
constant, the percentages of female equity analysts in Nordic countries are 9% less than Anglo
countries, 15% less than Latin countries, and 12% less than Near Eastern countries.
〈 Insert Table 2.11 about here 〉
Column 3 and 4 present the regression results using an alternative measurement of gender di-
versity, i.e. the percentage of recommendations issued by female analysts (FemRec%). The results
for cultural sub-regions are consistent with those from regressions for FemAnalyst%. The compari-
son of coefficients suggest that the percentage of stock recommendations issued by female analysts
are significantly lower in Nordic and Germanic countries (See Panel C of Table 2.11 for detail).
The proportion of recommendations issued by female analysts in Latin countries is 0.17 higher
than that of Nordic countries. In the same vein, I find that the proportion of recommendations
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issued by female analysts in Near Eastern countries is 0.11 higher than that of Nordic countries.
The F-tests suggest that the difference between the coefficients are statistically significant.
The coefficient estimates of the percentage of influential recommendations (InfluRec) is sig-
nificantly negative. The cumulative abnormal returns around the recommendation issue date is
commonly used to proxy for the influence of financial analysts. Given the fact that the variable
InfluRec measures the proportion of recommendations that triggered a statistically significant two-
day cumulative abnormal return, this result suggests that there are more female analysts in coun-
tries where investors attach less importance to the analysts’ opinion. Countries where financial
analysts exert less influence on capital market have more female figures among financial analysts.
In contrast, the coefficients for the variable that measures the influence of female analysts are
significantly positive across the four model specifications, indicating that there are more female
analysts in countries where female analysts are more influential to the market.
The coefficient on the percentage of recommendations issued by analysts working in a local
brokerage house LocalBroker is insignificant at conventional levels, suggesting that the interna-
tionalization of brokerage houses exerts no influence on the female representation among financial
analysts. In contrast, analysts’ workload is an important characteristic. The coefficients on the
numbers of recommendations issued per listed firms (Rec/Firm) are constantly positive at conven-
tional levels of significance. This suggests that female representation among financial analysts is
higher in countries where financial analysts are more active in issuing stock recommendations.
Regression results at analyst level: I report the probit regression results for female analysts
at analyst level in Table 2.12. The probit model is estimated with a dummy variable Female as
dependent variable, which is equal to one if the analyst is a woman, zero otherwise. The regression
results are presented in the first two columns for partial models. The estimated coefficients and the
marginal effects for full models are reported in Column (3) and (4). The coefficient for Germanic
is significantly negative. In contrast, the estimated coefficient for Latin is significantly positive.
〈 Insert Table 2.12 about here 〉
Panel B of Table 2.12 presents the comparison of coefficients for the five cultural dimensions.
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The results suggest that in Germanic countries the probability of being a female financial analysts
is the lowest, although the difference between Nordic countries and Germanic countries is weak.
Regression results at recommendation level: The results for probit model with FemRec as
the dependent variable confirm the findings obtained from probit model at analyst level (See Table
2.13 for detail). The probability of a recommendation issued by a woman is significantly lower in
Nordic and Germanic countries. Further, the marginal effects of the independent variable NbRec
is significantly positive, suggesting that female analysts issue more recommendations for covered
firms, compared to their male counterparts. Also, BrokerSize has a significant positive marginal
effect on the likelihood of a recommendation issued by a female analyst, indicating that stock
recommendations from larger brokerage houses are more likely to be issued by female analysts.
〈 Insert Table 2.13 about here 〉
The comparison of coefficients for cultural sub-regions are reported in Panel B of Table 2.13.
The F-tests confirm that the coefficients for Germanic and Nordic countries are significantly lower
than other countries, suggesting that stock recommendations are less likely to be issued by female
analysts in Germanic and Nordic countries.
Taken together, the analyses in Tables 2.11, 2.12, 2.13 suggest that gender diversity among
financial analysts are heterogeneous across cultural sub-regions. I observe the least female rep-
resentation among financial analysts in Germanic and Nordic countries, where national culture is
characterized by lower power distance (Hofstede 2001), after controlling for other related factors.
2.6 Additional Tests with Cultural Dimensions
To clarify the impact of cultural sub-regions on gender diversity among financial analysts, I per-
form a number of additional analyses to complement the results obtained from regressions with the
cultural sub-regions defined by Hofstede (2001). I replace the cultural sub-regions by the scores of
the four cultural dimensions used by Hofstede (2001) to form the cultural sub-regions, i.e, power
distance, individualism, masculinity, and uncertainty avoidance. These dimensions capture dif-
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ferent attributes of national culture. Each of these cultural dimensions is defined extensively in
appendix A. Power distance refers to the extent to which the less powerful members of institu-
tions and organizations within a country expect and accept that power is distributed unequally.
Uncertainty avoidance pertains to the stress perceived by people who are in uncertain or unknown
situation. Individualism v.s. Collectivism refers to the patterns of inter-personal links shared by
the members of a society. Masculinity v.s. Femininity refers to the extent to which the emo-
tional gender roles are distinct. Long-term v.s. Short-term orientation stands for the preference
of fostering virtues oriented towards future or towards past. Long-term v.s. short-term orientation
accounts mainly for the difference between oriental and occidental countries. Therefore, I omit the
long-term orientation dimension because this dimension is mainly used to capture national culture
differences between oriental and occidental countries. The countries under study are all European
countries. They are, therefore, all short-term oriented.
First, I perform OLS regressions at country level to examine the impact of each cultural di-
mension on the percentage of female analysts and percentage of stock recommendations issued by
female analysts per country.
GenderObservationi,t = α0+
4
∑
i=1
βiCDsi+α2dFemaleIn fi
+α3(
Rec
Firm
)i,t +α4In f luReci,t +α5FemaleIn f lui,t
+α6(
MarketCap
GDP
)i,t +α7IndustryMi,t +α8IndustryFi,t
+α9Und f Analyst+α10LocalBrokeri,t
+Year Fixed Effects+ εi,t (2.4)
where CDsi includes the scores of the four cultural dimensions (PDIs for power distance, IDVs
for individualism, MASs for masculinity, and UAIs for uncertainty avoidance).
Regressions results of cultural dimensions at country level are presented in Table 2.14. The
regression results with the scores of the four cultural dimensions are reported in column 2 and
column 4. The adjusted R2 of the regression models with cultural dimensions highly increases
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compared to the adjusted R2 of the partial models. The estimated coefficients for power distance
score (PDIs) is 0.2%. The regression results at country level suggest that female representations
among financial analysts increase with the score of power distance. Power distance measures
culture’s tolerance toward unequal power distribution. The findings suggests that female analysts
are more represented in countries where social members accept more the inequalities between
individuals.
The results from cultural dimensions are also consistent with the previous regression results
obtained from cultural sub-regions. Hofstede (2001) characterizes Nordic countries as those with
lower scores of power distance. Therefore, the lower female representations of financial analysts
in countries with lower scores of power distance is consistent with the previous findings which
suggest that Nordic countries have a significantly lower female representation among financial
analysts, all things being equal.
〈 Insert Table 2.14 about here 〉
Next, I investigate the impact of the Hofstede cultural dimensions on gender diversity among
financial analysts at stock recommendation level and analyst level as well using the probit model.
Femalei/FemReci = γ0+
4
∑
i=1
δiCDi+ γ2NbReci,t
+ γ3(BrokerSize)i,t + γ4NbFirmFoli,t
+ γ5(
MarketCap
GDP
)i,t + γ6NbCountryi,t + γ7In f lCARpi,t
+ γ8AnalystExpGi,t +Year Fixed Effects+ εi,t (2.5)
In the first model specification, the dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals one
if the stock recommendation is issued by a female analyst (FemRec). In the second specification,
I use as dependent variable a dummy variable that is equal to one if the analyst is identified as
a woman. The results of probit models at both levels are presented in Table 2.15. The power
distance dimension has a positive marginal effect that remains significant at 0.05 level. The results
indicate that in countries with higher power distance, stock recommendations are more likely
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to be issued by a female analyst and the probability of financial analysts being women is also
higher. Other cultural dimensions i.e., individualism, masculinity and uncertainty avoidance do
not exert significant marginal effect on the likelihood of a stock recommendation being issued by
female analysts or on the likelihood of a financial analyst being female. The findings from probit
regressions confirm the results from OLS regressions at country level.
〈 Insert Table 2.15 about here 〉
The full models at individual levels (column 2 and 4 of Table 2.15) also suggest that female
financial analysts issue more stock recommendations. Meanwhile, women analysts cover less
companies compared to their male counterparts, consistent with the findings provided by Green,
Jegadeesh, and Tang (2009).
Overall, regression results with the Hofstede cultural dimensions are largely consistent with
regression results of Hofstede cultural sub-regions, which suggest that Nordic countries have lower
female representation among financial analysts because of their lower tolerance toward unequal
power distribution.
2.7 Conclusions and Discussions
The primary goal of this study is to assess whether and how national culture influences female rep-
resentations among financial analysts. As such, this study sheds light on gender diversity among
financial analysts. It also complements the literature on the effect of national culture on financial
characteristics (Kanagaretnam, Lim, and Lobo 2011; Han et al. 2010). The empirical studies about
female financial analysts are limited to the U.S. context. Green, Jegadeesh, and Tang (2009) docu-
ment female representation among financial analysts of 15.6% in the United States. Kumar (2010)
and Li et al. (2013) confirm such female under-representation among American financial analysts.
However, the gender issue for financial analysts outside United States remains unexplored. Moti-
vated by the work of Aggarwal and Goodell (2014), I investigate the influence of national culture
on female representation among financial analysts in European countries.
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I conduct main analyses using a sample of financial analysts working in European countries
over the period 2006-2013. I first provide descriptive statistics for female financial analysts work-
ing in European countries. I provide evidence suggesting that female analysts are constantly
under-represented across Europe during the sample period. Female representation only enjoyed a
moderate increase over the period under study. My findings confirms a across-country variation in
female representation among financial analysts. Besides, female financial analysts are more likely
to cover companies in specific economic sectors such as “Apparel", “Restaurants, Hotels, Mo-
tels", “Food Products". In these feminine industries, women enjoy a higher representation among
financial analysts.
Second, I examine how national culture influences female representation among financial an-
alysts by comparing the proportions of female analysts in different cultural sub-regions defined by
Hofstede (2001), i.e., Anglo, Germanic, Latin, Near Eastern and Nordic countries. The univariate
tests suggest that Germanic and Nordic countries are those with the lowest proportions of female
analysts. In contrast, in Latin countries, female representation among financial analysts is the high-
est. The regression analyses at the country level show that the proportions of female analysts and
proportions of recommendations issued by female analysts are significantly lower in Nordic coun-
tries, other factors being constant. The probit models at both analyst level and recommendation
level confirm the same findings. For analysts located in Nordic countries, the likelihood of being a
female analyst is significantly lower, all things being equal. The same conclusion can be reached
using stock recommendations issued by female analysts. In Nordic countries, the likelihood of
stock recommendation issued by a woman is significantly lower.
Further, I replace the sub-region dummy variables by the cultural dimensions defined by Hof-
stede (2001) and rerun the regressions at country level and at individual levels respectively. The
results suggest that power distance is positively associated with female representation while other
cultural dimensions do not exert significant marginal effects. This findings is consistent with those
for sub-regions because Nordic countries have a lower power distance than any other countries.
Therefore, the results show that there are more women working as financial analysts in countries
where people are likely to accept inequality in power distribution.
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To my knowledge, it is the first research to document observations for gender diversity among
financial analysts in the European setting. Furthermore, in addition to confirming the results of
concurrent studies that have been performed in the U.S., I find that national culture has a significant
impact on female representation among financial analysts. As such, my findings contribute to
the finance and culture literature by adding new evidence of the economic relevance of national
culture, especially when research is conducted at the international scale.
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Appendices
2.A Hofstede Cultural Dimensions
Definitions for Five Cultural Dimensions of Hofstede (2001)
Culture dimension Definition
Power distance
The extent to which the less powerful members of
institutions and organizations within a country ex-
pect and accept that power is distributed unequally.
Individualism/Collectivism
Individualism stands for a society in which the ties
between individuals are loose: everyone is expected
to look after himself/herself and his/her immediate
family only. Collectivism, stands for a society in
which people are integrated into strong, cohesive in-
groups, which throughout people’s lifetime continue
to protect them in exchange for unquestioning loy-
alty.
Masculinity/Femininity
Masculinity stands for a society in which emotional
gender roles are clearly distinct: men are supposed
to be assertive, tough, and focused on material suc-
cess; women are supposed to be more modest, ten-
der, and concerned with the quality of life. Its oppo-
site, femininity, stands for a society in which emo-
tional gender roles overlap: both men and women
are supposed to be modest, tender, and concerned
with the quality of life.
Uncertainty avoidance
The extent to which the members of a culture feel
threatened by uncertain or unknown situations.
Long-term/Short-term orientation
Long-term orientation stands for the fostering of
virtues oriented towards future rewards and adapt-
ing to changing circumstances. Short-term orienta-
tion, stands for the fostering of virtues related to the
past and present, in particular respect for tradition,
preservation of ’face’, and fulfilling social obliga-
tions.
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Scores of the Five Cultural Dimensions defined by Hofstede for European Countries
This table reports the scores of the five cultural dimensions defined by (Hofstede 2001) for European countries. pdi
stands for power distance; idv refers to the individualism/collectivism; mas is the masculinity/femininity dimension;
uai refers to the uncertainty avoidance; lto stands for long-term/short-term orientation.
Country PDI IDV MAS UAI LTO
Austria 11 55 79 70 60
Belgium 65 75 54 94 82
Bulgaria 70 30 40 85 69
Croatia 73 33 40 80 58
Cyprus NA NA NA NA NA
Czech Republic 57 58 57 74 70
Denmark 18 74 16 23 35
Estonia 40 60 30 60 82
Finland 33 63 26 59 38
France 68 71 43 86 63
Germany 35 67 66 65 83
Greece 60 35 57 100 45
Hungary 46 80 88 82 58
Ireland 28 70 68 35 24
Italy 50 76 70 75 61
Lithuania 42 60 19 65 82
Luxembourg 40 60 50 70 64
Netherlands 38 80 14 53 67
Norway 31 69 8 50 35
Poland 68 60 64 93 38
Portugal 63 27 31 99 28
Romania 90 30 42 90 52
Russia 93 39 36 95 81
Slovenia 71 27 19 88 49
Spain 57 51 42 86 48
Sweden 31 71 5 29 53
Switzerland 34 68 70 58 74
United Kingdom 35 89 66 35 51
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2.B Variable Measurements
Definition of Variables
The table presents the definitions for all the variables used in this study.
Variable Definition Source
Dependent variables:
FemAnalyst% percentage of female analysts for a given country I/B/E/S
FemRec% percentage of recommendations issued by female
analysts for a given country
I/B/E/S
Female dummy variable equal to one if an analyst is identi-
fied to be women, zero otherwise
I/B/E/S
FemRec dummy variable equal to one if a recommendation
is issued by female analyst, zero otherwise
I/B/E/S
Cultural variables:
PDIs the scores of power distance for a given country Hofstede (2001)
IDVs the scores of Individualism for a given country Hofstede (2001)
MASs the scores of masculinity/femininity for a given
country
Hofstede (2001)
UAIs the scores of uncertainty avoidance for a given coun-
try
Hofstede (2001)
Anglo dummy variable that is equal to one for countries
belonging to cultural sub-regions labeled as Anglo
Hofstede (2001)
Germanic dummy variable that is equal to one for countries be-
longing to cultural sub-regions labeled as Germanic
Hofstede (2001)
Latin dummy variable that is equal to one for countries
belonging to cultural sub-regions labeled as Latin
Hofstede (2001)
Near Eastern dummy variable that is equal to one for countries be-
longing to cultural sub-regions labeled as Near East-
ern
Hofstede (2001)
Nordic dummy variable that is equal to one for countries
belonging to cultural sub-regions labeled as Nordic
Hofstede (2001)
Country-level variables:
FemaleInf percentage of influential recommendations issued by
female analysts in a given year
I/B/E/S, Compustat
Rec/Firm number of recommendations issued per firm in a
given year
I/B/E/S
InfluRec percentage of influential recommendations issued by
financial analysts in a given year
I/B/E/S, Compustat
Continued on next page
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Table Definition of Variables – Continued from previous page
Variable Definition Source
MarketCap/GDP the sum of market capitalization of all listed firms
divided by GDP
Compustat
IndustryM percentage of firms in sectors favored by male ana-
lysts
Compustat
IndustryF percentage of firms in sectors favored by female an-
alysts
Compustat
UndAnalyst percentage of analysts with undefined gender I/B/E/S
LocalBroker percentage of recommendations issued by analysts
working for local brokerage houses
I/B/E/S
Individual-level variables:
NbRec number of recommendations issued by an analyst in
a given year
I/B/E/S
NbFirmFol number of firms followed by an analyst in a given
year
I/B/E/S
BrokerSize number of analysts working in the brokerage house
in a given year
I/B/E/S
NbCountry number of countries in which followed firms are lo-
cated
I/B/E/S, Compustat
pInfluRec percentage of influential recommendations issued by
an analyst in a given year
I/B/E/S, Compustat
GenAnalystExp number of years since analyst’s first recommenda-
tion recorded in the database
I/B/E/S
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2.C Tables
Table 2.1: Stock Coverage and Recommendations by Analyst Gender
The table summarizes gender difference in stock coverage and stock recommendations. Panel A summarizes gender
difference for the whole sample. Analysts refers to the number of analysts; Stocks stands for the number of stocks
followed by analysts; Rec is the number of recommendations issued by analysts; the number of stocks followed per
analyst is labeled as Stocks/Analyst; the number of recommendations issued per analyst is labeled as Rec/Analyst;
Rec/Stock/Analyst refers to recommendations made by each analyst per firm. I test the significance of the difference
between male and female at country level by using the t-statistics: ***, **, * means that the difference is significant
at the 0.01 level, at the 0.05 level and at the 0.10 level, respectively. Panel B reports the number of analysts work-
ing in each country (Analysts), the proportion of analysts who are female (FemAnalysts), or male (MalAnalysts), the
number of recommendations issued by all analysts (Rec), the proportion of recommendations issued by female analysts
(FemRec) and by male analysts (MalRec). Others refers to the countries with less than 1% of all financial analysts
under study: namely Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Ireland, Lithuania, Luxembourg„
Portugal, Romania, and Slovenia.
Panel A: Whole Sample
Analysts Stocks Rec Stocks Rec Rec/Stock
/Analyst /Analyst /Analyst
Male 2804 9217 101442 10.56 36.46 3.45
Female 578 3282 18386 9.39 31.98 3.40
Diff 2226 5935 83056 1.17∗∗∗ 4.49∗∗ 0.05
Panel B: Country Level
Country Analysts FemAnalysts MalAnalysts Rec FemRec MalRec
Austria 52 19.23% 73.08% 1538 10.99% 84.01%
Belgium 46 8.70% 84.78% 2075 4.00% 90.31%
Denmark 48 4.17% 89.58% 1512 1.06% 97.35%
Finland 78 21.79% 76.92% 4752 18.41% 80.81%
France 298 18.79% 74.50% 12546 24.54% 69.36%
Germany 389 9.51% 84.06% 16507 8.63% 87.11%
Greece 48 20.83% 79.17% 1132 17.58% 82.42%
Italy 110 40.00% 60.00% 5714 35.65% 64.35%
Netherlands 90 7.78% 85.56% 2986 3.25% 94.61%
Norway 143 10.49% 88.81% 4888 9.62% 88.52%
Poland 86 26.74% 73.26% 3283 23.58% 76.42%
Russia 163 23.93% 75.46% 2134 21.42% 77.88%
Spain 94 31.91% 63.83% 2945 34.57% 64.48%
Sweden 132 12.12% 87.88% 5146 9.50% 90.50%
Switzerland 121 11.57% 85.95% 3431 10.14% 89.22%
United Kingdom 1543 14.78% 77.32% 51760 12.29% 79.77%
Others 138 18.84% 78.26% 3559 13.71% 85.53%
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Table 2.2: Country-level Comparisons of Recommendations Issued and Stocks Followed by European Analysts
The table reports gender comparison at individual level for European countries. I compare for the two genders the number of stocks followed by an analyst, the
number of recommendations issued by an analyst, as well as the number of recommendations per stock issued by an analyst. Others refers to countries with less than
1% of all financial analysts under study: namely Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Ireland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Portugal, Romania,
Slovenia. I test the difference between male and female for each country using the t-statistics: *** if difference is significant at the 0.01 level, ** if difference is
significant at the 0.05 level, * if difference is significant at the 0.10 level.
Country Stocks Recommendations Rec per Stock
Female Male Difference Female Male Difference Female Male Difference
Austria 8.00 10.58 2.58 18.78 35.89 17.11∗∗ 2.35 3.39 1.04∗∗∗
Belgium 7.75 12.08 4.33∗∗ 20.75 52.06 31.31∗∗∗ 2.68 4.31 1.63∗∗∗
Denmark 3.50 9.10 5.60 8.00 35.90 27.90∗ 2.29 3.95 1.66∗∗∗
Finland 11.82 12.03 0.21 51.47 65.08 13.61 4.35 5.41 1.06∗∗∗
France 15.04 11.15 −3.89 57.02 40.47 −16.54∗ 3.79 3.63 −0.16
Germany 9.38 11.89 2.51∗∗ 38.51 44.24 5.73 4.11 3.72 −0.39∗
Greece 7.80 7.32 −0.48 19.90 24.55 4.65 2.55 3.36 0.8∗∗∗
Italy 10.25 12.53 2.28∗ 46.30 55.71 9.42 4.52 4.45 −0.07
Netherlands 7.14 11.65 4.51∗ 13.86 36.69 22.83∗∗∗ 1.94 3.15 1.21∗∗∗
Norway 9.73 9.41 −0.32 31.33 34.07 2.74 3.22 3.62 0.40
Poland 8.65 10.78 2.13∗ 33.65 39.83 6.17 3.89 3.70 −0.19
Russia 5.82 7.20 1.37 11.72 13.51 1.79 2.01 1.88 −0.14
Spain 9.00 9.40 0.40 33.93 31.65 −2.28 3.77 3.37 −0.4∗
Sweden 8.62 9.29 0.67 30.56 40.15 9.58 3.54 4.32 0.78∗∗∗
Switzerland 7.71 9.39 1.67 24.86 29.72 4.86 3.22 3.17 −0.06
United Kingdom 9.33 10.92 1.58∗∗ 27.90 34.73 6.82∗∗ 2.99 3.18 0.19∗∗∗
Others 5.19 7.95 2.76∗∗∗ 18.77 28.19 9.42∗ 3.61 3.54 −0.07
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Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics about the Evolution of Gender Observations for Analysts over
Time
The table reports statistics for analysts data from 2006 to 2013. All recommendations for stocks with available in-
formation in the I/B/E/S database are included in the Full sample. The Restricted sample consists only of stock rec-
ommendations issued by analysts who have issued at least 10 recommendations in a given year. NbStocks refers to
the total number of stocks followed by European analysts. NbAnalysts is the total number of analysts in office during
the given time period, and NbRec stands for the total number of recommendations issued by these analysts. Finally,
the proportion of all analysts that are female (FemAnalysts) and the proportion of stock recommendations of female
analysts (FemRec) are also reported in the table.
(a) Full Sample
Year NbRec NbStocks NbAnalysts FemAnalysts FemRec
2006 13,307 4,041 1,634 14.99% 13.66%
2007 17,553 4,626 1,733 14.66% 14.56%
2008 20,083 4,641 1,727 14.88% 14.51%
2009 17,408 4,723 1,742 14.93% 13.38%
2010 14,332 4,657 1,861 15.26% 14.50%
2011 15,542 4,675 1,893 15.74% 15.27%
2012 14,441 4,532 1,753 16.26% 15.71%
2013 13,242 4,440 1,700 15.65% 15.47%
(b) Restricted Sample
Year NbRec NbStocks NbAnalysts FemAnalysts FemRec
2006 8,088 2,757 497 13.28% 13.48%
2007 12,543 3,604 710 15.21% 14.85%
2008 15,161 3,714 794 14.11% 14.36%
2009 12,126 3,642 674 13.06% 12.61%
2010 8,339 3,146 513 12.67% 12.74%
2011 9,818 3,314 575 13.91% 14.73%
2012 9,116 3,035 532 14.10% 15.29%
2013 7,678 2,949 475 12.42% 15.15%
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Table 2.4: Industry Segments for European Analysts
The table reports European analysts’ industrial preferences during the sample period. NbAnalysts is the number of
analysts for each market segment, FemAnalysts refers to the proportion of female analysts in the given industry. Per-
TotRec is the percentage of all recommendations issued for the related industry, and FemRec refers to the proportion
of recommendations issued by female analysts within a given industry. The industrial segments are based on the Fama
and French industry classification (Fama and French 1997).
Industry NbAnalysts FemAnalysts PerTotRec FemRec
Agriculture 188 16.489 0.726 21.335
Aircraft 113 15.044 0.596 16.511
Almost Nothing 82 15.854 0.230 24.138
Apparel 235 30.638 1.223 30.844
Automobiles and Trucks 383 12.533 2.591 9.565
Banking 468 17.735 5.226 17.660
Beer and Liquor 143 20.979 0.916 21.162
Business Services 1,261 13.957 9.470 12.311
Business Supplies 202 17.327 1.141 15.449
Candy and Soda 151 14.570 0.486 16.013
Chemicals 494 13.563 2.717 14.060
Coal 103 13.592 0.415 13.193
Communication 536 14.552 4.449 14.959
Computers 391 13.299 1.940 11.789
Construction 557 12.926 3.229 14.736
Construction Materials 483 14.907 2.375 11.371
Consumer Goods 382 20.157 1.568 23.860
Defense 19 15.789 0.044 12.500
Electrical Equipment 279 9.319 0.907 9.632
Electronic Equipment 578 12.457 3.907 8.498
Entertainment 249 17.269 0.961 18.760
Fabricated Products 78 12.821 0.218 12.774
Food Products 333 21.622 1.848 22.475
Healthcare 146 13.699 0.672 9.693
Insurance 247 17.409 2.422 11.016
Machinery 693 13.276 4.463 11.621
Measuring and Control Equipment 229 10.044 0.709 12.878
Medical Equipment 222 18.468 1.355 15.123
Non-Metallic and Industrial Metal Mining 326 12.883 1.933 10.435
Personal Services 117 13.675 0.406 15.068
Petroleum and Natural Gas 542 16.790 5.751 13.714
Pharmaceutical Products 355 20 2.321 17.248
Precious Metals 134 12.687 1.276 8.899
Printing and Publishing 256 17.188 1.642 26.367
Continued on next page
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Table 2.4 – Continued from previous page
Industry NbAnalysts FemAnalysts PerTotRec FemRec
Real Estate 407 16.462 4.059 13.129
Recreation 132 20.455 0.621 23.018
Restaurants, Hotels, Motels 206 22.816 1.399 19.478
Retail 653 19.449 5.218 19.452
Rubber and Plastic Products 147 8.844 0.518 7.209
Shipbuilding, Railroad Equipment 98 11.224 0.298 8.800
Shipping Containers 69 20.290 0.191 23.237
Steel Works Etc 448 12.277 2.454 15.210
Textiles 62 12.903 0.181 14.035
Tobacco Products 58 17.241 0.195 17.551
Trading 587 13.969 3.460 10.629
Transportation 545 14.679 4.529 9.644
Unclassified 80 11.250 0.206 11.583
Utilities 440 16.136 3.736 20.153
Wholesale 691 14.906 2.800 14.351
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Table 2.5: Statistics for the Hofstede (2001) Cultural Sub-Regions
The table reports differences between cultural sub-regions based on the Hofstede’s cultural model. NbAnalysts (NbRec)
is the total number of analysts (recommendations issued by analysts) working in the given cultural sub-regions during
the sample period. FemAnalysts% (FemRec%) refers to the proportion of all analysts (recommendations issued by ana-
lysts) that are female. According to the Hofstede’s culture model, Anglo includes Ireland, United Kingdom; Germanic
refers to Austria, Germany, and Switzerland; Latin stands for Belgium, France, Italy, Portugal, and Spain; Near Eastern
includes Greece; Nordic represents Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. All the remaining countries
(Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland, Romania, Russia, and
Slovenia) are not classified by Hofstede (2001) and thus grouped into Unclassified.
Sub-Regions NbAnalysts FemAnalysts% NbRec FemRec%
Anglo 1577 14.77% 52538 12.29%
Germanic 562 10.85% 21476 9.04%
Latin 576 24.31% 24195 26.27%
Near Eastern 48 20.83% 1132 17.58%
Nordic 491 11.61% 19284 10.1%
Unclassified 325 23.69% 7283 20.42%
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Table 2.6: Comparison of Analyst Gender Representation Between the Hofstede (2001) Cultural
Sub-regions
The table reports differences on the proportion of female analysts and the proportion of recommendations issued by
women between cultural sub-regions based on the Hofstede’s cultural model. I conduct Pearson’s chi-squared test to
compare the proportions of female financial analysts and the proportions of stock recommendations issued by female
analysts recorded in different cultural sub-regions. Panel A of the table reports the comparison of the percentage of
female analysts. The comparison for the percentage of female analysts’ stock recommendation is reported in Panel B.
Values in the first line and first column stands for the difference between the proportion of female analysts in Anglo
countries and in Germanic countries (the former minus the latter). χ2 values of the chi-squared test are in parentheses.
The *,**,*** means that the differences are significant at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 level respectively using a two-tailed test.
(a) Proportion of female financial analysts
Germanic Latin Near Eastern Nordic
Anglo 3.92%∗∗ −9.53%∗∗∗ −6.06% 3.17%∗
(5.05) (26.09) (0.91) (2.86)
Germanic −13.45%∗∗∗ −9.98%∗ −0.75%
(34.47) (3.37) (0.08)
Latin 3.47% 12.70%∗∗∗
(0.13) (27.55)
Near Eastern 9.22%
(2.62)
(b) Proportion of stock recommendations issued by female financial analysts
Germanic Latin Near Eastern Nordic
Anglo 3.25%∗∗∗ −13.98%∗∗∗ −5.29%∗∗∗ 2.19%∗∗∗
(159.32) (2326.05) (28.08) (65.38)
Germanic −17.22%∗∗∗ −8.54%∗∗∗ −1.05%∗∗∗
(2268.98) (90.42) (12.95)
Latin 8.69%∗∗∗ 16.17%∗∗∗
(42.09) (1815.07)
Near Eastern 7.48%∗∗∗
(62.86)
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Table 2.8: Comparison of Analyst Gender Representation for the Hofstede (2001) Cultural Sub-
Regions between 2006 and 2013
The table reports the comparison for European analysts in Hofstede’s cultural sub-regions between 2006 and 2013.
NbAnalysts is the total number of analysts in office during the given time period. FemAnalysts refers to the proportion
of female analysts. NbRec is the total number of recommendations issued by European analysts during the sample
period. FemRec refers to the proportion of recommendations issued by female analysts. ∆ Fem stands for the difference
between 2006 and 2013, the latter minus the former. *,**,*** means that the differences are significant at the 0.10,
0.05, 0.01 level respectively using Pearson’s chi-squared test.
(a) Comparison for analysts
Sub-Regions 2006 2013 ∆ Fem
NbAnalysts FemAnalysts NbAnalysts FemAnalysts
Anglo 663 12.52% 723 14.11% 1.59%
Germanic 346 9.54% 246 12.20% 2.66%
Latin 321 24.61% 271 24.35% −0.26%
Near Eastern 26 26.92% 21 4.76% −22.16%
Nordic 232 13.36% 265 7.92% −5.44%∗
(b) Comparison for stock recommendations
Sub-Regions 2006 2013 ∆ Fem
NbRec FemRec NbRec FemRec
Anglo 5430 12.87% 5229 10.84% −2.03%∗∗∗
Germanic 3029 7.10% 2023 11.07% 3.97%∗∗∗
Latin 2576 23.64% 2538 30.34% 6.70%∗∗∗
Near Eastern 157 17.20% 68 5.88% −11.32%∗∗
Nordic 1771 12.54% 2066 9.05% −3.48%∗∗∗
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Table 2.10: Descriptive Statistics for the Variables in the Regression Model
The table reports descriptive statistics for the variables in the regression model. I use data for European countries with
more than 1% of the financial analysts recorded in the sample. FemAnalysti,t refers to the proportion of female analysts.
FemReci,t the proportion of recommendations issued by female analysts. UndAnalysti,t refers to the percentage of
analysts whose gender cannot be determined. IndustryFi,t measures the percentage of firms in the five industries where
female representation is the highest. IndustryMi,t measures the percentage of firms in the five industries where male
representation is the highest. In f luReci,t is the percentage of influential stock recommendations that trigger a significant
two-day cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement date of stock recommendation. LocalBrokeri,t refers to
the percentage of recommendations issued by analysts working in a local brokerage house. Rec/Firmi,t is the number
of all the recommendations issued by analysts in a given country divided by the number of listed firms in that country
during a given year. MarketCap/GDPi,t , stands for the ratio of total market capitalization of all the listed firms in a
country over the country’s GDP.
Variable Mean StdDev 1st Quantile Median 3rd Quantile
FemAnalyst 0.176 0.101 0.100 0.151 0.226
FemRec 0.163 0.106 0.085 0.130 0.229
UndAnalyst 0.027 0.031 0 0.018 0.045
industryF 0.053 0.021 0.034 0.045 0.069
industryM 0.034 0.017 0.020 0.028 0.052
InfluRec 0.073 0.081 0 0.067 0.104
LocalBroker 0.423 0.233 0.258 0.410 0.571
Rec/Firm 3.128 1.203 2.272 2.920 3.595
MarketCap/GDP 0.647 0.452 0.368 0.516 0.807
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Table 2.11: Regressions for Cultural Sub-regions at Country Level
Panel A of the table reports the results of regression models for cultural sub-regions at country level. The dependent
variable is either the proportion of female analysts (FemAnalysti,t ) (column 1 and 2) or the proportion of recommen-
dations issued by female analysts (FemReci,t )(column 3 and 4). I use data from European countries with more than
1% of all financial analysts in the sample from 2006 to 2013. FemAnalysti,t refers to the proportion of female ana-
lysts. FemReci,t the proportion of recommendations issued by female analysts. UndAnalysti,t refers to the percentage
of analysts whose gender cannot be determined. IndustryFi,t measures the percentage of firms in the five industries
where female representation is the highest. IndustryMi,t measures the percentage of firms in the five industries where
the male representation is the highest. In f luReci,t is the percentage of recommendations that trigger a significant two-
day cumulative abnormal returns. f emaleIn f lui,t is the percentage of recommendations issued by female analysts that
trigger a significant two-day cumulative abnormal returns. LocalBrokeri,t refers to the percentage of recommendations
issued by analysts working in a local brokerage house. Rec/Firmi,t is the number of recommendations issued by ana-
lysts in a given country divided by the number of listed firms in that country during a given year. MarketCap/GDPi,t ,
stands for the ratio of total market capitalization of all the listed firms in a country over the country’s GDP. According
to the Hofstede’s culture model, Anglo includes Ireland, United Kingdom; Germanic refers to Austria, Germany, and
Switzerland; Latin stands for Belgium, France, Italy, Portugal, and Spain; Near Eastern includes Greece; Nordic rep-
resents Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. All the remaining countries (Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus,
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland, Romania, Russia, and Slovenia) are not classified
by Hofstede (2001) and thus grouped into Unclassified. I control for the year fixed effect. The standard errors are
clustered at country level. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ stand for p-value less than 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 respectively. In Panel B, I compare
the coefficients of the dummy variables for the five cultural sub-regions. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ mean that the differences between
coefficients are significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 level, respectively, using a F-test.
Panel A: Regression Results at Sub-region Level
Dependent variable:
FemAnalyst% FemRec%
Partial model Full model Partial model Full model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IndustryF 0.399 −1.171 0.539 −1.185
(1.295) (0.798) (1.310) (0.911)
IndustryM −1.079∗ −1.892∗∗∗ −1.087∗ −1.952∗∗
(0.642) (0.695) (0.646) (0.784)
InfluRec −0.806∗ −0.997∗∗ −0.879∗ −1.072∗∗
(0.416) (0.430) (0.476) (0.484)
FemaleInflu 0.724∗∗ 0.750∗∗∗ 0.696∗∗ 0.726∗∗∗
(0.293) (0.185) (0.338) (0.215)
Rec/Firm 0.009∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.009∗∗ 0.007∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
UndAnalyst −0.409 −0.414∗∗ −0.359 −0.333∗
(0.253) (0.199) (0.268) (0.186)
MarketCap/GDP −0.003 0.048∗∗ 0.010 0.066∗∗
(0.020) (0.024) (0.022) (0.027)
Continued on next page
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Table 2.11 – Continued from previous page
Dependent variable:
FemAnalyst% FemRec%
Partial model Full model Partial model Full model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
LocalBroker 0.086∗ −0.011 0.082 −0.016
(0.047) (0.040) (0.052) (0.044)
Anglo −0.006 −0.024
(0.055) (0.065)
Germanic −0.119∗∗ −0.134∗∗
(0.049) (0.057)
Latin 0.059 0.058
(0.061) (0.072)
NearEastern 0.025 0.006
(0.036) (0.042)
Nordic −0.095∗ −0.107
(0.056) (0.066)
Constant 0.108 0.274∗∗∗ 0.095 0.276∗∗∗
(0.092) (0.081) (0.097) (0.090)
Observations 127 127 127 127
R2 0.318 0.508 0.265 0.464
Adjusted R2 0.225 0.416 0.165 0.363
Fixed effect Year Year Year Year
Panel B: Comparison of coefficients for the percentage of female analysts at sub-region level
Germanic Latin Near Eastern Nordic
Anglo 0.11∗∗ −0.07 −0.03 0.09∗
Germanic −0.18∗∗∗ −0.14∗∗ −0.02
Latin 0.03 0.15∗∗∗
Near Eastern 0.12∗∗
Panel C: Comparison of coefficients for the percentage of recommendations by female analysts at
sub-region level
Germanic Latin Near Eastern Nordic
Anglo 0.11∗ −0.08 −0.03 0.08
Germanic −0.19∗∗∗ −0.14∗∗ −0.03
Latin 0.05 0.17∗∗∗
Near Eastern 0.11∗
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Table 2.12: Regressions for Cultural Sub-regions at Analyst Level
The table reports the results of probit models. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that is set to one if analyst
is identified as female analyst (Femalei,t ). I use data from European countries with more than 1% of all analysts in the
sample. NbReci,t refers to number of stock recommendations issued by a given analyst during the year under consid-
eration. BrokerSizei,t measures the number of analysts working in the same brokerage house. NbFirmFoli,t measures
the number of firms covered by a given analyst. MarketCap/GDPi,t , stands for the ratio of total market capitalization
of all listed firms in a country over the country’s GDP. pIn f luReci,t is the percentage of recommendations that trig-
ger a significant two-day cumulative abnormal returns issued by a given analyst during the year under consideration.
GenAnalystExpi,t is general experience for an analyst, which is measured by the number of years since analyst’s first
recommendations recorded in I/B/E/S. The standard errors are clustered at country level. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ stand for p-value
less than 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 respectively. In Panel B, I compare the coefficients of the dummy variables for the five
cultural sub-regions. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ mean that the differences between coefficients are significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1
level, respectively, using a F-test.
Panel A: Regressions with Cultural Sub-regions
Dependent variable:
Female
Partial model Marginal effects Full model Marginal effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NbRec 0.002 0.039 0.002 0.036
(0.007) (0.006)
BrokerSize 0.001∗ 0.027 0.001∗∗ 0.020
(0.001) (0.0005)
NbFirmFol 0.006 0.129 0.001 0.032
(0.014) (0.016)
MarketCap/GDP −0.260 −5.849 −0.081 −1.766
(0.171) (0.099)
NbCountry −0.011 −0.248 −0.004 −0.092
(0.015) (0.010)
pInfluRec 0.441 9.931 0.237 5.174
(0.420) (0.339)
GenAnalystExp 0.017 0.394 0.017 0.368
(0.015) (0.014)
Anglo −0.138 −3.002
(0.169)
Germanic −0.396∗∗∗ −8.634
(0.148)
Latin 0.343∗ 7.467
(0.176)
NearEastern 0.078 1.700
(0.148)
Continued on next page
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Dependent variable:
dFemale
Partial model Marginal effects Full model Marginal effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Nordic −0.317 −6.912
(0.201)
Observations 4,529 4,529 4,529 4,529
Akaike Inf. Crit. 3,734.579 3,734.579 3,627.581 3,627.581
Pseudo-R2 0.008 0.040
Fixed effect Year Year
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Panel B: Comparison of coefficients for female analysts at sub-region level
Germanic Latin Near Eastern Nordic
Anglo 0.26∗∗∗ −0.48∗∗∗ −0.22 0.18∗∗
Germanic −0.74∗∗∗ −0.47 −0.08
Latin 0.26 0.66∗∗∗
Near Eastern 0.40
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Table 2.13: Regressions for Cultural Sub-regions at Recommendation Level
The table reports the results of probit models. The dependent variable is either a dummy variable that is set to one if a
stock recommendation is issued by female analyst (d f emaleReci,t ). I use data from European countries with more than
1% of all financial analysts recorded in our sample from 2006 to 2013. NbReci,t refers to number of stock recommen-
dations issued by a given analyst during the current year. BrokerSizei,t measures the number of analysts working in the
same brokerage house. NbFirmFoli,t measures the number of firms covered by a given analyst. MarketCap/GDPi,t ,
stands for the ratio of total market capitalization of all the listed firms in a country over the country’s GDP. pIn f luReci,t
is the percentage of recommendations that trigger a significant two-day cumulative abnormal returns issued by a given
analyst during the year under consideration. GenAnalystExpi,t is general experience for an analyst. The standard errors
are clustered at country level. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ stand for p-value less than 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 respectively. In Panel B, I compare
the coefficients of the dummy variables for the five cultural sub-regions. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ mean that the differences between
coefficients are significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 level, respectively, using a F-test.
Panel A: Regressions with Cultural Sub-regions
Dependent variable:
FemRec
Partial model Marginal effects Full model Marginal effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NbRec 0.007∗∗∗ 0.162 0.007∗∗∗ 0.146
(0.002) (0.002)
BrokerSize 0.002∗∗ 0.035 0.001∗∗ 0.029
(0.001) (0.001)
NbFirmFol −0.007 −0.161 −0.010 −0.214
(0.010) (0.010)
MarketCap/GDP −0.249 −5.719 0.004 0.082
(0.169) (0.088)
NbCountry −0.014 −0.324 −0.009 −0.189
(0.019) (0.017)
pInfluRec 0.493 11.341 0.234 5.184
(0.522) (0.369)
GenAnalystExp 0.008 0.191 0.009 0.199
(0.015) (0.015)
Anglo −0.260 −5.758
(0.167)
Germanic −0.457∗∗∗ −10.117
(0.153)
Latin 0.313∗ 6.928
(0.173)
Near Eastern −0.099 −2.187
(0.155)
Nordic −0.433∗∗ −9.601
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Dependent variable:
dFemRec
Partial model Marginal effects Full model Marginal effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(0.198)
Observations 78,657 78,657
Akaike Inf. Crit. 65,604.150 63,248.760
Pseudo-R2 0.010 0.045
Fixed effect Year Year
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Panel B: Comparison of coefficients for stock recommendations issued by female analysts at sub-
region level
Germanic Latin Near Eastern Nordic
Anglo 0.26∗∗∗ −0.36∗∗∗ −0.06 0.20∗∗∗
Germanic −0.62∗∗∗ −0.32∗∗∗ −0.06
Latin 0.29∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗
Near Eastern 0.26∗∗
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Table 2.14: Regressions for Cultural Dimensions at Country Level
The table reports the results of regression models for the cultural dimensions defined by Hofstede (2001). The dependent
variable is either the proportion of female analysts (FemAnalyst%i,t ) (column 1, 2) or the proportion of recommenda-
tions issued by female analysts (FemRec%i,t ) (column 3, 4) in each of the countries under study for each year under
consideration. PDIsi, IDV si, MASsi, UAIsi refer to the scores of power distance, individualism, masculinity and uncer-
tainty avoidance, respectively. The measurement of control variables is the same as presented in Table 2.11. I control
for the year fixed effects. The standard errors are clustered at country level. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ stand for p-value less than 0.01,
0.05, and 0.1 respectively.
Dependent variable:
FemAnalyst% FemRec%
Partial Model Full Model Partial Model Full Model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PDIs 0.002∗ 0.003∗
(0.001) (0.002)
IDVs −0.002 −0.001
(0.003) (0.003)
MASs 0.001∗ 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
UAIs −0.001 −0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
industryF 0.399 1.347 0.450 0.918
(1.295) (1.348) (1.329) (1.348)
industryM −1.079∗ −0.823 −1.104∗ −1.191∗∗
(0.642) (0.558) (0.650) (0.593)
InfluRec −0.806∗ −0.230 −0.915∗ −0.447
(0.416) (0.509) (0.473) (0.557)
femaleInflu 0.724∗∗ 0.827∗∗∗ 0.674∗∗ 0.781∗∗∗
(0.293) (0.174) (0.337) (0.214)
Rec/Firm 0.009∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
UndAnalyst −0.409 −0.312 −0.364 −0.251
(0.253) (0.193) (0.271) (0.194)
MarketCap/GDP −0.003 0.026 0.009 0.041
(0.020) (0.029) (0.022) (0.032)
LocalBroker 0.086∗ 0.017 0.089∗ 0.005
(0.047) (0.036) (0.052) (0.042)
Constant 0.108 0.041 0.102 0.0002
(0.092) (0.124) (0.098) (0.133)
Observations 127 127 127 127
R2 0.318 0.455 0.251 0.392
Continued on next page
2.C. TABLES 77
Table 2.14 – Continued from previous page
Dependent variable:
FemAnalyst% FemRec%
Partial Model Full Model Partial Model Full Model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Adjusted R2 0.225 0.358 0.150 0.285
Fixed effect Year Year Year Year
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Table 2.15: Regressions for Cultural Dimensions at Individual Level
The table reports the results of probit regression models of stock recommendations issued by female financial ana-
lysts (dFemRec and of female analysts (dFemale. PDIsi, IDV si, MASsi, UAIsi refer to the scores of power distance,
individualism, masculinity and uncertainty avoidance, respectively. NbRec refers to the number of recommendations
issued by analyst i in year t. BrokerSize is the number of analysts working for the given brokerage house in a given
year. NbFirmFol refers to the number of firms followed by analyst i in year t. NbCountry is the number of countries
in which followed firms are located. InflCARp refers to the percentage of influential recommendations issued by an
analyst. AnalystExpG refers to analyst’s general experience. MarketCapGDP is the value of market capitalization divided by
the GDP. I control for the fixed effect at year levels. The standard errors are clustered at country level. The *,**,***
means the difference is significant at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 level respectively, using a two-tailed test.
Dependent variable:
FemRec Female
Partial Model Full Model Partial Model Full Model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PDIs 0.012∗∗ 0.010∗∗
(0.006) (0.005)
IDVs 0.004 −0.001
(0.008) (0.007)
MASs 0.002 0.003
(0.003) (0.003)
UAIs 0.002 −0.001
(0.006) (0.005)
NbRec 0.088 0.120∗ 0.073∗ 0.103∗∗
(0.067) (0.071) (0.043) (0.051)
BrokerSize −0.001 0.006 −0.014 0.002
(0.061) (0.075) (0.032) (0.035)
NbFirmFol −0.122 −0.181∗ −0.155∗∗∗ −0.186∗∗∗
(0.085) (0.101) (0.052) (0.060)
MarketCap/GDP −0.203 −0.034 −0.195 −0.092
(0.150) (0.185) (0.144) (0.193)
NbCountry −0.028 −0.021 −0.023 −0.023
(0.055) (0.062) (0.042) (0.041)
pInfluRec −0.089 −0.134 −0.194 −0.188∗
(0.334) (0.248) (0.124) (0.107)
GenAnalystExp −0.006 −0.0001 −0.014 −0.008
(0.012) (0.009) (0.011) (0.008)
Constant −0.800∗∗∗ −2.056∗∗∗ −0.636∗∗∗ −1.306∗∗
(0.269) (0.624) (0.220) (0.570)
Observations 78,657 78,657 4,529 4,529
Akaike Inf. Crit. 100,055.700 98,097.470 11,701.500 11,574.940
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Dependent variable:
FemRec Female
Partial Model Full Model Partial Model Full Model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pseudo-R2 0.006 0.034 0.009 0.020
Fixed effect Year Year Year Year
80 Chapter 2
Chapter 3
Innovation in Financial Analysts’
Recommendations: Does Gender
Matter?
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Abstract: This paper investigates innovation in
analyst’s recommendations. It aims to deter-
mine whether there are gender differences in is-
suing innovative stock recommendations. My
conjecture is that female analysts’ lower over-
confidence (superior ability) leads to less (more)
innovative stock recommendations. The em-
pirical evidence shows that female analysts are
less likely to issue innovative recommendations.
Stock recommendations issued by female ana-
lysts diverge less from the analyst consensus,
or from their own prior recommendation for the
same stock. They are also less ahead in time
than those of male analysts. The observed gen-
der differences in issuing innovative stock rec-
ommendation are not attributable to other ana-
lyst characteristics or characteristics of covered
stock, and they are robust to different estima-
tion methods. The lower innovation in female
analysts’ recommendations suggests that ana-
lysts’ recommendations are overall more driven
by overconfidence, which is characteristic of
men and eventually leads to innovations, than
by superior forecasting ability, which also leads
to innovation in recommendations but is mostly
characteristic of female analysts.
Keywords: financial analysts, gender, stock
recommendations, overconfidence
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3.1 Introduction
Traditional accounting and finance research largely ignores the influence of personal attributes on
decision making, mainly focusing on patterns at firm, industry or country levels. Nevertheless, in
the light of the behavioral differences in gender documented in psychology, an emerging literature
examines the impact of personal attributes on decision making and job performance in accounting
and finance by focusing on an important characteristic: gender. Prior studies on corporate board-
room suggest that female directors are less power oriented (Adams and Funk 2012) and have better
attendance records than their male counterparts (Adams and Ferreira 2009). Huang and Kisgen
(2013) show that firms with female executives are less likely to make acquisitions and that acqui-
sitions made by female executives trigger higher stock returns on the announcement date. Beck,
Behr, and Guettler (2013) examine the job performance of loan managers and find that loans
screened and monitored by female loan officers have a lower likelihood to turn problematic than
loans handled by male officers. In this paper, I examine whether the gender of financial analysts
has a material impact on stock recommendation characteristics. Specifically, assuming that ana-
lysts’ innovation in recommendation revisions result from higher overconfidence or from superior
forecasting ability, I explore the idea that gender difference in overconfidence and forecasting abil-
ity leads to gender heterogeneity in issuing innovative recommendations, i.e., recommendations
that diverge from the analyst consensus or from their own prior recommendations, and leading
recommendations significantly ahead of those of other analysts.
The existing literature that focuses on the impact of gender on financial analysts’ decisions
making have not examined the role of gender on innovation of stock recommendation revisions.
Examining this problem is important not only because it provides more insights into analysts’
behavior, but also because the representation of female equity analysts continues to be relatively
small. Female financial analysts are constantly under-represented. In the United States, roughly
15% of equity analysts are women, despite an increase in female representation in the recent years
(Green, Jegadeesh, and Tang 2009). I investigate whether female financial analysts are different
from male analysts in terms of recommendation innovation, which is a fascinating setting to study
gender difference among financial analysts for at least three reasons.
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First, prior literature on analysts’ outputs suggests that analysts’ stock recommendations or
earnings forecast revisions are not all informative to market investors. Innovation is an important
attribute of the informativeness of financial analysts’ outputs. Gleason and Lee (2003) argue that
forecast revisions are innovative when they diverge away from the analyst’s own prior estimate
and the current analyst consensus. Based on these criteria, they show that innovative revisions
incorporate more analysts’ private information and therefore, provide new and useful information
to investors. In the same vein, Cooper, Day, and Lewis (2001) suggest that stock recommendations
that are leader in time also convey more information to stock markets. Consistent with the idea
that innovative recommendations are more informative, Loh and Stulz (2011) find that market
abnormal returns associated with innovative stock recommendation that are away from the analyst
consensus are significantly higher.
Second, several personal attributes are associated with innovation. Psychological studies pro-
vide evidence that agents appear to constantly overestimate their personal ability. A growing
literature studies the impact of overconfidence and suggests that overconfidence results in a higher
propensity to innovate and more engagement in innovative activities (Galasso and Simcoe 2011;
Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh 2012). In the context of corporate arena, Galasso and Simcoe (2011)
find that firms with overconfident CEO are more engaged in innovative investments because they
routinely underestimate the probability of failure. Overconfidence helps CEOs to be more effective
at exploiting growth opportunity. On the other hand, innovative recommendations are associated
with superior forecasting ability (Clement and Tse 2005). The likelihood of issuing innovative
forecasts increases with analysts prior forecast accuracy.
Third, prior works confirm a gender difference in two personal attributes related to innovation:
overconfidence and forecasting ability. Men are different from female in terms of overconfidence.
Men are systematically more overconfident than women (Dahlbom et al. 2011; Bengtsson, Pers-
son, and Willenhag 2005). With respect to gender difference in forecasting ability, Kumar (2010)
argues that only female security analysts with superior ability enter into the profession of equity
analysts, hence, they demonstrate more accuracy in forecasting than their male counterparts.
Based on previous literature on gender difference in business, my primary hypotheses to test
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are that female financial analysts issue less (more) innovative stock recommendations due to lower
overconfidence (superior forecasting ability). Prior literature finds evidence of gender difference
in overconfidence and forecasting ability, two personal attributes that results in innovation. If
recommendation revisions of male analysts are more innovative than those of female analysts,
innovation is more driven by overconfidence than ability. In case that female analysts issue more
innovative recommendations than male analysts, forecasting ability exerts larger marginal effects
than overconfidence when analysts issue stock recommendations.
I test the above-mentioned two opposite hypotheses using a comprehensive sample of stock
recommendations issued by sell-side equity analysts. I investigate whether innovation in stock
recommendations vary with European analyst personal attributes, and specially with gender. To
directly test my hypotheses, I examine the innovation level in stock recommendations issued by
female and male analysts. If overconfidence (superior ability) has a larger impact on the analyst’s
decision of issuing innovative recommendation, female analysts would issue less (more) inno-
vative recommendations. Investment recommendations are usually reported along with the last
revision date, the recent analyst consensus and analyst’s own prior recommendation on the same
stock. Therefore, divergence from analyst consensus, revision from prior recommendation, and
recommendation timing are three benchmarks that I use to determine innovation in stock recom-
mendations. I refer stock recommendations that diverge from recent analyst consensus, that are
much revised relative to the analyst’s own prior recommendation and that are ahead in time of
other recommendations, as innovative recommendations. Using these three criteria, I define an
innovation index for recommendation revisions. Based on this index, a recommendation is inno-
vative if if falls in the first quartile of at least two out of the three above-mentioned criteria sorted
by descending order.
According to the innovation index, innovative recommendations represent about 16.6% of
stock recommendations issued during the sample period (from 2006 to 2013). My empirical find-
ings suggest that female analysts are less likely to issue innovative recommendations, compared to
male analysts. More precisely, I find that female analysts issue stock recommendations that diverge
less from their prior investment advice and from the analyst consensus. Stock recommendations
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issued by women also are less ahead in time. Empirical results from multivariate tests confirm that
gender heterogeneity in analysts’ recommendations can not be attributed to differences in analysts’
characteristics and covered stocks’ characteristics. I conclude from these findings that for equity
analysts, overconfidence exerts larger marginal effect on analyst decision of issuing innovative
stock recommendations than forecasting ability, which leads to lower innovative recommendation
issued by female analysts.
This study is not the first to examine the impact of gender on financial analysts’ decision mak-
ing and job performance. Gender heterogeneity among financial analysts has been scrutinized
from different aspects in previous literature. For instance, Li et al. (2013) find that investment rec-
ommendations issued by female financial analysts trigger similar market abnormal returns as those
issued by male analysts but they are associated with lower idiosyncratic risks. Furthermore, gen-
der does not have a negative impact on either female analysts likelihood to be ranked as “All-star
analysts" or their promotion to larger brokerage houses. Bosquet, Goeij, and Smedts (2014) focus
on differences between male and female analysts in terms of optimistic investment recommenda-
tions. They find that the odds that female analysts issue optimistic recommendations are lower
than male analysts. Analysts also produce earnings forecasts. However, prior work on gender dif-
ferences in analysts’ forecast revisions provided mixed conclusions. Green, Jegadeesh, and Tang
(2009) show reduced coverage and lower forecast accuracy from women financial analysts, indi-
cating that they are less competent compared to male analysts in terms of forecasting ability, but
the authors still allege that women outperform male analysts in other aspects such as client service,
given that female analysts are more likely to be designated as “All-stars" analysts. A related paper,
Kumar (2010), reports evidence that only female analysts with superior ability self-select into the
profession. He finds that due to the self-selection bias, female financial analysts issue more ac-
curate earnings forecasts than male analysts. Further, forecast revisions issued by women diverge
farther away from the analyst consensus. A key distinguishing feature of my approach from this
literature is that I control for the potential endogeneity problem caused by stock coverage. Some
authors find a significant gender effect on analysts’ decision making and job performance, others
do not find the same empirical evidence. The mixture in the empirical results might result from
the fact that female financial analysts cover stocks that differ from those covered by male analysts.
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I control this selection bias using a battery of robustness tests including fixed effects, Heckman
selection model and propensity score matching.
This study is related to prior research on analyst behavioral pattern when they issue stock
recommendations (Bradley, Jordan, and Ritter 2008; Sorescu and Subrahmanyam 2006; Loh and
Stulz 2011). Extant literature confirms that analyst forecasting ability, brokerage size, information
environment of covered stocks lead analysts to different behavior in issuing investment recom-
mendations. My empirical findings complement the existing literature by exploring the previously
unexplored gender effects, controlling for various analyst and covered stock characteristics. This
study also relates to the literature on gender differences in general. Researchers have found that
across various settings, women differ from men regarding risk aversion (Eckel and Grossman
2008), effectiveness under competition (Gneezy, Niederle, and Rustichini 2003), ethnic values
(Alice H. Eagly 1990; Eagly, Johannesen-Schmidt, and Van Engen 2003) and overconfidence
(Dahlbom et al. 2011; Bengtsson, Persson, and Willenhag 2005). This study complements and
extends prior research by investigating the existence of any gender effect on analysts’ innovation
with respect to stock recommendations while controlling for other key analyst characteristics.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly outlines the prior litera-
ture on gender difference in finance and develop the hypotheses. The data and research method-
ology are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the results. Section 5 presents the results of
additional tests. Robustness checks are discussed in Section 6. The final section contains conclu-
sions and discussions.
3.2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
This study is related to the literature that examines gender difference among financial analysts. In
the context of financial analysts, prior research about gender heterogeneity in financial analysts’
milieu focuses uniquely on financial analysts in the United States and yields mixed empirical re-
sults about gender heterogeneity among financial analysts. Green, Jegadeesh, and Tang (2009)
document that female equity analysts make less accurate EPS forecasts but outperform men in all
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other aspects of job performance. Consistent with the self-selection hypothesis that female ana-
lysts who are able to survive in the competitive world of financial analysts are more “men-like"
and share more similarities than differences with their male counterparts, Kumar (2010) shows
that female analysts are more likely to issue bold forecasts. He also shows that investors are aware
of this self-selection bias: market responds strongly to the bold forecasts issued by female. In
contrast, Bosquet, Goeij, and Smedts (2014) finds that female analysts are less likely to issue op-
timistic recommendations than their male colleagues. Li et al. (2013) analyse the abnormal stock
returns associated with stock recommendations of female analysts and find that female analysts
underperform with respect to their upgrade recommendation revisions. Different from the extant
research, I focus only on innovative recommendations and investigate gender difference in issuing
innovative recommendations.
3.2.1 Innovation in Recommendations
Financial analysts are key pillars of financial markets. The activities of analysts, in particular,
analysts’ earnings forecasts and stock recommendations, provide a natural settings for behavioral
research of individuals’ decision process. Extant literature confirms that the value of financial
analysts’ stock recommendations is of great interests to investors (Womack 1996; Gleason and
Lee 2003). Francis and Soffer (1997) find that recommendation revisions explain the variation
of excess stock returns around recommendation announcement dates. Not surprisingly, all stock
recommendations or forecast revisions are not equally informative to market investors. Loh and
Stulz (2011) document that only a subset (roughly 12%) of investment recommendations issued
by financial analysts are valuable to the market and trigger significant abnormal price returns.
Innovative recommendations are shown to be more informative because investors place emphasis
on the strength of the signal (Sorescu and Subrahmanyam 2006).
Gleason and Lee (2003) refer earnings estimates that diverge away from analyst own prior
estimate and the current analyst consensus as innovative earnings forecasts. Based on this criteria,
they show that innovative forecast revisions incorporate more analysts’ private information and,
therefore, provide new information to investors. In the same vein, Cooper, Day, and Lewis (2001)
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suggest that stock recommendations that are leader in time also convey more information to the
market. Consistent with the theory that innovative recommendations are more informative, Loh
and Stulz (2011) find that market abnormal returns associated with innovative stock recommenda-
tion that are away from analyst consensus are significantly higher.
The recommendation attribute examined in this paper is the level of innovation in the rec-
ommendations issued by sell-side analysts. Analyst recommendations are usually compared to
both the analyst’s prior recommendation for the same firm and the most recent analyst consensus
as well. Therefore, both the analyst’s own prior recommendation and the prior recommendation
consensus are potentially important benchmarks in assessing the information content of recom-
mendation revisions. Following Gleason and Lee (2003), I use both benchmarks in distinguishing
between innovative and non-innovative recommendations. The timing of a recommendation is
also an important factor. Cooper, Day, and Lewis (2001) formulate a leader-follower ratio for
recommendation timeliness and contend that analysts with superior ability issue more leader rec-
ommendations that are followed by other analysts. The leader-follower ratio is the gap sum of the
prior forecasts divided by the gap sum of later forecasts issued by other analysts. A ratio larger
than one shows that other analysts issue new forecasts quickly in response to the analyst’s current
forecasts. Following their paper, I define lead recommendations as those issued ahead of other
analysts. Stock recommendations issued ahead of other recommendations are innovative because
they are the first to convey new information to the market. Different from Cooper, Day, and Lewis
(2001)’s leader-follower ratio, I do not take into consideration recommendations subsequent to the
recommendation announcement. My interest is on the analyst’s intention to innovate. Therefore,
whether other analysts react or not to the current recommendation announcement does not matter.
In sum, an innovative recommendation is defined as a recommendation that diverges from the
analyst consensus (Divergent), that is revised compared to the analyst own prior recommendation
(Bold), and that is issued ahead of other recommendations (Lead). I will refer to any recommen-
dation that falls in the first quartile of at least two of the three above-mentioned criteria sorted in
decreasing order, as an innovative recommendation (InnoRec).
Prior studies on analyst forecasts of corporate earnings per share (EPS) find evidence that
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innovative forecasts are more accurate, suggesting that analyst superior ability leads to more in-
novative outputs (Clement and Tse 2005). High-innovative forecast revisions likely contain more
information than low-innovative forecast revisions, and therefore generate higher return responses
in stock markets (Gleason and Lee 2003). Analysts with inferior forecasting ability are more likely
to herd so as to preserve their reputation. Stickel (1990) finds that members of on the Institutional
Investor annual “All-American Research Team", who represent analysts with superior forecasting
ability, are less likely to herd than other analysts when they issue forecast revisions.
Apart from that, personal dispositions such as overconfidence also influence the level of inno-
vation. In psychology, overconfidence is a well-established behavioral bias that leads individuals
to overestimate their ability to perform well. Shefrin (2007) explains that overconfidence “per-
tains to how well people understand their own abilities and the limits of their knowledge". Griffin
and Tversky (1992) point out that overconfidence is the greatest when people estimate their per-
formance on difficult tasks. A particular variant of overconfidence applies to the use of private
information. In this setting, overconfident agents believe that their private information is more
accurate than it actually is and, therefore, emphasize on their private information in an irrational
way (Hilary and Menzly 2006). The existence of overconfidence in form of overestimation on
private signal value impulses individuals to be engaged in aggressive decision-makings.
Consistent with the psychological theories related to individual behavior, prior literature in the
field of accounting and finance finds evidence that overconfidence is associated with an increased
propensity to innovation. Galasso and Simcoe (2011) find that overconfident CEOs, who under-
estimate the probability of failure are more likely to pursue corporate innovation. In the same
vein, Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh 2012 find that overconfident CEOs invest more in innovation and
achieve more innovative success. In the context of financial analysts, Hilary and Menzly (2006)
provide evidence that overconfidence, as a cognitive bias, affects the analyst’s decision making
process. Analysts with higher prior forecast accuracy become overconfident in their forecasting
ability, which leads them to issue less accurate earnings forecasts subsequently.
3.2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 91
3.2.2 Gender Difference in Overconfidence
Prior studies show that women are different from men in many aspects, physically and psycho-
logically. Such dispositional differences originated from gender impel them to have specific be-
havioral patterns when they are involved in social activities. Empirical findings in the domain of
behavioral finance identify gender differences in the following dispositional factors: 1) Risk aver-
sion. Women are more risk averse than men at least in field studies (Eckel and Grossman 2008).
Once they enter the financial world, stronger risk-aversion makes them reluctant to invest (Char-
ness and Gneezy 2012), unless sufficiently qualified information is available. 2) Competitiveness.
Women may be less effective than men in competitive environments, even if they are capable of
the same performance as men within non-competitive environments. Furthermore, the situation
worsens when women have to compete with men instead of other women (Gneezy, Niederle, and
Rustichini 2003). Although competition has a positive influence on performance, such influence is
stronger on men than on women. This might account for the rarity of women in the financial world,
because financial activities are commonly considered as full of competition. 3) Ethic values. The
psychological and sociological literature reveals that women usually attach more importance to
ethic values. More ethical, women executives are less intended to trade on insider information
and exhibit more participative spirit in their leadership compared to male leaders (Alice H. Eagly
1990). Overall, they appear to have more sense of cooperation and care more about others’ self-
worth (Eagly, Johannesen-Schmidt, and Van Engen 2003). 4) Overconfidence. Overconfidence
is a well-established behavioral bias that lead individuals to overestimate their ability to perform
well.
In this study, I focus on gender difference in overconfidence. Research on psychology pro-
vides evidence that while men and women exhibit both overconfidence, men are more overcon-
fident than women, particularly in male-dominated realms such as finance (Dahlbom et al. 2011;
Bengtsson, Persson, and Willenhag 2005). Consistent with the findings in psychology, Barber and
Odean (2001) document that stock trading reduces men’s net returns by 2.65 percentage points
a year as opposed to 1.72 percentage points for women. They attribute the difference to men’s
overconfidence in their ability to trade.
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Under the conjecture that overconfidence leads to more innovation and that men are systemat-
ically more overconfident than women, I hypothesize that
Hypothesis 1. All others things being equal, female analysts issue less innovative recommenda-
tions than male analysts because they are less overconfident than their male counterparts.
3.2.3 Gender Difference in Forecasting Ability
Prior research confirms a systematic gender difference in analyst job performance. Female an-
alysts exhibit superior forecasting ability by issuing more accurate earnings forecasts than male
analysts possibly due to a self-selection bias for female financial analysts. Kumar (2010) argues
that only female analysts with superior forecasting abilities enter the profession due to a percep-
tion of discrimination in the analyst labor market. He shows that their earnings forecasts are bolder
and more accurate than those of male analysts. Female analysts’ superior forecasting ability is also
recognized by investors. Kumar (2010) finds that market reactions to earnings forecasts of female
analysts are stronger despite the limited media coverage for female analysts.
With regard to stock recommendations, Li et al. (2013) find evidence that recommendation
revisions of female analysts generate excess stock returns similar to those of male analysts, but
with less idiosyncratic risks. Because superior ability is likely to result in higher innovation, the
well-documented superior forecasting ability of female analysts provides us with an alternative
hypothesis to test.
Hypothesis 2. All others things being equal, female analysts issue more innovative recommenda-
tions than male analysts because of their superior forecasting ability.
3.3 Research Design
3.3.1 Model Specification
When investigating analyst forecast revisions, Gleason and Lee (2003) distinguish between high-
innovation and low-innovation revisions using two benchmarks: the analyst’s own prior forecast
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and the prior day’s consensus forecast. Following Gleason and Lee (2003), I characterize in-
novative recommendations as recommendations that diverge from analyst consensus, that differ
from the analyst’s own prior opinion and that are issued ahead in time of other recommendations.
I compare male and female analysts in terms of innovation in three aspects: (1) recommenda-
tion divergence, measured by the distance from analyst consensus, (2) recommendation revision,
measured as the absolute value of recommendation change relative to the analyst’s own prior esti-
mation on the same stock, (3) recommendation gap, measured as the number of days between the
current recommendation and the latest previous recommendation by other analysts for the same
stock. I sort recommendations for the sample firms in decreasing order of innovation for each of
the above-mentioned criteria. Recommendations are expected to be innovative if they fall in the
first quartile of a given criteria sorted by descending order in order to obtain an innovation index.
Based on this index, a recommendation is considered as innovative if it is innovative for two out
of the three criteria.
I examine the relation between the likelihood of an innovative recommendation and several
characteristics of recommendations, analysts and recommended firms in both univariate and probit
settings. My baseline model allows to estimate the incremental contribution of each characteristics
on innovative recommendations and its economic significance.
InnoReci, j,t = β0+β1Femalei+β4BrokerSizei, j,t +β5Favorablei, j,t +β6Unfavorablei, j,t
+β7Affiliationi, j,t +β8EPS supporti, j,t +β9NbFirmi, j,t +β10FirstReci, j,t
+β11FirmExperi, j,t +β12AnalystFoli, j,t +β13SameCountryi, j,t + εi, j,t (3.1)
where, the dependent variables InnoRec is a binary variable that equals one if a recommendation
falls in the first quartile of at least two of the following three criteria ranked by descending order:
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Boldi, j,t = change in recommendation by analyst i for firm j at time t relative to the
previous recommendation made by the analyst i for firm j. The calculation
of recommendation changes is based on a five-point scale, i.e. 1= Strong
Sell, 2 = Underperform, 3 = Hold, 4 = Buy, 5 = Strong Buy. If the
current recommendation is the first recommendation issued by analyst i
for firm j, the recommendation change is set to be zero.
Divergent i, j,t = absolute value of the difference between recommendation by analyst i
for firm j at time t and the six-month consensus. The consensus for the
six months preceding the recommendation date is based on the five-point
scale of recommendation, i.e. 1 = Strong Sell, 2 = Underperform, 3 =
Hold, 4 = Buy, 5 = Strong Buy.
Leadi, j,t = analyst i’s recommendation timeliness for firm j at time t. It is measured
by the number of days between the current recommendation and the pre-
vious recommendation for the same firm. If the current recommendation
is the first recommendation for firm j, Lead is not available.
The variable of interest in the probit model is the gender of the analyst issuing a recommenda-
tion (Female). Analyst’s gender is determined by the first name.
Femalei, j,t = analyst’s gender, which is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the analyst is
a female, zero otherwise;
According to hypotheses H1 and H2, the coefficient of Female should be negative (positive)
if overconfidence (superior forecasting ability) has a greater marginal effect on issuing innovative
recommendations.
I control for several other analyst, firm, and recommendation characteristics in the estimation
model. The measurement of these control variables are as follows:
(a) Analyst coverage: The overall level of information available for a firm affects the analyst’s
recommendations (Hong, Lim, and Stein 2000). Prior studies find evidence that analyst cov-
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erage (i.e., number of analysts that follow a stock) influences the market ability to process
information. Gleason and Lee (2003) suggest that in case of innovative forecast revisions,
additional analyst coverage facilitates market price discovery by amplifying the market re-
action to the information conveyed in the revision innovation level. Therefore, I argue that
the likelihood to issue innovative recommendations increases with the number of financial
analysts who cover the firm. AnalystFoli, j,t is the number of analysts covering the firm j
recommended by analyst i during the year of the recommendation.
(b) Broker affiliation: Prior studies indicate that underwriting relations between brokerage
houses and covered firms bias analyst recommendations. Due to conflicts of interests, af-
filiated analysts are more reluctant to issue unfavorable recommendations for underwritten
firms (Clarke et al. 2011), and investors systematically discount favorable recommendations
issued by affiliated analyst (Barber, Lehavy, and Trueman 2007). Therefore, affiliated an-
alysts are less likely to issue innovative recommendations. I characterize analyst affiliation
(A f f iliationi, j,t) by a binary variable that equals one if the recommendation is issued by an
analyst employed by a brokerage house who worked for the recommended firm as a book-
runner or lead-manager for IPO (initial public offering) or SEO (second equity offering)
during the five-year preceding the recommendation.
(c) Broker size: Equity analysts in large brokerage houses issue more accurate earnings fore-
cast because they have easier access to corporate information (Jacob, Lys, and Neale 1999).
Such superior forecasting ability may lead to higher innovation in stock recommendations.
BrokerSizei, j,t which refers to the analyst’s broker size, is calculated as the number of ana-
lysts working for the brokerage house employing the analyst i during the year of the recom-
mendation under study.
(d) Forecast support: EPSsupport i, j,t is an indicator variable equal to one if the analyst’s rec-
ommendation occurred within ten days around the announcement date of an earnings fore-
cast for the same firm by the same analyst, zero otherwise. Recommendation revisions
supported by forecast revisions have a greater price impact than those without forecast re-
visions (Kecskés, Michaely, and Womack 2016). Earnings-based recommendations contain
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more verifiable information because earnings estimates are sooner or later exposed to ac-
tual earnings. Hence, issuing recommendations supported by earnings forecasts requires
higher forecasting ability. Therefore, earnings-based recommendations are more likely to
be innovative.
(e) Analyst firm-specific experience: Sorescu and Subrahmanyam (2006) show that recommen-
dation revisions of more experienced analysts outperform those of less experienced analysts,
under the conjecture that only analysts with superior forecasting skills can survive. Hence,
analyst experience may be related to the innovation in stock recommendations. Analyst’s
firm-specific experience (FirmExperi, j,t) is measured as the number of year between the
analyst’s first recommendation recorded by I/B/E/S and the current recommendation.
(f) Initial recommendation: Financial analysts tend to cover firms for which they intuitively
have optimistic views (McNichols and O’Brien 1997). Investors are aware of their behav-
ioral pattern and tend to react more strongly to initial stock recommendations. Therefore,
I conjecture that initial recommendations are less likely to be innovative because the ini-
tiation of stock coverage already conveys a strong information signal to the stock market.
FirstReci, j,t is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a recommendation is the first recommen-
dation made by the analyst for the recommended firm j, zero otherwise.
(g) Recommendation level: Favorablei, j,t is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the recommen-
dation is either labeled as “Strong Buy" or “Buy", zero otherwise. Un f avorablei, j,t is an
indicator variable that equals 1 if the recommendation is either labeled as “Under-perform"
or “Sell", zero otherwise. The distribution of analysts’ recommendations is skewed to fa-
vorable recommendations because analysts stop covering stocks for which they do not have
an optimistic view instead of issuing unfavorable recommendations. Market reactions to
unfavorable recommendations are therefore always systematically stronger. Hence, I argue
that unfavorable recommendations are more innovative than favorable recommendations.
(h) Analyst workload: Stock coverage is one of the financial analysts’ job performance met-
rics. Jacob, Lys, and Neale (1999) argue that as their workload increases, analysts spare less
effort for each of the firms they cover. Analysts covering numerous firms simultaneously
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are therefore less likely to issue innovative recommendations. I measure analyst’s work-
load by the number of firms covered by the analyst during the year of the recommendation
(NbFirmsi, j,t).
(i) Analyst geographic location: Analysts that are geographically close to the firms they cover
have an information advantage over the other analysts covering the same firms and, there-
fore, issue more accurate analyses (Malloy 2005; Sonney 2007). Bae, Stulz, and Tan (2008)
find that analyst domiciled in the same country as the covered firms issue more precise earn-
ings forecasts than non-resident analysts. Local analyst’s advantage on information may
therefore lead to more innovative recommendations. SameCountryi, j,t is a binary variable
that equals 1 if the recommendation is issued by an analyst located in the same country as
the recommended firm, zero otherwise.
I use a probit regression to model the binary response variable InnoRec. Subscripts i, j, t refer
to the analyst, firm and recommendation date, respectively. To make the scale of the regressors
irrelevant, all the variables (except the dummy variables) are standardized. The explanatory vari-
ables are put on equal footing because they have a mean of zero and a variance (and therefore a
standard deviation) equal to one. To ensure that extreme values do not affect the estimates, all
variables are winsorized at their 0.5 and 99.5 percentile levels.
Prior literature suggests that the residuals of panel data may be correlated, resulting in biased
standard errors (Petersen 2009). Following Loh and Stulz (2011), I adopt a two-way clustering
method in the probit models to correct the potential biases. I adjust the standard errors for firm-
specific and analyst-specific dependence by clustering standard errors at firm and analyst level
in order to control for the correlation problem. Dummy variables are not added to the probit
regressions as additional variables to control for fixed effects because of the incidental parameters
problems (Neyman and Scott 1948) that will be discussed in detail in section 6.
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3.3.2 Data and Sample Selection
To study the impact of gender difference on innovative recommendations, I merge several data sets.
The most important one is I/B/E/S detailed recommendation database. The recommendations un-
der scrutiny are those issued by European analysts, i.e. analysts located in the 28 European coun-
tries; namely, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and United
Kingdom. Countries outside the European Union, such as Switzerland, Norway and Russia, are
included in this research given that they belong to the same economic region as EU countries.
I/B/E/S database provides information about analysts’ stock recommendation consisting of 1)
company identifier, i.e., ISIN code of recommended firms, 2) the announcement date of recom-
mendation (Recommendation date), 3) the level of each recommendation1, 4) the identification
code of each analyst and 5) the broker for which the analyst works. Our data cover a eight-year
period from January 2006 to December 2013. The beginning of the sample period is coincident
with the date when European countries finished transposing the Market Abuse Directive (gener-
ally referred to as MAD) into their local legislation (Dubois and Dumontier 2008). The Market
Abuse Directive (Directive 2003/6/EC), hereafter MAD, was adopted in 2003 by the European
Commission to curb the insider dealing and market manipulation. The Directive 2003/6/EC states
that
“The identity of the producer of investment recommendations, his conduct of busi-
ness rules and the identity of his competent authority should be disclosed, since it may
be a valuable piece of information for investors to consider in relation to their invest-
ment decisions.”
Since the implementation of MAD, analysts are therefore required to disclose their names and
informations about their previous research reports when publishing their outputs, which makes
our study much more feasible since I can determine each analyst’s gender by the first name.
1For the whole sample period under study, I/B/E/S database use a five-level recommendation scale: namely, Strong
Buy, Buy, Hold, Underperform, and Sell.
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Since the I/B/E/S database does not mention the analyst’s gender, the gender is identified by the
analyst’s first name. However I/B/E/S only provides a brief identity code for each analyst, which
is composed of the analyst’s last name and the initial letter of his/her first name. For example,
an analyst named "Joe Black” is coded as "J Black” in the I/B/E/S database. Thus, complemen-
tary information about analysts’ complete first name and their workplace (at the country level) is
obtained from the official website of Thomson One2. Thomson One provides more detailed and
thorougher information about the analysts from whom it collects data. The analyst’s first name,
last name, employer, workplace, contact coordinates can all be found in the website. After merg-
ing the recommendation data from I/B/E/S with data of analyst identities, I determine the gender
of associated analysts by using a list of 22,345 unique first names3. Thus according to the outcome
of gender identification, analysts are separated into three categories: male, female and undefined.
Some analyst’s gender is undefinable due to the following facts: 1) unisex first name, some first
names, such as “Alex", could be used as a first name for both male and female; 2) duplicate last
name and first initial, there are more than one analyst identification that could be matched with an
analyst identity code, for example, “Julia Smith" and “John Smith" could both be abbreviated as
“J Smith”; or 3) undisclosed analyst code: some analyst identity codes are deliberately veiled by
the data provider and thus turn out to be “Undisclosed".
〈 Insert Table 3.1 about here 〉
I identify 125,908 recommendations issued by 3,554 European analysts from 2006 to 2013
(See Table 3.1 4). Almost half of the recommendations are favorable. The statistics show that
among the 3,554 European analysts, 575 analysts are women. The proportion of female analysts
in Europe, 16.18%, is comparable to the statistics obtained from the United States (Kumar 2010).
Further, 18,386 recommendations were issued by female analysts. They account for 14.6% of
all the recommendations. Female analysts, on average, issued less recommendations that their
male counterparts. I use a five-point scale (1 = Strong Sell, 2 = Underperform, 3 = Hold, 4 =
2www.thomsonone.com
3The data mainly come from in the following sites: www.behindthename.com/, www.babynameindex.com/,
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Masculine_given_names, and en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:
Feminine_given_names
4All the tables are presented in the end of chapter for easier reading purposes.
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Buy, 5 = Strong Buy) for analysts’ investment recommendations. I label “Strong Buy" and “Buy"
recommendations as “favorable" recommendations, “Hold" recommendations as “neutral" recom-
mendations, and “Underform" and “Sell" recommendations as “unfavorable" recommendations.
The descriptive statistics for each of the three levels of recommendations indicate that female an-
alysts issue less neutral recommendations than their male counterparts. 13.6% of all the neutral
recommendations are issued by female financial analysts, lower than the percentage of favorable
(unfavorable) recommendations issued by female analysts.
I eliminate recommendations from the sample if they fall in one of the following criteria.
First, recommendations are dropped from the sample if they are issued by an analyst for whom
I cannot define the gender. Second, I/B/E/S sometimes records twice the same recommendation
revision. In case of duplicate recommendations, the earliest date observation is chosen. Third, I
eliminate recommendations that occur within the three-day window around a firm-specific news
release date. This is to remove recommendations that merely repeat the information contained in
firm-specific news releases. Not removing observations contaminated by contemporaneous firm-
specific news releases leads to falsely giving credit to analyst performance. Finally, if different
analysts issue recommendations for the same company on the same date, all the recommendations
issued at this date are removed from the sample. This requirement is necessary because it is
not possible to determine which recommendation triggers the abnormal stock returns when more
than one recommendations are issued simultaneously (see Table 3.2 for details). The final sample
contains 89,312 recommendations issued by European analysts from 2006 to 2013.
〈 Insert Table 3.2 about here 〉
In order to control for brokerage house affiliation, I collect data for equity offering for years
2001 to 2013 from the Securities Data Company (SDC) databases. Using SDC, I obtain informa-
tion on initial public offerings (IPOs) and secondary equity offerings (SEOs) conducted during the
sample period, including the date of the offering and the name of underwriters and bookrunners.
I, then, merge information on these IPOs and SEOs with the stock recommendation sample, so
that I can categorize for each recommended firm whether the analyst’s brokerage house had an
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underwriting relationship with the covered firm over the five proceeding year.
3.4 Main Results
3.4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.3 reports the univariate analyses for gender difference in recommendation characteristics.
16.6% of all stock recommendations are innovative according to my innovation index. Among all
stock recommendations issued by male (female) analysts, 17.0% (14.5%) of them are innovative.
T-statistics confirm that the gender difference in terms of recommendation innovation is significant
at 0.01 level for univariate tests.
I also observe statistically significant gender difference in the boldness of stock recommen-
dations. Female analysts issue recommendations closer to the recommendation consensus than
their male counterparts. On average, recommendations issued by female analysts diverge from
the consensus by 0.895 while male analysts issue recommendations more away from the consen-
sus, with an average divergence of 0.925. The change in the recommendation level relative to
the analyst’s prior recommendations is also smaller for recommendations issued by women. The
average revision degree from the previous recommendation is 0.798 for female analysts, less than
that for male analysts (0.849). The descriptive statistics also show that female analysts issue stock
recommendations 30 days after the previous recommendation available for the same stock, which
is more than the average recommendation gap of male analysts, i.e., 26 calender days.
〈 Insert Table 3.3 about here 〉
The distribution of innovative recommendations is reported in Table 3.4. The statistics show
that most of stock recommendations are not innovative according to our criteria. 45.6% of all
the stock recommendations are neither Bold, Divergent, nor Lead recommendations. 37.5% of
them are innovative in only one dimension. For stock recommendations that are innovative in
two dimensions, most of them are innovative in terms of boldness and divergence from the con-
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sensus (8%). Less recommendations are both bold and lead (2.8%). Among all the stock rec-
ommendations in our sample, only 2.6% are innovative in all of the three criteria, i.e., they are
simultaneously bold, divergent from analyst consensus and lead in time.
〈 Insert Table 3.4 about here 〉
Table 3.5 reports the Pearson correlation coefficients for all the explanatory variables in the
baseline model. The coefficients are all trivial in absolute value, indicating none of the variables
are highly correlated one to the other. T-tests for the Pearson correlation coefficients confirm a
low probability of collinearity or multicollinearity among the regressors.
〈 Insert Table 3.5 about here 〉
3.4.2 Regression Results
Next, I turn to regression analyses to provide more direct evidence on whether there exists a gender
effect on issuing innovative recommendations. Analysts characteristics as well as firm characteris-
tics are incorporated as control variables in the probit regressions. Table 3.6 presents the estimation
results from Equation (1) for the whole sample. Standard errors of estimated coefficients are clus-
tered at firm and analyst levels. The marginal effects of the independent variables are reported
beside the coefficient estimates. The marginal effects for dummy (continuous) explanatory vari-
ables represents the change in the predicted probability when the independent variable changes
from zero to one (by one standard deviation).
The empirical evidence shows significant gender heterogeneity among analysts’ stock recom-
mendations. Compared to male analysts, female analysts issue less innovative recommendations,
all other things being equal. The magnitude of the marginal effect at the mean value of Female
is 3.4%, which suggests that on average, the predicted probability of innovative recommendations
is 3.4% less for female analysts than for male analysts. Given that the unconditional probabil-
ity of a recommendation being innovative is 16.6%, such a gender effect on innovation is large.
This means that for a male analyst, the probability that his current recommendation is innovative
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increases by 3.4%.
〈 Insert Table 3.6 about here 〉
The coefficient of FirstRec is negative and significant at 0.01 level, suggesting that initial
investment recommendations on a newly-covered firm are less likely to be innovative. Prior lit-
erature finds evidence suggesting that security analysts selectively provide coverage for firms for
which their expectations are favorable (Das, GUO, and Zhang 2006). Market reactions to analyst’s
initiations are also significantly higher than those to other recommendations. Therefore, initial rec-
ommendations already convey strong information to investors and are less likely to be innovative.
Affiliation has a negative coefficient that is significant at conventional level. This indicates that
affiliated analysts are less likely to issue innovative recommendations. This finding is consistent
with prior research that suggests affiliated analysts publish more optimistic and favorable recom-
mendations than non-affiliated analysts (Lin and McNichols 1998) because recommendations are
less likely to be innovative if they are always favorable.
Innovation in recommendations is also driven by the recommendation levels. The marginal
effect of Unfavorable is significantly negative and larger than that of Favorable, suggesting that
unfavorable recommendations (i.e. Underperform and Sell) leads to more innovative recommen-
dations relative to favorable and neutral recommendations. Furthermore, the coefficient of Broker-
size is negative and statistically significant at 0.01 level, indicating that analysts working in large
brokerage houses are less likely to issue innovative recommendations.
The coefficient of AnalystFol is significantly negative, which indicates that recommendations
for firms followed by numerous analysts are less likely to be innovative. The marginal effect of
AnalystFol is 1.1%. Firms with low analyst coverage are therefore more likely to receive inno-
vative recommendations, consistent with the idea that security analysts are more innovative when
they speak in a smaller crowd. The coefficient of SameCountry is both positive and significant at
0.01 level, suggesting that analysts working in the same country as the recommended firm issue
more innovative recommendations. The similar advantage of local analysts is also documented
by Malloy (2005) and Sonney (2007), who find evidence that local analysts issue more accurate
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forecasts and have stronger impact on security prices than other analysts.
Not surprisingly, the estimated coefficient on EPS support is strongly positive, indicating that
stock recommendations are more likely to be innovative if supported by a forecast on ESP. I
also find that the analyst’s firm specific experience (FirmExper) as well as the analyst’s workload
(NbFirms) do no provide incremental predictability in identifying recommendation innovation.
To summarize, I show evidence of gender difference in issuing innovative stock recommen-
dations. Female analysts issue less innovative recommendations than their male counterparts, all
other things being equal. Based on the hypotheses H1 and H2, this evidence suggests analysts’
overconfidence exerts a larger marginal effect on recommendation revisions than their forecasting
ability.
3.5 Additional Tests
3.5.1 Three Criteria of Innovation
In the previous section, I examined the relation between the likelihood of an innovative recom-
mendation and several characteristics at the recommendation, analyst and firm levels. If the effect
documented for the dummy variable InnoRec is robust, I should observe similar patterns for each
of the three criteria (Bold, Divergent, Lead). To test this, I examine the incremental effect of
gender on each of these three criteria respectively.
Criteriai, j,t = β0+β1Femalei+β2Boldi, j,t +β3Divergenti, j,t +β4Leadi, j,t
β5BrokerSizei, j,t +β6Favorablei, j,t +β7Unfavorablei, j,t
+β8Affiliationi, j,t +β9EPS supporti, j,t +β10NbFirmsi, j,t +β11FirstReci, j,t
+β12FirmExperi, j,t +β13AnalystFoli, j,t +β14SameCountryi, j,t
+Firm fixed effects+ εi, j,t (3.2)
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where, Criteria is either Bold, Divergent, or Lead. I use OLS model to estimate the coefficients.
I include firm dummies to control for firm fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at analyst
level.
Table 3.7 reports the coefficient estimates for the three criteria as the response variable respec-
tively. I find that the coefficients of the indicator variable Female are significantly negative across
all of the three model specifications. Results in Table 3.7 based on the three criteria of innovation
lead to similar qualitative conclusions as the baseline model of InnoRec. Female analysts issue
less innovative recommendations. Recommendation revisions of female analysts diverge less from
the analyst consensus. They are less revised relative to the analyst’s own prior recommendation
for the same firm. They are also less ahead in time of other recommendations for the same firm.
〈 Insert Table 3.7 about here 〉
In the model specification with Divergent as dependent variable, the results suggest that Bold
and Lead both have positive marginal effects, all other things being equal. Analyst’s initial rec-
ommendations (FirstRec) diverge more from the analyst consensus. Affiliated analysts are not
significantly different from non-affiliated analysts with regard to divergence from the analyst con-
sensus. Unfavorable recommendations are more divergent, because the distribution of recom-
mendation revisions are skewed to favorable recommendations, i.e., recommendations labeled as
Strong Buy and Buy. Recommendations issued by analysts in larger brokerage houses (Broker-
Size) are less divergent. For firms with larger analyst coverage (AnalystFol), recommendation
revisions diverge less from the consensus. Analysts domiciled in the same country as the recom-
mended firms (SameCountry) issue more divergent recommendations. Earning forecasts support
(EPS support), analyst firm-specific experience (FirmExper) and analyst workload (NbFirms) do
not exert statistically significant effect on the divergence of recommendation revisions from the
analyst consensus.
With regard to regression results with Bold as dependent variable, I find that recommendation
revisions that diverge more from the analyst consensus (Divergent) are bolder recommendations.
Nonetheless, recommendations that are more ahead in time than other recommendations (Lead)
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are less revised relative to analyst’s own prior revision for the same firm. In the research de-
sign, I set that if the current recommendation is the first recommendation, the recommendation
change is set to be zero. Therefore, the coefficient of the initial recommendations (FirstRec) is
significantly negative. The findings also suggest that affiliated analysts (Affiliation) issue less bold
recommendations than non-affiliated analysts. The coefficients of Favorable and Unfavorable are
both negative at conventional level, which indicates that neutral recommendations are bolder than
favorable and unfavorable recommendations. Revisions to neutral recommendations, i.e., recom-
mendations labeled as Hold are the largest revisions. Similar to the results of Divergent, analysts
working in large brokerage houses (BrokerSize) publish less revised recommendations. Recom-
mendations are more revised if they are related to firms with large analyst coverage (AnalystFol).
Analysts domiciled in the same country as recommended firms (SameCountry) issue bolder rec-
ommendations. Recommendation revisions are bolder when they are supported by an earnings
forecast (EPS support). I find no significant marginal effects for analyst firm-specific experience
(FirmExper) and analyst workload (NbFirms).
As for the model specification of Lead presented in Column 4 of Table 3.7, the findings in-
dicate that strongly revised recommendations (Bold) are less ahead in time. However, recom-
mendations that diverge more from the analyst consensus (Divergent) lead more in the timeliness.
In addition, analysts’ initial recommendations (FirstRec) are more ahead in time. Similar to the
regression findings of Bold, recommendations issued by affiliated analysts (Affiliation) lead less
in time relative to other recommendations for the same firm. The coefficient of Favorable is not
significant while that of Unfavorable is negative at the conventional level, suggesting that ana-
lysts issue unfavorable recommendation in a less timely way, later than other recommendations.
Analysts working in large brokerage houses (BrokerSize) issue more recommendations ahead of
others. Recommendations issued for firms with larger analyst coverage (AnalystFol) are less ahead
in time because the time gap between recommendation revisions reduces as the number of analysts
following the firm increases.
The coefficient of SameCountry is negative, suggesting that recommendations issued by an-
alysts domiciled in the same country as the recommended firms are less ahead in time just like
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recommendations supported by an earnings forecast (EPS support). Earnings forecasts are more
sophisticated and more complicated to produce than stock recommendations. Therefore, it may
take more time to issue recommendations supported by such forecasts. I also find that analysts with
more firm-specific experience (FirmExper) issue recommendations that are more ahead of others.
More surprisingly, recommendations issued by analysts who cover numerous firms (NbFirms),
i.e., those with a larger workload, issue recommendations that are more ahead in time.
3.5.2 Recommendation Levels
Using the pooled sample of all recommendations, I have shown that female analysts are less likely
to issue innovative recommendations than male analysts. I now examine the association between
innovation in recommendations and gender for recommendations with different tones. Table 3.8
reports sub-sample regression results on favorable, neutral and unfavorable recommendations re-
spectively. The marginal effect of the variable Female is −3.5% for favorable recommendations,
which indicates that, on average, the predicted probability of favorable innovative recommenda-
tions is 3.5% less for female analysts than for male analysts. The same negative marginal effects
for the Female variable are documented for neutral and unfavorable stock recommendations as
well: −2.2% (−4.7%) for neutral (unfavorable) stock recommendations. I find that the marginal
effects of Female are not homogeneous across the three recommendation levels. Female analysts
are more unlikely to issue innovative stock recommendations when they issue unfavorable stock
recommendations.
Results in Table 3.8 are consistent with the baseline results presented in Table 3.6. The dummy
variable Female is consistently negative across the three specifications: favorable recommenda-
tions, neutral recommendations, and unfavorable recommendations. In sum, results in Table 3.8
using stock recommendations with different tones lead to similar qualitative conclusions. Female
financial analysts are less likely to issue innovative recommendations than male analysts. Prior
research shows that men are systematically more overconfident than women and that female an-
alysts have higher predicting skills than male analysts. In the light of prior literature, I conclude
that innovation in recommendations is more driven by overconfidence than by analyst’s predicting
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skills.
〈 Insert Table 3.8 about here 〉
3.6 Robustness Tests
3.6.1 Endogeneity Corrections
The main concern is that analysts’ recommended firms are not randomly distributed to financial
analysts. Gender difference in innovative recommendations might therefore result from gender
heterogeneity in stock coverage. This is why the following robustness tests are mainly focused on
mitigating the endogeneity resulting from selection biases in firm coverage.
The first approach I use is based on fixed effects by adding firm dummies in the baseline equa-
tion, using standard estimation procedures. However, prior literature suggests that fixed effect
estimators of non-linear models such as binary response models suffer from incidental parameters
problems (Neyman and Scott 1948). The maximum likelihood estimators (MLE) are asymptoti-
cally unbiased and consistent only if the number of observations (N) and time periods (T) tend to
infinity. When T is small, fixed effects are biased and poorly estimated, which contaminates the
rest of the coefficients estimated by MLE procedure. A quick yet efficient remedy is to use linear
probability model (LPM) with fixed effects (Aeberhardt and Davezies 2012). Although the issue
of fitted values being outside the unit interval is a obvious weakness, the LPM is often considered
to provide “good estimates of the partial effects on the response probability near the center of the
distribution of X" (Wooldridge 2002). Therefore, I estimate the following LPM with firm fixed
effects:
P(InnoRec = 1 | X) = β T X +FEγ (3.3)
As in the baseline model, X is the set of recommendation, analyst, firm characteristics, including
the binary explanatory variable Female. The coefficient estimate of Female is just the difference
in the probability of success when InnoRec = 1 and InnoRec = 0, holding the other independent
variables fixed. FE is the set of firm dummies used as additional variables to control for firm fixed
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effects.
Table 3.9 reports the OLS estimators for the linear probability model. The firm fixed effects
are included in the model. Standard errors are clustered at the analyst level. The OLS estimates
are comparable to the marginal effects calculated from the probit model presented in Table 3.6.
Consistent with the results from the baseline probit model, I find that female analysts are less
likely to issue innovative recommendations. The difference in the probability of issuing innovative
recommendation is 3.2% between male and female analysts. The results of other control variables
are similar to those reported in Table 3.6 for the baseline model. The coefficients for the control
variables are with the same scale as those of the marginal effects estimated using the baseline
probit model.
〈 Insert Table 3.9 about here 〉
As a robustness check, I also use the Heckman’s two-stage technique to address the concern
that female analysts cover stocks that differ from those covered by their male counterparts. The
first approach uses linear probability regression that includes firm fixed effects. Nevertheless, I
use the two-stage Heckman selection model (Heckman 1979) to directly account for this type of
endogeneity problem. The treatment effect model is the baseline model presented in Equation (1),
which can be written as follows:
InnoRec = β1Female+β T X + ε (3.4)
where X is a vector of exogenous variables (including an intercept) that affect the dependent
variable, InnoRec. The dummy variable of interest, Female, is estimated using a binary choice
model:
Female∗ = α0Z+αT X +υ (3.5)
where Female = 1 if Female∗ > 0 and Female = 0 if Female∗ < 0. Z refers to the instrumental
variable. To implement the Heckman procedure, I first regress the dummy variable Female on an
exogenous factor that could affect the likelihood of a recommendation to be issued by a female
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analyst (Z). The key instrumental variable is the percentage of analysts with undefined gender
in each country (Undefined). While this variable Undefined is likely to affect the likelihood of
recommendations issued by female analysts, it is unlikely to affect individual analysts’ innovation
in stock recommendations, i.e., the variable InnoRec. The first-stage Heckman model is usually
estimated using probit model (Lennox, Francis, and Wang 2011).
In Panel A of Table 3.10, the probit regression results suggest that the proportion of undefined
analysts (Undefined) significantly predicts the likelihood of stock recommendation to be issued
by female analysts. I then estimate the inverse Mill’s ratio (IMR) from the first stage Heckman
regression.
IMR =

ϕ(α̂0Undefined+α̂T X)
Φ(α̂0Undefined+α̂T X)
, if Female = 1
−ϕ(α̂0Undefined+α̂T X)
1−Φ(α̂0Undefined+α̂T X) , if Female = 0
(3.6)
where ϕ(.) and Φ(.) are the normal density and cumulative distribution functions, respectively. I
include the estimated IMR as an additional variable in the second-stage Heckman regression.
In Panel B of Table 3.10, I report the results for the second-stage Heckman model for InnoRec.
Consistent with findings for the baseline probit model, the coefficient of Female is significantly
negative, with a marginal effect of −3.4%. I then replicate the same two-stage Heckman proce-
dure for each of the three criteria (See Panel C of Table 3.10). The coefficients for Female are
constantly negative across three model specifications.Therefore, after the Heckman correction for
endogeneity, the main results remain valid, i.e., female financial analysts issue less innovative
recommendations than male analysts.
〈 Insert Table 3.10 about here 〉
The final alternative model specification refers to a propensity score matching used as ro-
bustness check. To isolate the effect of gender heterogeneity in firm coverage, I compare female
recommendations against a benchmark sample with similar characteristics but issued by male an-
alysts. I use a propensity-score matching to select the control sample. The matching begins with
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a probit regression of a female dummy variable on control variables presented below.
Femalei, j,t = β0+β1FirstReci+β4BrokerSizei, j,t +β5Favorablei, j,t
+β6Unfavorablei, j,t +β7Affiliationi, j,t +β8EPS supporti, j,t +β9NbFirmi, j,t
+β10FirmExperi, j,t +β11AnalystFoli, j,t +β12SameCountryi, j,t + εi, j,t (3.7)
Panel A of Table 3.11 reports the pooled probit regressions before and after matching for two-
way (by firm and analyst) cluster-robust standard errors. All of the determinants that significantly
predict the probability of innovative recommendation before matching become insignificant after
matching, which suggests that the matching effectively reduces the differences in the observable
recommendation characteristics between female and male analysts and, therefore, mitigates the
endogeneity issues.
I then use the propensity scores from this probit estimation and perform a nearest neighbor
match with replacement. This procedure ensures that a female recommendation is paired with
a male recommendation with statistically the same characteristics. During the sample period,
the propensity-score matching generates 11,506 female-male recommendation pairs I then run a
univariate regression, and a multivariate regression with control variables on the matched sample
to examine the gender differences in innovative recommendations (See Panel B of Table 3.11). In
the regression with Innorec as the dependent variable, the marginal effect of Female is −3.9%,
consistent with the results from the baseline model.
Results for each of the three innovative criteria (Bold, Divergent, and Lead) are reported in
Table 3.11. The negative and significant coefficients on Female for three model specifications
indicate that female analysts issue less recommendations that diverge less from the analyst’s own
prior recommendation, from the current analyst consensus. They also issue recommendations that
are less ahead in time.
〈 Insert Table 3.11 about here 〉
112 Chapter 3
3.6.2 Bias in Sample Selections
This study shows that female analysts are, all things equal, less innovative than their male coun-
terparts. To strengthen this conclusion, I replicate the baseline model [Equation (1)] on different
sub-samples. First, I eliminate all recommendations issued by inactive analysts, who issued less
than five recommendations in a given year. Second, the recommendations issued from United
Kingdom are withdrawn from the sample. Almost one third of the recommendations in the sample
are issued by analysts in United Kingdom. By eliminating these recommendations, I can deter-
mine the extent to which the observed gender difference in recommendation innovation is driven
by UK observations. Third, I exclude all recommendations issued during the financial crisis, i.e.,
stock recommendations from 2008 to 2009, in order to eliminate the abnormality in the stock mar-
ket returns during the crisis period. Fourth, I exclude recommendations for the less covered firms,
which are followed by less than five analysts in a given year.
The results from these additional tests are presented in Table 3.12. In all instances, the re-
sults are qualitatively similar to the baseline results obtained using the full sample. The coefficient
estimates of Female remain significantly negative across the four model specifications. The regres-
sions with different sub-samples confirm that female analysts issue, all things equal, less innova-
tive stock recommendations. In sum, my results are robust to alternative methods of endogeneity
corrections and different samples.
〈 Insert Table 3.12 about here 〉
3.7 Conclusion and Discussion
Prior research shows that innovative recommendations are associated with higher abnormal stock
returns because they incorporate more private information. The existing literature focuses on the
attributes of financial analysts who issue the most innovative stock recommendations or earnings
forecasts and finds evidence that overconfidence and superior skills lead to innovation. In the same
vein, this study investigates whether female financial analysts issue less/more innovative recom-
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mendations than their male counterparts. The research question is motivated by two behavioral
principles. First, extensive literature confirms that men are more overconfident than women in gen-
eral circumstances. Second, with regard to financial analysts, prior research provides evidence that
female analysts have superior forecasting ability than male analysts. Hence, investigating whether
female analysts issue more innovative recommendations than their male counterparts helps to de-
termine whether innovation in recommendation revisions, which accounts for most of the excess
stock returns associated with recommendations, is driven by analysts’ overconfidence or by ana-
lysts’ superior predicting skills.
I use three criteria to detect innovative recommendations. A recommendation is likely to be
innovative if it is bold because it is much revised relative to the analyst’s own prior revision, if it
is divergent because it diverges from the analyst consensus, and finally, if it is lead because it is
issued ahead of other recommendations for the same firm. Based on the three criteria, I construct
an innovation index “InnoRec" equal to one if a recommendation falls in the first quartile of at
least two out of the three criteria ranked by decreasing order.
I show that the gender of financial analysts exerts an incremental effect on the likelihood of
issuing innovative recommendations. I find that 16.6% of the investment recommendations are
innovative after eliminating recommendation revisions contaminated by confounding corporate
news. Nearly half of the sample recommendations are not innovative regardless of the criterion
under consideration. I find that female financial analysts are less likely to issue innovative recom-
mendations. Considering that prior research shows that women are less overconfident than men
and that female analysts have higher forecasting abilities than male analysts, this findings sug-
gest that innovation in stock recommendations is more driven by analyst’s overconfidence than
analyst’s superior forecasting skills. I also find that a) unfavorable recommendations are more in-
novative relative to favorable and neutral recommendations, b) affiliated analysts, analysts working
in large brokerage houses are less expected issue innovative recommendations, c) analysts close
to the headquarter of covered firms issue more innovative recommendations, giving credit to the
view that geographic proximity is an important determinant of information availability, d) stock
recommendations supported by earnings forecasts are more likely to be innovative.
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Stock recommendations are a direct outcome of the analysts’ decision process. They are, there-
fore, often used to investigate gender heterogeneity among financial analysts (Green, Jegadeesh,
and Tang 2009; Li et al. 2013). This study contributes to the literature by shedding light on the
mechanism behind analysts’ innovation in recommendation revisions. The empirical evidence
provided here clearly shows that male analysts are more innovative than their female counter-
parts. This contributes to the gender literature by confirming that women have different behavioral
patterns than men in the world of financial analysts. More interestingly, regarding the financial an-
alyst literature, the higher level of innovation in male analysts’ recommendations evidenced in this
study leads to consider that innovative stock recommendations are likely more driven by overcon-
fidence than by forecasting skills. However, this needs to be confirmed notably by investigating
whether investors react differently to innovative recommendations depending on whether they are
issued by male or by female analysts.
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3.A Tables
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics of Stock Recommendations
This table provides descriptive statistics for recommendations issued by European financial analysts during the 2006-
2013 period.
Full sample Female Male Undefined %female
Nb recommendations 125,908 18,386 101,442 6,080 0.146
Nb favorable recommendations 61,600 9,322 49,364 2,914 0.151
Nb neutral recommendations 43,583 5,943 35,229 2,411 0.136
Nb unfavorable recommendations 20,725 3,121 16,849 755 0.151
Nb analysts 3,554 575 2,782 197 0.162
Table 3.2: Sample Selection Criteria
The table presents the sample selection procedure. Criteria refers to the selection criteria imposed to the recommenda-
tion sample. NumObservations is the number of remaining recommendations after the application of the criteria.
Criteria Number of Observations
Recommendations issued by European analysts 125,908
After deleting:
- recommendations with undefined gender 119,828
- duplicated recommendations 111,782
- rec by different analysts at the same date for the same firm 96,523
- recommendations around the firm news release dates 89,312
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Table 3.3: Univariate Tests for Gender Differences in Recommendation Characteristics
The table reports the gender difference in behavioral patterns of financial analysts. Diverge is the divergence from the
consensus. Lead is the number of days between the current recommendation and previous recommendations issued
for the same firm. Bold is the absolute value of recommendation change relative to the previous recommendation by
the same analyst for the same firm. The values in the column Full sample, Female rec, and Male rec are mean values.
Difference (Male-Female) reports the difference between the statistics for male analysts and those for female analysts.
*** , ** , and * denote two-tailed significance of t-test at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively
Full Sample Female Rec Male Rec Difference (Male-Female)
InnoRec 0.166 0.145 0.170 0.024∗∗∗
Diverge 0.921 0.895 0.925 0.030∗∗∗
Lead 27.170 30.134 26.624 −3.509∗∗∗
Bold 0.841 0.798 0.849 0.051∗∗∗
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Table 3.4: Distribution of Innovative Stock Recommendations
The table reports the distributions of stock recommendations in terms of innovation. Bold refers to the change in
recommendation by analyst i for firm j at time t relative to the previous recommendation made by the analyst i for firm
j. Divergent is the absolute value of the difference between recommendation by analyst i for firm j at time t and the
six-month consensus. Lead is the number of days between the current recommendation and previous recommendation
for the same firm.
Number of rec % rec
Not innovative recommendations 47,369 0.456
Innovative recommendations at one dimension 37,641 0.375
Bold 11,444 0.106
Divergent 10,910 0.106
Lead 15,287 0.162
Innovative recommendations at two dimensions 14,520 0.143
Bold+Diverge 8,571 0.080
Bold+Lead 2,741 0.028
Diverge+Lead 3,208 0.034
Innovative recommendations at three dimensions 2,517 0.026
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Table 3.5: Pearson Correlations
This table reports the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients between the independent variables of the baseline regression model. FirstRec is an
indicator variable that equals 1 if the recommendation is the first recommendation made by the analyst for recommended firm j, zero otherwise. Affiliation
is a binary variable that equals one if the recommendation is issued by an analyst employed by a brokerage house who worked for the recommended firm
as a book-runner or lead-manager for IPO (initial public offering) or SEO (second equity offering) during the five-year preceding the recommendation.
SupportEPS is an indicator variable equal to one if the analyst’s recommendation occurred within ten days around the announcement date of the EPS
forecast for the same firm, zero otherwise. Favorable is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the recommendation is either labeled as “Strong Buy" or
“Buy", zero otherwise. Unfavorable is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the recommendation is either labeled as “Under-perform" or “Sell", zero
otherwise. SameCountry is an binary variable that equals 1 if recommendation is issued by analyst located in the same country as the firm covered by
analyst, zero otherwise. BrokerSize refers to analyst’s broker size, which is calculated as the number of analysts working for the brokerage house employing
the analyst i during the year of recommendation. AnalystFol is the number of analysts covering the firm i during the year of the recommendation. FirmExper
is measured as the number of year between analyst’s first recommendation recorded by I/B/E/S and the current recommendation. NbFirms the number of
firms covered by the analyst during the year of the recommendation revisions. *** , ** , and * denote two-tailed significance of t-test at the 0.01, 0.05, and
0.10 levels, respectively
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FirstRec 0.00 0.02∗∗∗ −0.04∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.00 0.02∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ 0.00 −0.01∗∗∗
Affiliation −0.01∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗ −0.09∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗ −0.47∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗
SupportEPS −0.02∗∗∗ 0.00 −0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.00 −0.04∗∗∗
Favorable 0.01∗∗∗ 0.00 −0.03∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗
Unfavorable −0.44∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗ −0.04∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗
SameCountry 0.02∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.00
BrokerSize −0.24∗∗∗ −0.12∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗∗
AnalystFol 0.09∗∗∗ −0.03∗∗∗ −0.07∗∗∗
FirmExper 0.09∗∗∗ −0.08∗∗∗
NbFirms 0.04∗∗∗
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Table 3.6: Regressions for Innovative Recommendations
This table reports the results for the probit regressions conducted for innovative recommendations. The dependent
variables are InnoRec for both restraint and extended models. FirstRec is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the
recommendation is the first recommendation made by the analyst for recommended firm j, zero otherwise. Affiliation
is a binary variable that equals one if the recommendation is issued by an analyst employed by a brokerage house who
worked for the recommended firm as a book-runner or lead-manager for IPO (initial public offering) or SEO (second
equity offering) during the five-year preceding the recommendation. SupportEPS is an indicator variable equal to one if
the analyst’s recommendation occurred within ten days around the announcement date of the EPS forecast for the same
firm, zero otherwise. Favorable is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the recommendation is either labeled as “Strong
Buy" or “Buy", zero otherwise. Unfavorable is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the recommendation is either labeled
as “Under-perform" or “Sell", zero otherwise. SameCountry is an binary variable that equals 1 if recommendation is
issued by analyst located in the same country as the firm covered by analyst, zero otherwise. BrokerSize refers to
analyst’s broker size, which is calculated as the number of analysts working for the brokerage house employing the
analyst i during the year of recommendation. AnalystFol is the number of analysts covering the firm i during the year of
the recommendation. FirmExper is measured as the number of year between analyst’s first recommendation recorded
by I/B/E/S and the current recommendation. NbFirms the number of firms covered by the analyst during the year of
the recommendation revisions. All variables are winsorized at their 0.5 and 99.5 percentile levels. The independent
variables (except the dummy variables) are standardized.
Dependent variable:
InnoRec
Restricted model Full model Marginal effects
Probit Probit
(1) (2) (3)
Female −0.118∗∗∗ −0.151∗∗∗ −0.034
(0.036) (0.039)
FirstRec −0.803∗∗∗ −0.179
(0.022)
Affiliation −0.157∗∗ −0.035
(0.073)
Favorable 0.479∗∗∗ 0.107
(0.020)
Unfavorable 1.029∗∗∗ 0.229
(0.024)
BrokerSize −0.099∗∗∗ −0.022
(0.015)
AnalystFol −0.050∗∗∗ −0.011
(0.011)
SameCountry 0.057∗∗ 0.013
(0.027)
EPS support 0.050∗∗∗ 0.011
(0.018)
FirmExper −0.005 −0.001
(0.012)
Continued on next page
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Dependent variable:
InnoRec
Restricted model Full model marginal effects
Probit Probit
(1) (2) (3)
NbFirms −0.014 −0.003
(0.013)
Constant −0.947∗∗∗ −1.298∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.031)
Observations 79,418 79,418
Pseudo-R2 -0.092 0.014
SE cluster Firm+Analyst Firm+Analyst
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
3.A. TABLES 125
Table 3.7: Regressions for the Three Criteria of Innovation
This table reports the results for the OLS regressions conducted for the three criteria used to determine innovative
recommendations. The dependent variables are Divergent, Bold, and Lead, respectively. Bold refers to the change in
recommendation by analyst i for firm j at time t relative to the previous recommendation made by the analyst i for firm
j. Divergent is the absolute value of the difference between recommendation by analyst i for firm j at time t and the
six-month consensus. Lead is the number of days between the current recommendation and previous recommendation
for the same firm. FirstRec is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the recommendation is the first recommendation
made by the analyst for recommended firm j, zero otherwise. Affiliation is a binary variable that equals one if the
recommendation is issued by an analyst employed by a brokerage house who worked for the recommended firm as
a book-runner or lead-manager for IPO (initial public offering) or SEO (second equity offering) during the five-year
preceding the recommendation. SupportEPS is an indicator variable equal to one if the analyst’s recommendation
occurred within ten days around the announcement date of the EPS forecast for the same firm, zero otherwise. Favorable
is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the recommendation is either labeled as “Strong Buy" or “Buy", zero otherwise.
Unfavorable is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the recommendation is either labeled as “Under-perform" or “Sell",
zero otherwise. SameCountry is an binary variable that equals 1 if recommendation is issued by analyst located in
the same country as the firm covered by analyst, zero otherwise. BrokerSize refers to analyst’s broker size, which
is calculated as the number of analysts working for the brokerage house employing the analyst i during the year of
recommendation. AnalystFol is the number of analysts covering the firm i during the year of the recommendation.
FirmExper is measured as the number of year between analyst’s first recommendation recorded by I/B/E/S and the
current recommendation. NbFirms the number of firms covered by the analyst during the year of the recommendation
revisions. All variables are winsorized at their 0.5 and 99.5 percentile levels. The independent variables (except the
dummy variables) are standardized.
Dependent variable:
Divergent Bold Lead
OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3)
Female −0.053∗∗∗ −0.046∗∗ −0.024∗
(0.015) (0.019) (0.014)
Bold 0.362∗∗∗ −0.013∗∗
(0.007) (0.006)
Diverge 0.349∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.007)
Lead 0.055∗∗∗ −0.024∗∗
(0.012) (0.010)
FirstRec 0.410∗∗∗ −1.373∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
Affiliation −0.018 −0.145∗∗∗ −0.083∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.035) (0.024)
Favorable 0.537∗∗∗ −0.141∗∗∗ 0.008
(0.015) (0.009) (0.009)
Unfavorable 1.280∗∗∗ −0.068∗∗∗ −0.060∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.015) (0.013)
BrokerSize −0.049∗∗∗ −0.053∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.008) (0.006)
Continued on next page
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Dependent variable:
Divergent Bold Lead
OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3)
AnalystFol −0.023∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ −0.214∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
SameCountry 0.053∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗ −0.245∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.013) (0.013)
supportEPS −0.004 0.103∗∗∗ −0.126∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
FirmExper −0.003 0.004 0.008∗
(0.004) (0.008) (0.005)
NbFirms 0.0002 −0.005 0.017∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.008)
Constant −0.951∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.019) (0.016)
Observations 80,690 80,690 80,690
R2 0.286 0.473 0.064
Adjusted R2 0.285 0.473 0.064
Fixed effects Firm Firm Firm
SE cluster Analyst Analyst Analyst
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 3.8: Regression for Innovative Recommendations: Conditional on Recommendation Levels
The table reports the results for the probit regressions conducted for innovative recommendations. The dependent
variable is InnoRec. Stock recommendations are categorized into favorable, neutral and unfavorable recommendations.
FirstRec is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the recommendation is the first recommendation made by the analyst
for recommended firm j, zero otherwise. Affiliation is a binary variable that equals one if the recommendation is issued
by an analyst employed by a brokerage house who worked for the recommended firm as a book-runner or lead-manager
for IPO (initial public offering) or SEO (second equity offering) during the five-year preceding the recommendation.
SupportEPS is an indicator variable equal to one if the analyst’s recommendation occurred within ten days around the
announcement date of the EPS forecast for the same firm, zero otherwise. Favorable is an indicator variable that equals
1 if the recommendation is either labeled as “Strong Buy" or “Buy", zero otherwise. Unfavorable is an indicator variable
that equals 1 if the recommendation is either labeled as “Under-perform" or “Sell", zero otherwise. SameCountry is an
binary variable that equals 1 if recommendation is issued by analyst located in the same country as the firm covered
by analyst, zero otherwise. BrokerSize refers to analyst’s broker size, which is calculated as the number of analysts
working for the brokerage house employing the analyst i during the year of recommendation. AnalystFol is the number
of analysts covering the firm i during the year of the recommendation. FirmExper is measured as the number of year
between analyst’s first recommendation recorded by I/B/E/S and the current recommendation. NbFirms the number of
firms covered by the analyst during the year of the recommendation revisions. All variables are winsorized at their 0.5
and 99.5 percentile levels. The independent variables (except the dummy variables) are standardized.
Dependent variable:
InnoRec
Favorable Neutral Unfavorable
Probit Probit Probit
Coeff Marg. eff Coeff Marg. eff Coeff Marg. eff
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female −0.147∗∗∗ −0.035 −0.160∗∗∗ −0.022 −0.138∗∗ −0.047
(0.044) (0.051) (0.055)
FirstRec −0.768∗∗∗ −0.181 −0.794∗∗∗ −0.110 −0.861∗∗∗ −0.295
(0.028) (0.044) (0.037)
Affiliation −0.156∗ −0.037 −0.065 −0.009 −0.258∗∗ −0.088
(0.083) (0.096) (0.124)
BrokerSize −0.081∗∗∗ −0.019 −0.111∗∗∗ −0.015 −0.122∗∗∗ −0.042
(0.016) (0.019) (0.022)
AnalystFol 0.036∗∗∗ 0.008 −0.282∗∗∗ −0.039 0.012 0.004
(0.013) (0.016) (0.017)
SameCountry 0.102∗∗∗ 0.024 0.0002 0.00002 0.023 0.008
(0.031) (0.039) (0.038)
supportEPS 0.059∗∗ 0.014 −0.014 −0.002 0.100∗∗∗ 0.034
(0.023) (0.028) (0.029)
FirmExper 0.024∗ 0.006 −0.049∗∗∗ −0.007 −0.022 −0.007
(0.014) (0.016) (0.019)
NbFirms −0.039∗∗∗ −0.009 0.0004 0.0001 0.029 0.010
(0.015) (0.017) (0.018)
Continued on next page
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Dependent variable:
InnoRec
Favorable Neutral Unfavorable
Probit Probit Probit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant −0.854∗∗∗ −1.290∗∗∗ −0.278∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.039) (0.037)
Observations 38,446 27,377 13,595
Pseudo R2 0.060 0.093 0.064
SE cluster Firm+Analyst Firm+Analyst Firm+Analyst
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 3.9: Linear Probability Model for Innovative Recommendations
This table reports the results for linear probability models conducted for innovative recommendations. The dependent
variables are InnoRec. FirstRec is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the recommendation is the first recommendation
made by the analyst for recommended firm j, zero otherwise. Affiliation is a binary variable that equals one if the
recommendation is issued by an analyst employed by a brokerage house who worked for the recommended firm as
a book-runner or lead-manager for IPO (initial public offering) or SEO (second equity offering) during the five-year
preceding the recommendation. SupportEPS is an indicator variable equal to one if the analyst’s recommendation
occurred within ten days around the announcement date of the EPS forecast for the same firm, zero otherwise. Favorable
is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the recommendation is either labeled as “Strong Buy" or “Buy", zero otherwise.
Unfavorable is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the recommendation is either labeled as “Under-perform" or “Sell",
zero otherwise. SameCountry is an binary variable that equals 1 if recommendation is issued by analyst located in
the same country as the firm covered by analyst, zero otherwise. BrokerSize refers to analyst’s broker size, which
is calculated as the number of analysts working for the brokerage house employing the analyst i during the year of
recommendation. AnalystFol is the number of analysts covering the firm i during the year of the recommendation.
FirmExper is measured as the number of year between analyst’s first recommendation recorded by I/B/E/S and the
current recommendation. NbFirms the number of firms covered by the analyst during the year of the recommendation
revisions. All variables are winsorized at their 0.5 and 99.5 percentile levels. The independent variables (except the
dummy variables) are standardized.
Dependent variable:
InnoRec
Restricted model Full model
OLS OLS
(1) (2)
Female −0.028∗∗∗ −0.032∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.004)
FirstRec −0.153∗∗∗
(0.003)
Affiliation −0.027∗∗∗
(0.009)
Favorable 0.099∗∗∗
(0.003)
Unfavorable 0.265∗∗∗
(0.005)
BrokerSize −0.026∗∗∗
(0.002)
AnalystFol −0.045∗∗∗
(0.004)
SameCountry 0.018∗∗∗
(0.005)
EPS support 0.013∗∗∗
(0.003)
FirmExper 0.002
(0.002)
Continued on next page
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Dependent variable:
InnoRec
Restricted model Full model
OLS OLS
(1) (2)
NbFirms −0.003∗
(0.002)
Constant 0.172∗∗∗
(0.004)
Observations 79,418 79,418
R2 0.001 0.102
Adjusted R2 0.001 0.014
Fixed effects None Firm
SE cluster Analyst Analyst
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 3.10: Analysis of Innovative Recommendations Using the Heckman Model
The table reports the regression results using the Heckman two-stage model to account for endogeneity in analyst
coverage. Panel A reports the first-stage Heckman model, where I regress Female on the percentage of analysts with
undefined gender in the country where an analyst is located. Other analyst-level characteristics and firm-level character-
istics are added to the regression model as control variables. Panel B reports the main coefficients for the second-stage
Heckman model, where the inverse Mill’s ratio(IMR) is calculated from the first-stage model. Undefined is the percent-
age of analysts for whom I can not determine the gender in a given country for a given year. All the other independent
variables are defined in the same way as presented in Table 3.6. All variables are winsorized at their 0.5 and 99.5
percentile levels. The independent variables (except the dummy variables) are all standardized.
Panel A. First-stage Heckman
Dependent variable:
Female
Probit
Undefined −0.046∗
(0.027)
FirstRec 0.018
(0.023)
Affiliation 0.201∗∗
(0.091)
BrokerSize −0.050∗
(0.028)
AnalystFol −0.003
(0.016)
SameCountry 0.049∗∗
(0.020)
supportEPS 0.050∗
(0.027)
FirmExper 0.016
(0.045)
NbFirms −0.106∗∗∗
(0.026)
AEF −0.002
(0.016)
lognbFirms −0.032
(0.026)
Constant −1.017∗∗∗
(0.039)
Observations 81,874
Akaike Inf. Crit. 69,998.090
SE cluster Analyst
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Panel B. Second-stage Heckman of InnoRec
Dependent variable:
InnoRec
Restricted model Full model
Probit Probit
Coefficients Coefficients Marginal effects
(1) (2) (3)
Female −0.138∗∗∗ −0.151∗∗∗ −0.034
(0.036) (0.039)
IMR −0.091∗∗∗ 0.029 0.006
(0.011) (0.038)
Observations 80,678 80,678
Control variables None Yes
Pseudo R2 0.005 0.111
SE cluster Firm+Analyst Firm+Analyst
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Panel C. Second-stage Heckman of Three Criteria
Dependent variable:
Divergent Bold Lead
OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3)
Female −0.052∗∗∗ −0.048∗∗ −0.023
(0.015) (0.019) (0.014)
IMR 0.036∗∗ −0.043∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.018) (0.015)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes
Observations 80,678 80,678 80,678
R2 0.286 0.473 0.064
Adjusted R2 0.286 0.473 0.064
SE cluster Firm+Analyst Firm+Analyst Firm+Analyst
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 3.11: Analysis of Innovative Recommendations Using Propensity Score Matching
The table reports results from a propensity score matching approach. I first run a probit regression to pair each female
recommendation with a male recommendation with statistically the same recommendation characteristics. I then run
a univariate regression and a multivariate regression of financial analyst gender on the dummy dependent variable
InnoRec. All the independent variables are defined in the same way as presented in Table 3.6. All variables are
winsorized at their 0.5 and 99.5 percentile levels. The independent variables (except the dummy variables) are all
standardized.
Panel A
Dependent variable:
Female
Before matching After matching
Probit Probit
(1) (2)
FirstRec 0.022 −0.006
(0.039) (0.039)
Affiliation 0.192 0.080
(0.124) (0.142)
BrokerSize 0.053∗ 0.015
(0.032) (0.036)
AnalystFol 0.054 −0.0001
(0.043) (0.050)
SameCountry −0.015 0.008
(0.040) (0.041)
supportEPS −0.012 0.005
(0.027) (0.030)
FirmExper 0.060 0.013
(0.068) (0.079)
NbFirms −0.115∗∗∗ −0.039
(0.041) (0.044)
AEF −0.005 −0.010
(0.026) (0.030)
nbFirms −0.008 0.060
(0.060) (0.057)
Constant −1.037∗∗∗ 0.104
(0.059) (0.068)
Observations 81,886 23,012
Akaike Inf. Crit. 70,263.730 31,723.110
SE cluster Firm+Analyst Firm+Analyst
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Panel B. Propensity Score Matching Model of InnoRec
Dependent variable:
InnoRec
Restricted model Full model
Probit Probit
Coefficients Coefficients Marginal effects
(1) (2) (3)
Female −0.160∗∗∗ −0.177∗∗∗ −0.039
(0.038) (0.040)
Control variables None Yes
Observations 23,012 23,012
Akaike Inf. Crit. 20,107.430 17,940.390
SE cluster Firm+Analyst Firm+Analyst
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Panel C. Propensity Score Matching Model of Three Criteria
Dependent variable:
Divergent Bold Lead
OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3)
Female −0.053∗∗∗ −0.062∗∗∗ −0.036∗∗
(0.016) (0.021) (0.017)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes
Observations 23,012 23,012 23,012
R2 0.275 0.473 0.071
Adjusted R2 0.275 0.472 0.071
SE cluster Firm+Analyst Firm+Analyst Firm+Analyst
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 3.12: Regressions Results for Restricted Samples
This table reports results from different the restricted samples. I run the baseline model for 1) recommendations issued
by active analysts who issued at least five recommendations in a given year (Active analysts); 2) recommendations
issued by analysts not located in the United Kingdom (UK excluded); 3) recommendations issued out of the financial
crisis period in the year 2008-2009 (Out of Crisis); 4) recommendations issued for firms followed by at least five
analysts (Firms well followed). The dependent variable is InnoRec. FirstRec is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the
recommendation is the first recommendation made by the analyst for recommended firm j, zero otherwise. Affiliation
is a binary variable that equals one if the recommendation is issued by an analyst employed by a brokerage house who
worked for the recommended firm as a book-runner or lead-manager for IPO (initial public offering) or SEO (second
equity offering) during the five-year preceding the recommendation. SupportEPS is an indicator variable equal to one if
the analyst’s recommendation occurred within ten days around the announcement date of the EPS forecast for the same
firm, zero otherwise. Favorable is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the recommendation is either labeled as “Strong
Buy" or “Buy", zero otherwise. Unfavorable is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the recommendation is either labeled
as “Under-perform" or “Sell", zero otherwise. SameCountry is an binary variable that equals 1 if recommendation is
issued by analyst located in the same country as the firm covered by analyst, zero otherwise. BrokerSize refers to
analyst’s broker size, which is calculated as the number of analysts working for the brokerage house employing the
analyst i during the year of recommendation. AnalystFol is the number of analysts covering the firm i during the year of
the recommendation. FirmExper is measured as the number of year between analyst’s first recommendation recorded
by I/B/E/S and the current recommendation. NbFirms the number of firms covered by the analyst during the year of
the recommendation revisions. All variables are winsorized at their 0.5 and 99.5 percentile levels. The independent
variables (except the dummy variables) are standardized.
Dependent variable:
InnoRec
Active analysts UK excluded Out of Financial Crisis Firms well followed
Probit Probit Probit Probit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female −0.168∗∗∗ −0.197∗∗∗ −0.156∗∗∗ −0.172∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.043) (0.039) (0.041)
FirstRec −0.809∗∗∗ −0.883∗∗∗ −0.789∗∗∗ −0.805∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.027) (0.024) (0.023)
Affiliation −0.165∗∗ −0.028 −0.218∗∗∗ −0.183∗∗
(0.076) (0.080) (0.075) (0.081)
Favorable 0.462∗∗∗ 0.515∗∗∗ 0.449∗∗∗ 0.595∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.026) (0.021) (0.021)
Unfavorable 1.020∗∗∗ 1.064∗∗∗ 1.032∗∗∗ 1.128∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.031) (0.026) (0.025)
BrokerSize −0.092∗∗∗ −0.090∗∗∗ −0.093∗∗∗ −0.108∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.018) (0.016) (0.015)
AnalystFol −0.052∗∗∗ −0.036∗∗∗ −0.063∗∗∗ −0.026∗∗
(0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012)
SameCountry 0.061∗∗ −0.013 0.029 0.046∗
(0.029) (0.033) (0.028) (0.028)
supportEPS 0.045∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗ 0.016 0.045∗∗
Continued on next page
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Table 3.12 – Continued from previous page
Dependent variable:
InnoRec
Active analysts UK excluded Out of Financial Crisis Firms well followed
Probit Probit Probit Probit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(0.020) (0.023) (0.021) (0.020)
FirmExper −0.012 0.015 0.004 0.002
(0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013)
NbFirms −0.006 −0.016 −0.021∗ −0.009
(0.014) (0.015) (0.013) (0.014)
Constant −1.286∗∗∗ −1.232∗∗∗ −1.238∗∗∗ −1.393∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.041) (0.033) (0.033)
Observations 69,335 48,374 57,468 69,563
Pseudo R2 0.108 0.118 0.112 0.123
SE cluster Firm+Analyst Firm+Analyst Firm+Analyst Firm+Analyst
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Abstract: This study analyses the role that an-
alysts’ overconfidence plays in the investors’
perception of innovative recommendations. I
investigate whether investors discount innova-
tive recommendations of overconfident ana-
lysts. The underlying conjecture is that if in-
vestors consider analysts’ overconfidence to be
detrimental to their job performance, stock mar-
kets should discount the innovative recommen-
dations issued by male analysts, who are more
overconfident than female analysts. The em-
pirical findings suggest that market reactions
to innovative recommendations are stronger
than those to non-innovative recommendations.
Nonetheless, I document no empirical evidence
for gender differences in market reactions to in-
novative recommendations. The findings con-
trast to the empirical evidence in corporate fi-
nancial decisions (Huang and Kisgen 2013;
Malmendier and Tate 2008), which suggests
that investors are more skeptical about projects
undertaken by overconfident CEOs. My find-
ings indicate that innovation of overconfident
male analysts is not less credible than that of fe-
male analysts, suggesting that investors do not
find analysts’ overconfidence to be detrimental.
Keywords: financial analysts, gender, stock
recommendations
4.1. INTRODUCTION 139
4.1 Introduction
Sell-side equity analysts are important figures in the financial investment arena. Extensive prior
research aims to identify the characteristics of financial analysts who produce more accurate fore-
casts (Clement 1999; Jacob, Lys, and Neale 1999; Kini et al. 2009) and more influential recom-
mendations (Bradley, Jordan, and Ritter 2008; Sorescu and Subrahmanyam 2006; Loh and Stulz
2011) than their peers. Difference in analysts’ performance is partly determined by factors such
as analysts’ forecasting ability, available resources and portfolio complexity. Past research also
documents the existence of an upward bias in the outputs of financial analysts and attributes its
possible origin to analysts’ temptation to favor company managers or to attract investment banking
business (Agrawal and Chen 2008; Cowen, Groysberg, and Healy 2006; Michaely and Womack
1999). In this paper, I investigate investors’ perception of the cross-sectional difference in stock
recommendations by focusing on one potentially important personal attribute of financial analysts:
overconfidence. More specifically, I examine whether the well-documented gender differences in
overconfidence lead to different market reactions to innovative recommendation revisions issued
by male and female analysts.
Psychologists define overconfidence as an individual’s over-estimation of his knowledge or
ability under uncertainty. Research in psychology provides evidence for gender difference in this
particular personal disposition. Men are more overconfident than women when they are involved
in social activities, especially in male-dominated fields such as finance (Dahlbom et al. 2011;
Bengtsson, Persson, and Willenhag 2005). In corporate decisions, overconfidence causes CEOs
to be more engaged in innovations because they tend to under-estimate the probability of failure
associated with innovative projects (Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh 2012; Galasso and Simcoe 2011).
From shareholders’ perspective, CEOs’ overconfidence leads to increased engagement in projects
with negative net values, which is detrimental to shareholder value. This is why Huang and Kisgen
(2013) and Malmendier and Tate (2008) find evidence that investors discount projects undertaken
by overconfident male CEOs.
In the light of prior research, I argue that male analysts are more overconfident than female
analysts when issuing stock recommendations. Overconfidence in this setting implies that ana-
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lysts overestimate their forecasting ability, notably because they rely too much on their private
information. Similar to market distrust on corporate projects undertaken by overconfident CEOs, I
posit that investors discount innovative recommendations issued by male analysts if their innova-
tion is motivated essentially by the over-estimation of their forecasting ability, i.e, male analysts’
overconfidence.
I test the hypothesis using a comprehensive sample of sell-side analyst investment recommen-
dations from I/B/E/S. I find that abnormal stock returns around innovative recommendations
are significantly higher, holding other factors constant. This finding is consistent with prior lit-
erature that shows that innovative output of financial analysts are more informative to investors
(Gleason and Lee 2003). Further, I investigate the potential gender difference in market reactions
to innovative recommendations. The underlying conjecture is that investors should be skeptical
about innovation in recommendations of male analysts, due to their relative overconfidence. I
consider a battery of analyst, recommendation, and firm variables. The multivariate results show
that investors do not discount innovative recommendations issued by overconfident male analysts.
The cumulative abnormal returns associated with innovative recommendations of female analysts
are similar to those of male analysts. The hypothesis which states that investors should discount
innovative recommendations of male analysts is, therefore, rejected, suggesting that male analysts
are not unduly more overconfident than female analysts to the detriment of investors who follow
their stock recommendations. I find similar results using abnormal trading volume around recom-
mendation dates as a proxy for market reactions. Additionally, I use the Heckman approach and
propensity-matching scores to mitigate potential endogeneity concerns relating to the distribution
of recommended firms. The results remain robust to alternative empirical approaches.
To my knowledge, this study is the first to investigate gender differences in overconfidence for
financial analysts and, more specifically, in the European context. Prior research on gender hetero-
geneity in the financial analysts’ milieu focuses uniquely on financial analysts in the United States
and does not address the overconfidence issue. Green, Jegadeesh, and Tang (2009) document that
female equity analysts make less accurate EPS forecasts but outperform men in all other aspects
of job performance. In contrast, Kumar (2010) shows that female analysts are more likely to issue
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bolder and more accurate earnings forecasts than their male counterparts. He classifies forecasts
that are both above (below) the prevailing analyst consensus and above (below) the analyst’s most
recent forecast as bold forecasts. He also shows that investors are aware of female analysts’ supe-
rior forecasting abilities. Market responds more strongly to the bold earnings forecasts of female
analysts. In contrast, Bosquet, Goeij, and Smedts (2014) find that female analysts are less likely to
issue optimistic recommendations than their male colleagues. Li et al. (2013) analyze the abnor-
mal stock returns associated with stock recommendations issued by female analysts and find that
female analysts underperform with respect to their upgraded recommendation revisions. How-
ever, they do not find statistically significant gender difference in stock abnormal returns around
recommendation announcements. This study differs from previous literature as I focus on gender
difference in market reactions to innovative recommendations rather than those to all confounded
recommendations.
This study’s main contribution to prior literature is threefold. First, my empirical findings
complement the literature on overconfidence by showing that innovation resulting from overcon-
fidence is not detrimental to investors in the context of financial analysts. Hence, investors do not
discount innovation in recommendations issued by overconfident male analysts, contrary to the
empirical evidence documented for corporate financial decisions made by overconfident CEOs.
Second, this study complements prior research on determinants of recommendation informative-
ness. Past research shows that recommendations are not equally informative to stock markets and
that informativeness of recommendations can be attributed to analysts’ experience, reputation, ge-
ographic proximity, brokerage size, availability of corporate information for the recommended
firms, etc (Bradley, Jordan, and Ritter 2008; Sorescu and Subrahmanyam 2006; Loh and Stulz
2011; Sonney 2007). Consistent with Gleason and Lee (2003), I confirm that recommendation
informativeness also depends on innovation in recommendation revisions. Third, this study con-
tributes to the literature on gender heterogeneity among financial analysts by providing evidence
for the impact of gender on market reactions to stock recommendations. My findings are generally
consistent with those of Li et al. (2013), which, without taking into consideration the innovation
level of recommendations, also confirm no gender-based difference in market reactions to recom-
mendations revisions.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature and
develops the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the research design. Section 4 reports the results
about gender differences in market reactions to innovative recommendations. Section 5 presents
robustness tests using different sub-samples. Section 6 offers a concluding discussion.
4.2 Review of Prior Literature
Extensive prior literature investigates the analyst’s personal attributes that influence market reac-
tions to stock recommendations. Heterogeneity among financial analysts may influence the in-
vestors’ perception of the informativeness of earnings forecasts and investment recommendations,
if investors are aware that analysts’ characteristics affect forecast accuracy and recommendation
profitability (Sorescu and Subrahmanyam 2006). One important analyst attribute that I study is
the analyst gender. Li et al. (2013) investigate the impact of gender on market reactions to rec-
ommendation revisions and find that investment recommendations of female analysts, on average,
produce abnormal stock returns comparable to those of male analysts. In this study, I investi-
gate, whether innovative recommendations of female financial analysts are more informative to
investors than those of male analysts. To develop the hypothesis under study, I rely on recent re-
search that explicitly addresses gender difference in personal dispositions i.e., overconfidence and
the association between overconfidence and innovation.
4.2.1 Significance of Innovative Recommendations
This study builds on previous literature that examines the effect of analyst personal attributes on
the informativeness of stock recommendations. Investment recommendations issued by sell-side
equity analysts aim to provide investors with profitable investment advice. Nonetheless, only a
subset of recommendation revisions are price informative and associated with visible impacts on
stock prices and trading volume (Loh and Stulz 2011). Previous literature that analyses the impact
of analysts’ outputs on capital markets provide evidence for price informativeness of innovative
recommendations and forecasts. Stickel (1990) implies that earnings forecasts revisions are more
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informative to investors when they are of high innovation. In the same vein, Gleason and Lee
(2003) find that a forecast of high-innovation triggers larger short-term market reactions. They
define as forecasts of high innovation those significantly revised from the analyst’s prior advice,
and far away from the analyst consensus. Furthermore, Cooper, Day, and Lewis (2001) find
evidence that timeliness is also an important dimension of innovation. Analysts who issue earnings
forecasts or stock recommendations ahead of other analysts are more likely to issue influential
recommendations that triggers larger market reactions. This study contributes to this literature
by examining the influence of a primary analyst characteristics, gender, on market reactions to
innovative recommendations.
4.2.2 Overconfidence and Innovation in Stock Recommendations
The recent financial analyst research examines how analysts’ psychological biases or character-
istics affect their outputs such as investment recommendations and earnings forecasts (see, for
example, Kumar (2010), Friesen and Weller (2006)). My focus is on overconfidence. In psychol-
ogy, overconfidence is a well-established behavioral bias that causes individuals to overestimate
their knowledge and their ability to perform well in decision making under uncertainty. Shefrin
(2007) explains that overconfidence “pertains to how well people understand their own abilities
and the limits of their knowledge". Griffin and Tversky (1992) point out that overconfidence is
at its greatest when people estimate their performance on difficult tasks. An important variant of
overconfidence applies to the use of private versus public signal value. In this setting, overconfi-
dent subjects systematically believe that their private information is more accurate than it actually
is and, therefore, excessively value private over public information (Kraemer, Nöth, and Weber
2006).
Researchers in finance often refer to findings in psychology related to overconfidence to ex-
plain various puzzling anomalies in financial markets and corporate finance that can not be ex-
plained by traditional theory assuming rational behaviors and expectations. Prior behavioral
research in capital markets shows that overconfidence may explain excessive trading volumes.
Odean (1998) shows that overconfident investors, who believe that the precision of their private
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information about the value of a security is greater than it actually is, trade more than rational
investors and, therefore, lower their expected utilities. He develops a model in which overconfi-
dent investors overestimate the probability that their personal assessments of the security’s value
are more accurate than the assessments of others, which intensifies differences of opinion. The
overconfident investor overestimates the precision of his information and, thereby, the expected
gains of trading.
Recent studies also prove the existence of overconfidence in corporate environment. These
studies mainly investigate the relation between overconfidence and decisions on mergers and ac-
quisitions, internal corporate financing and investment. Overconfident CEOs are found to be more
prone to make acquisitions and market reactions to acquisition announcements by overconfident
CEOs are more negative (Malmendier and Tate 2008; Huang and Kisgen 2013). However, the
negative impact of overconfident CEOs on merger and acquisition decisions may be compensated
by their increased propensity to innovate. Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh (2012) find that overconfi-
dent CEOs are better innovators. Firms with overconfident managers accept greater risk and invest
more heavily in innovative projects. Overconfident CEOs are more likely to pursue innovation be-
cause they underestimate the probability of failure and they innovate to provide evidence of their
ability (Galasso and Simcoe 2011).
Prior literature points out that selecting stocks that will outperform the market is the type of
task for which people are subject to overconfidence (Barber and Odean 2001). This obviously ap-
plies to stock recommendations issued by financial analysts who are therefore subject to overcon-
fidence. Consistent with this argument, Hilary and Menzly (2006) find that, due to overconfidence
resulting from past successes, analysts tend to put excessive weight on their private information
and to discount public signals. They also point out that overconfident analysts do not necessar-
ily underperform relative to other analysts, but rather they underperform compared to their own
expectations.
If investors are overconfident in their assessment of private information, I would expect to
observe similar biases in the way security analysts process information to produce investment rec-
ommendations. I further argue that analyst’s overconfidence, similar to overconfidence exhibited
4.2. REVIEW OF PRIOR LITERATURE 145
by CEOs in the corporate arena, is associated with an increased propensity to innovate in their
stock recommendations. Successful innovation in recommendations should be recognized and re-
warded by the market because it reveals new information about the recommended firm’s value.
Failure causes investors to infer analyst’s lack of ability. Overconfident analysts underestimate
the likelihood of failure, and are therefore more likely to pursue innovation when they issue stock
recommendations.
Innovative recommendations issued by overconfident analysts are more likely to be driven by
overconfidence in the precision of their own information (Friesen and Weller 2006). Investors
should hence discount the innovative recommendations of overconfident analysts. Nonetheless,
Hilary and Menzly (2006) argue that overconfident analysts do not necessarily underperform rel-
ative to other analysts. Their under-performance is rather relative to their own estimation. Over-
confident analysts perform worse than what they expected but not systematically worse than non-
overconfident analysts. As a consequence, stock markets do not necessarily discount innovative
recommendations issued by overconfident analysts. Accordingly, the effect of overconfidence on
market reactions to innovative recommendations remains ambiguous. Therefore, a negative rela-
tionship between innovation in recommendations of overconfident analysts and abnormal market
reactions at the recommendation announcement would indicate that analysts are excessively over-
confident to the detriment of investors who follow their stock recommendations. In contrast, a
positive relationship would indicate that analysts issue innovative recommendations that are ben-
eficial to investors, even when they are driven by overconfidence.
4.2.3 Overconfidence and Gender
In this part, I discuss the hypothesis that male analysts exhibit more overconfidence compared to
female analysts when issuing investment recommendations. Prior literature in finance and in psy-
chology provides evidence that while both men and women exhibit overconfidence, men are more
overconfident than women, particularly in male-dominated domains such as finance (Dahlbom et
al. 2011; Bengtsson, Persson, and Willenhag 2005). Overconfidence implies that women gener-
ally make fewer significant decisions than men, all other things held constant (Huang and Kisgen
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2013). Because overconfident men overestimate their ability, they undertake more transactions
and expand the spectrum of acceptable transactions to include some deals with negative net present
value. Barber and Odean (2001) document that male investors trade more than female investors
but trading reduces men’s net returns by 2.65 percentage points a year as opposed to 1.72 per-
centage points for women. They attribute the difference to men’s overconfidence in their ability
to trade. In the same vein, Huang and Kisgen (2013) confirm men’s overconfidence in corporate
financial and investment decision making. Male executives undertake more mergers and acquisi-
tions and issue more debts relative to female analysts. However, market returns associated with
M&A and debt issuance undertaken by male executives are systematically lower, which supports
the interpretation that male executives are overconfident relative to their female counterparts.
In the context of financial analysts, men’s overconfidence implies that, holding other factors
constant, male analysts issue more innovative recommendations than female analysts. I test this
implication by examining innovation in recommendations for male versus female analysts. If male
analysts are systematically overconfident to the detriment of investors who follow their recommen-
dations, markets should discount their innovative recommendations. In contrast, if female analysts
are less excessively overconfident than male analysts, market reactions to their recommendations
should be stronger than reactions to those issued by male analysts for a given level of innovation
in recommendations.
In summary, overconfidence leads to more innovation in stock recommendations. Since men
are systematically more overconfident than women in their ability to predict firm’s value and that
overconfidence leads to inaccurate decisions, I posit the following testable hypothesis:
Hypothesis Ceteris paribus, stock markets give less credit to innovative recommendations issued
by male analysts than to those issued by female analysts.
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4.3 Research Design
4.3.1 Model Specification
In a study of analyst forecast revisions, Gleason and Lee (2003) distinguish between high-innovation
and low-innovation revisions by using two benchmarks: the analyst’s own prior forecast and the
prior day’s consensus forecast. Following Gleason and Lee (2003), I characterize innovative rec-
ommendations as recommendations that diverge from the analyst consensus and from the analyst’s
own prior opinion. I also consider as recommendations of high-innovation, recommendations
ahead of other recommendations for the same stock in time. Using these three criteria, I build an
innovation index. According to this index, a recommendation revision is classified as innovative
(InnoRec) if it falls in the last quartile of at least two of the following three criteria sorted by
increasing order:
Boldi, j,t = change in recommendation level at time t relative to the previous rec-
ommendation made by analyst i for firm j. Recommendation changes are
based on the I/B/E/S five-point scale fors recommendation, i.e. 1= Strong
Sell, 2 = Underperform, 3 = Hold, 4 = Buy, 5 = Strong Buy. If the cur-
rent recommendation is the first recommendation issued by analyst i for
firm j, the recommendation change is set to zero.
Divergei, j,t = analyst i’s recommendation divergence from the analyst consensus for
firm j at time t, which is the absolute value of the recommendation grade
minus the six-month consensus. Recommendation consensus is based on
the I/B/E/S five-point scale of recommendation described above.
Leadi, j,t = analyst i’s recommendation timeliness for firm j at time t, which is the
number of days between the current recommendation and the previous
recommendation for the same firm. If the current recommendation is the
first recommendation for firm j, the Lead is not available.
Dependent Variables: I examine the relation between the market reaction to each stock rec-
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ommendation announcement and the recommendations’ characteristics, especially the level of
innovation in the recommendation and the analyst gender. I measure market reactions using both
absolute abnormal returns and abnormal trading volume. To calculate abnormal returns, I use the
classic three-factor model developed by Fama and French (1993).
R j,t = β0+β1(Rmt −Rft)+β2SMBt +β3HMLt + ε j,t (4.1)
where,
Rmt = the daily t return on the market index;
R j,t = the daily t return of firm j;
Rft = the daily t return on risk-free bonds;
SMBt = the difference between the daily returns of a value-weighted portfolio of
small stocks and one of large stocks;
HMLt = the difference between the daily returns of a value-weighted portfolio of
high book-to-market stocks and one of low book-to-market stocks.
The estimation period is three month before the recommendation announcement date t. The
regression yields parameter estimates that are used to estimate expected daily returns. The daily
abnormal return of stock j at time t (AR j,t) is the difference between the observed daily return
and the expected daily return. I calculate the cumulative abnormal return over a three-day window
around the recommendation announcement date as follows:
CAR j,t =Πt+1t−1(AR j,t +1)−1 (4.2)
Apart from cumulative abnormal stock returns, I also capture market reaction using cumulative
abnormal trading volume. Following Loh and Stulz (2011), I calculate the daily abnormal turnover
of stock j on the date t, ATVj,t as follows,
ATV j,t = lturnover j,t − lturnover j,t (4.3)
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where,
turnover j,t = the number of shares j traded at time t divided by the number of outstand-
ing shares j;
lturnover j,t = log(turnover j,t +0.00000255);
lturnover j,t = the average of daily turnover in log form, lturnover j,t , over the past three
months.
The cumulative abnormal trading volume is the sum of daily abnormal trading volumes over
the three-day window around the event date.
CAV j,t =
t+1
∑
t−1
ATV j (4.4)
Control Variables: The selection of control variables is motivated by prior literature. Pre-
vious research has extensively investigated the stock market impacts of recommendations issued
by sell-side financial analysts. Market reactions to stock recommendations are closely linked to
various characteristics of the recommendation, financial analyst, financial institution and followed
company under study.
Recommendation characteristics: Stock recommendations are conventionally labeled as
“Strong buy", “Buy", “Hold", “Underperform" or “Sell". Market reactions to recommendations
differ across recommendation levels. The distribution of analysts’ recommendations is skewed
to favorable recommendations because analysts tend to stop covering stocks for which they do
not have an optimistic view instead of issuing unfavorable recommendations. Market reactions
to unfavorable recommendations are therefore always systematically stronger. Therefore, I add
to the regression model two dummy variables as control variables to capture the level of stock
recommendations. Favorable is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the recommendation is ei-
ther labeled as “Strong Buy" or “Buy", zero otherwise. Un f avorable is an indicator variable that
equals 1 if the recommendation is either labeled as “Under-perform" or “Sell", zero otherwise.
Extant literature also shows that recommendations are more informative to the market if they
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are simultaneously accompanied by an analyst’s earnings forecast for the recommended company
(Jegadeesh and Kim 2010; Loh and Stulz 2011). Kecskés, Michaely, and Womack (2016) find
that stock price reaction is greater for stock recommendation changes accompanied by earnings
forecast revisions in the same direction as the change of recommendations. The greater informa-
tiveness of earnings-based recommendations stems from the fact that earnings-based recommen-
dations contain detailed quantitative information, which can be eventually verified by investors at
the firm’s earnings announcement date. EPSsupport is used in the regression model to capture
the effect of earnings forecasts supports. This is an indicator variable equal to one if the analyst’s
recommendation occurred within ten days around the announcement of an earnings forecast for
the same firm by the same analyst, zero otherwise.
Prior studies also document a stronger market reactions to initial recommendations than to
other recommendations made by analysts who already cover the firm (Irvine 2003; Li and You
2015). McNichols and O’Brien (1997) suggest that financial analysts tend to cover firms for which
they intuitively have optimistic views. Hence, FirstRec is used in the model to control for the effect
of initial recommendations. This is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a recommendation is the
first recommendation made by the analyst for the recommended firm, zero otherwise.
Analyst characteristics: Market reactions to recommendation revisions are closely related to
analyst’ experience and reputation (Sorescu and Subrahmanyam 2006; Stickel 1995). Analysts
with more firm-specific experience tend to issue more informative recommendations than other
analysts. Sorescu and Subrahmanyam (2006) show that recommendation revisions of more ex-
perienced analysts outperform those of less experienced analysts, under the conjecture that only
analysts with superior forecasting skills can survive. I capture the impact of analyst’s firm-specific
experience using a variable FirmExper, which is measured as the number of years between the
analyst’s first recommendation recorded by I/B/E/S and the current recommendation.
Further, sell-side analysts are subject to conflicts of interest because they face pressure to
inflate stock recommendations when their employer has major business relations with the recom-
mended firm. Financial institutions, undertaking IPO, SEO and M&A for current or potential
clients, would like their sell-side analysts to disseminate favorable information to the market so
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as to facilitate the operations. Analysts with affiliation to the covered firm are, hence, more re-
luctant to issue unfavorable recommendations (Kadan et al. 2009). Agrawal and Chen (2008),
Michaely and Womack (1999) find that investors are aware of this upward bias and therefore dis-
count recommendation upgrades of affiliated analysts. Barber, Lehavy, and Trueman (2007) show
that the average daily abnormal returns to favorable recommendations issued by independent re-
search firms exceed those to favorable recommendations issued by analysts working for investment
banks, whose opinions are potentially biased. Therefore, analyst’s affiliation is controlled in the
regression model. I characterize analyst affiliation (A f f iliation) by a binary variable that equals
one if the recommendation is issued by an analyst employed by a brokerage house that worked
for the recommended firm as a book-runner or lead-manager for an IPO (initial public offering) or
SEO (second equity offering) during the five-year preceding the recommendation.
The geographic proximity of financial analysts to followed companies is also shown to be
relevant to the analysts’ performance and the informativeness of their outputs. Prior literature
documents a local analyst advantage that leads to better performance (Bae, Stulz, and Tan 2008;
Malloy 2005). Forecast revisions made by local analysts have a larger impact on stock prices than
those by other analysts because local analysts benefit from superior knowledge of country-specific
factors (Sonney 2007). To control for the effect of analysts’ geographic proximity, SameCountry
is used in the model. This is a binary variable that equals 1 if the recommendation is issued by an
analyst located in the same country as the recommended firm, zero otherwise.
Broker characteristics: Analysts work for brokerage houses of different sizes. Prior literature
suggests that marketing ability of brokerage houses differs, which affects the visibility of analysts’
investment advices (Stickel 1995; Jegadeesh and Kim 2006). Stock recommendations issued by
analysts working for large brokerage houses exert stronger influence on stock markets than those
issued by analysts working for small brokers. In addition, equity analysts in large brokerage houses
have easier access to corporate information (Jacob, Lys, and Neale 1999), which enables them to
issue more informative recommendations. To control for the effect of the brokerage house size, I
add to the regression model the variable BrokerSize which is calculated as the number of analysts
working for the brokerage house employing the analyst.
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Firm characteristics: The information environment of recommended companies affects the
value of recommendations. Analysts’ opinions are more influential to investors in case of higher
information asymmetry (Stickel 1995). Prior literature use analyst coverage or market capitaliza-
tion of the recommended company as a proxy for information environment. Moreover, Gleason
and Lee (2003) suggest that in case of innovative forecast revisions, additional analyst coverage
facilitates market price discovery by amplifying the market reaction to the information conveyed
by the innovation. Therefore, I add AnalystFol to the regression model as a control variable.
AnalystFol refers to the number of analysts covering the recommended firm.
In sum, the empirical model used to investigate whether the informativeness of a stock rec-
ommendation is related to the level of innovation in recommendation and analyst’s gender is as
follows:
absCARi, j,t /CAVi, j,t = β0+β1Femalei+β2InnoReci, j,t +β3Female× InnoReci, j,t
+β4BrokerSizei, j,t +β5Favorablei, j,t +β6Unfavorablei, j,t
+β7Affiliationi, j,t +β8EPS supporti, j,t +β9NbFirmi, j,t
+β10FirstReci, j,t +β11FirmExperi, j,t +β12AnalystFoli, j,t
+β13SameCountryi, j,t +
m
∑
1
Firm j + εi, j,t (4.5)
where,
absCARi, j,t = absolute value of the cumulative abnormal returns over a three-day win-
dow centered around the recommendation announcement day. I use the
three-factor model developed by Fama and French (1993) to estimate
expected daily returns;
CAV i, j,t = cumulative abnormal trading volume over a three-day window centered
by around the recommendation announcement day;
Femalei, j,t = analyst’s gender, which is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the analyst
is a female, zero otherwise;
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InnoReci, j,t = an indicator variable that equals 1 if the recommendation is classified as
“innovative", zero otherwise;
AnalystFoli, j,t = number of analysts covering firm i during the year of the recommenda-
tion;
A f f iliationi, j,t = a binary variable that equals one if the recommendation is issued by
an analyst employed by a brokerage house who worked for the recom-
mended firm as a book-runner or lead-manager for an IPO (initial public
offering) or SEO (second equity offering) during the five-year preceding
the recommendation., zero otherwise;
BrokerSizei, j,t = analyst’s broker size, which is calculated as the number of analysts work-
ing for the brokerage house employing the analyst i during the year of
recommendation;
EPSsupport i, j,t = indicator variable equal to one if the analyst’s recommendation occurred
within ten days around the announcement date of an EPS forecast by the
same analyst for the same firm, zero otherwise;
FirmExperi, j,t = analyst’s firm-specific experience, which is the number of years between
analyst’s first recommendation recorded by I/B/E/S and the current rec-
ommendation;
FirstReci, j,t = indicator variable that equals 1 if the recommendation is the first recom-
mendation made by the analyst for the recommended firm j, zero other-
wise;
Favorablei, j,t = indicator variable that equals 1 if the recommendation is labelled as
“Strong Buy" or “Buy", zero otherwise;
Un f avorablei, j,t = indicator variable that equals 1 if the recommendation is labeled as
“Under-perform" or “Sell", zero otherwise;
NbFirmi, j,t = number of firms covered by the analyst during the year of the recommen-
dation;
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SameCountryi, j,t = binary variable that equals 1 if the recommendation is issued by an an-
alyst located in the same country as the recommended firm, zero other-
wise.
Subscripts i, j, t refer to the analyst, firm and recommendation date, respectively. All the
variables (except the dummy variables) are standardized so that each variable has a mean of zero
and a standard deviation of one. To ensure that extreme values do not affect the estimates, all
variables are winsorized at their 0.5 and 99.5 percentile levels. I control for firm fixed effects
by including dummy variables for each companies in the regression model. Standard errors are
adjusted for cross-section and time-series dependence by clustering on each financial analyst to
control for potential heteroscedasticity.
4.3.2 Data and Selection Method
To study the market reactions to analysts’ recommendations, I merge several data sets. The most
crucial one is the I/B/E/S database with stock recommendation data. The recommendations under
scrutiny are those issued by European analysts, i.e. analysts located in the 28 European countries;
namely, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom.
Countries outside the European Union, such as Switzerland, Norway and Russia, are included in
the research given that they belong to the same economic region.
The I/B/E/S database provides information on stock recommendations consisting of 1) com-
pany identifier, i.e., ISIN code of recommended firms, 2) the date when the recommendation was
issued (Recommendation date), 3) the level of each recommendation1, 4) the identification code
of each analyst and 5) the broker for which the analyst works. My data cover an eight-year pe-
riod from January 2006 to December 2013. The sample period begins with the date when Euro-
1A five-level recommendation scale is adopted by the I/B/E/S database: namely, Strong Buy, Buy, Hold, Underper-
form, and Sell.
4.3. RESEARCH DESIGN 155
pean countries finished transposing the Market Abuse Directive (generally referred to as MAD)
into their local legislation (Dubois and Dumontier 2008). The Market Abuse Directive (Direc-
tive 2003/6/EC), hereafter MAD, was adopted in 2003 by the European Commission to curb the
insider dealing and market manipulation. The Directive 2003/6/EC states that
“The identity of the producer of investment recommendations, his conduct of busi-
ness rules and the identity of his competent authority should be disclosed, since it may
be a valuable piece of information for investors to consider in relation to their invest-
ment decisions.”
Since the implementation of MAD, analysts are therefore required to disclose their names and
provide information about their previous research reports when publishing their outputs. This
makes my study much more feasible since I can determine each analyst’s gender by the first name.
Since the I/B/E/S database does not mention the analyst’s gender, the gender is identified by the
analyst’s first name. However I/B/E/S only provides a brief identity code for each analyst, which
is composed of the analyst’s last name and the initial letter of his/her first name. For example,
an analyst named “Joe Black” is coded as “J Black” in the I/B/E/S database. Thus, complemen-
tary information about analysts’ complete first name and their workplace (at the country level) is
obtained from the official website of Thomson One2. Thomson One provides more detailed and
thorougher information about the analysts from whom it collects data. The analyst’s first name,
last name, employer, workplace, contact coordinates can all be found in the website. After merg-
ing the recommendation data from I/B/E/S with data of analyst identities, I determine the gender of
associated analysts basing on a list of 22,345 unique first names3. Thus according to the outcome
of gender identification, analysts are separated into three categories: male, female and undefined.
Some analyst’s gender is undefinable due to the following facts: 1) unisex first name, some first
names, such as “Alex", could be used as a first name for both male and female; 2) duplicate last
name and first initial, there are more than one analyst identification that could be matched with an
2www.thomsonone.com
3The data mainly come from in the following sites: www.behindthename.com/, www.babynameindex.com/,
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Masculine_given_names, and en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:
Feminine_given_names
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analyst identity code, for example, “Julia Smith" and “John Smith" could both be abbreviated as
“J Smith”; or 3) undisclosed analyst code: some analyst identity codes are deliberately veiled by
the data provider and thus turn out to be “Undisclosed" during the data collection.
I identify 125,908 recommendations issued by 3,554 European analysts from 2006 to 2013.
Almost half of the recommendations are classified as favorable recommendations. The statistics in
Table 4.1 show that among all the 3,554 European analysts, 575 analysts are women. The propor-
tion of female analysts in Europe, 16.18%, is comparable to the one observed in the United States
(Kumar 2010). Further, 18,386 recommendations were issued by female analysts. They account
for 14.6% of all the recommendations. Female analysts, on average, issued less recommenda-
tions that their male counterparts. Using the I/B/E/S five-point scale for analysts’ investment
recommendations (1 = Strong Sell, 2 = Underperform, 3 = Hold, 4 = Buy, 5 = Strong Buy),
I label “Strong Buy" and “Buy" recommendations as “favorable" recommendations, “Hold" rec-
ommendations as “neutral" recommendations, and “Underform" and “Sell" recommendations as
“unfavorable" recommendations. The descriptive statistics suggest that analysts issue more fa-
vorable recommendations. Unfavorable recommendations are the least numerous, consistent with
prior studies. This suggests that analysts’ recommendation distribution is upward-biased. Female
analysts issue less frequently neutral recommendations. Only 13.6% of all neutral recommen-
dations are issued by female analysts, lower than the proportions for favorable and unfavorable
recommendations, i.e. , 15.1%.
〈 Insert Table 4.1 about here 〉
I eliminate recommendations from the sample if 1) they are issued by an analyst with an
undefined gender; 2) they are duplicated in I/B/E/S; 3) they occur within the three-day window
around a firm-specific news release; 4) they are contemporaneous with other recommendations
(see Table 3.2 for details in data selection). Starting from 125,908 recommendations, the final
sample consists of 89,312 recommendations issued by European analysts from 2006 to 2013.
〈 Insert Table 4.2 about here 〉
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I obtain daily stock prices and daily stock trading volume from Compustat. My data source for
initial public and follow-on equity offering is the Securities Data Company (SDC) database. The
index for the Fama-French three factor model are obtained from the website of Fama and French
4.
4.4 Main Results
4.4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 4.3 reports univariate statistics for gender difference in recommendation characteristics and
market reactions to recommendation revisions. 16.9% of the recommendations under study are in-
novative according to my innovation index. Among the recommendations issued by male (female)
analysts, 17.3% (14.5%) of them are innovative. T-statistics confirm a significant gender differ-
ence in terms of innovation in recommendations. I also observe statistically significant gender
difference in market reactions to stock recommendations. On average, recommendation revisions
issued by male (female) analysts trigger a three-day cumulative abnormal return that equals 3.5%
(3.3%). The three-day cumulative abnormal trading volumes for stock recommendations issued
by male (female) analysts is 0.423 (0.397). Recommendation revisions issued by male analysts
are associated with higher absCAR and CAV than those issued by women. T-statistics suggest that
the gender difference in terms of absCAR is significant at 0.01 level. The same statistics suggest
that gender does not impact the abnormal trading volume to analysts’ recommendations.
〈 Insert Table 4.3 about here 〉
4.4.2 Regression Results
I conduct multivariate analyses to investigate a potential gender heterogeneity in terms of market
reactions to innovative recommendation revisions. Analysts characteristics as well as firm char-
acteristics are incorporated as control variables in the estimated regressions. Table 4.4 presents
4http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/index.html
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the estimation results from Equation (1) for the whole sample. Standard errors of estimated coef-
ficients are clustered at the analyst level. Regression results with absCAR as dependent variable
are presented in columns (1) and (2), while in columns (3) and (4) are presented regression results
with CAV as dependent variable. Results for the partial model, without any control variable, are
reported in columns (1) and (3). Results for the full model, described by Equation (1), are reported
in columns (2) and (4), respectively.
〈 Insert Table 4.4 about here 〉
The empirical results show that the estimated coefficients for InnoRec are significantly positive
across all model specifications, suggesting that innovative recommendations lead to higher market
reactions. The coefficient for Female is significantly negative only for the partial model. The
coefficients remain negative but loss statistical significance once the control variables are included
in the regression model. This implies that the significant impact of the analyst gender on the
market reactions to recommendation revisions comes from the omitted factors that are captured
by analyst gender.
More interesting, the coefficients for the interaction between Female and InnoRec are con-
stantly not significant at conventional level, which suggests that investors do not make a difference
between innovative recommendations based on gender of the analyst who issues the innovative
recommendations. This rejects the hypothesis that investors should give less credit to innovation
in recommendations issued by male analysts, due to their higher overconfidence. Contrary to em-
pirical evidence in corporate financial decisions, which indicates that markets are skeptic about
projects undertaken by overconfident CEOs, I document no evidence that investors discount in-
novation in recommendations issued by overconfident analysts. I argue that overconfident male
analysts do not necessarily underperform to female analysts but rather, as suggested by Hilary and
Menzly (2006), they underperform relative to their own expectations. Hence, investors do not find
less credible innovative recommendations issued by male analysts, despite their overconfidence.
Overall, the empirical findings of the baseline model document no evidence for gender differ-
ence in market reactions to recommendations, regardless of the innovation level. This is consistent
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with the findings of Li et al. (2013), which confirm, without taking into consideration the level of
recommendation innovation, that on average, recommendations of female analysts produce similar
abnormal stock returns as those of male analysts. However, my findings are, to some extent, con-
trary to those of Kumar (2010) relating to earnings forecasts. Kumar (2010) shows that short-term
market reactions to bold forecasts are stronger when they are issued by female analysts.
The regression results also suggest that analyst’s initial investment recommendations on newly-
covered firms (FirstRec) trigger significantly less absCAR and less CAV as well, contrary to the
prior evidence which shows that analysts’ initial recommendations are more informative to in-
vestors. This finding suggests that investors find analysts’ recommendations for a newly-covered
firm less credible. The incremental impact of the analyst’s affiliation (A f f iliation) is not signif-
icant. This may result from the effectiveness of the Market Abuse Direction. Subsequent to the
adoption of this directive, analysts have to disclose any potential conflict of interest resulting from
business relations with the recommended firms over the twelve-month period preceding the rec-
ommendation announcement. This effectively curbs analysts’ propensity to issue over-optimistic
recommendations for stocks of affiliated clients.
Favorable recommendations (Favorable) trigger higher abnormal trading volume but no sig-
nificant abnormal returns. In contrast, unfavorable recommendations (Un f avorable) are asso-
ciated with significantly higher abnormal stock returns but no significant abnormal trading vol-
ume. The findings are consistent with prior literature which provides evidence that investors
weight more unfavorable recommendations than favorable ones due to analysts’ incentive to issue
upward-biased recommendations (Francis and Soffer 1997). The broker size (BrokerSize) also af-
fects market reactions. Recommendations issued by analysts working in larger brokerage houses
are associated with larger absCAR and CAV . This finding confirms the superior marketing abil-
ity of large brokerage houses and the superior forecasting ability of analysts working in larger
brokerage houses documented in prior literature. The coefficients for AnalystFol are significantly
negative, implying that recommendations are less influential when analysts coverage is large for
the recommended firm.
In addition, I find that recommendation revisions issued by financial analysts located in the
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same country as the covered firm (SameCountry) are more useful to investors, consistent with
the information advantage related to analysts with geographic proximity to the recommended firm
(Sonney 2007). Further, recommendations supported by an ESP forecast are associated with larger
market reactions. Earnings forecasts are more sophisticated outputs and can eventually be veri-
fied at the earnings announcement. Therefore, investors find recommendations more credible if
they are supported by an EPS forecast. The coefficients for the analyst firm-specific experience
(FirmExper) yield conflicting results. I find that recommendations issued by more experienced
analysts are associated with less abnormal stock returns but with more abnormal trading volume.
The workload of the financial analyst, proxied by the number of firms covered by financial ana-
lysts, does not exert a significant incremental impact on market reactions.
The final discussion on the regression results of baseline models focuses on the negative values
of adjusted R2 observed for all model specifications in Table 4.4. The adjusted R2 is derived from
R2 which measures the explanatory power of the set of X predictors on the variation of dependent
variable y. R2 is inflated as more X independent variables are added to the regressions models,
which results in a faked goodness of fit. The use of adjusted R2 corrects this bias by taking into
account the number of predictors included in the model.
R2ad j = 1− (1−R2)
n−1
n− k−1 (4.6)
where, n is the number of observations in the research sample and k is the number of independent
variables X (not including the intercept). As suggested in the equation above, a small R2 and a
high variable-to-sample size ratio n−1n−k−1 can lead to a negative adjusted R
2. This is the case for
the baseline model specification because numerous dummy variables at firm level are added to
the regression models to control for the firm fixed effects. The inclusion of firm dummy variables
amplifies the variable-to-sample size ratio, which accounts for the negative values of adjusted R2.
In sum, my regression results confirm that investors give more credit to innovative recom-
mendations. I find no evidence of gender difference in market reactions to innovative recommen-
dations. This suggests that innovation in recommendations accounts for the informativeness of
recommendation revisions. However, analyst’s gender, a proxy for the magnitude of overconfi-
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dence, does not exert a material impact on investors perception of innovative recommendations.
4.4.3 Additional Tests Using Recommendation Levels
Using a pooled sample of all recommendations, I have shown that innovative recommendations
lead to larger market reactions but there is no evidence of gender difference in investors’ reactions
to innovative recommendations. I now test whether the same conclusion holds for recommenda-
tions with different tones. Table 4.5 reports sub-sample regression results of market reactions on
favorable, neutral and unfavorable recommendations, respectively.
Panel A of Table 4.5 reports the regression results with three-day cumulative abnormal re-
turns as dependent variable. Given that recommendation revisions are already categorized into
three levels, I do not use the absolute value of CAR in this model specification. Results for the
signed value of CAR are consistent with the baseline results presented in Table 4.4. The dummy
variable InnoRec is significantly positive (negative) for favorable (unfavorable) recommendations.
Innovative favorable (unfavorable) recommendations are associated with more positive (negative)
stock returns. With regard to gender difference in market reactions to innovative recommenda-
tions, there is no evidence of a gender impact for favorable and neutral recommendations classi-
fied as innovative. Nonetheless, the regression results for unfavorable recommendations suggest
that larger negative CARs are associated with innovative unfavorable recommendations issued by
female analysts. This finding implies that investors find that innovative unfavorable recommen-
dations issued by female analysts are more informative. Extant literature documents that market
reactions are stronger to unfavorable recommendations than favorable recommendations because
of the analysts’ incentive to issue upward-biased recommendations. Instead of issuing favorable
recommendations, analysts tend to stop issuing recommendations for firms on which they do not
have a positive investment opinion. Hence, innovative unfavorable recommendations send a strong
signal to investors about the analyst’s pessimistic view on the recommended firm. Investors seek
for other information in the recommendation report when the report leads to an unfavorable recom-
mendation since analysts are more intended to issue favorable recommendations (Hirst, Koonce,
and Simko 1995). In such a case, investors may rely more on analysts’ personal attributes such as
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gender.
〈 Insert Table 4.5 about here 〉
Results for regressions with CAV as dependent variable are reported in Panel B of Table 4.5.
The findings are similar to those from CAR. The coefficients of InnoRec are significantly positive
for both favorable and unfavorable recommendations. I find no evidence of gender difference in
market reactions to innovative recommendations.
Results in Table 4.5 based on the tone of stock recommendations lead to similar qualitative
conclusions. Regardless of the recommendation tone, investors find innovative recommendations
more informative. In general, market reactions to innovative recommendations issued by female
analysts are not different from those by male analysts except for innovative unfavorable recom-
mendations. Innovative unfavorable recommendations issued by female analysts result in more
stock trades than those by male analysts.
4.4.4 Additional Tests for Each of the Three Criteria of Innovation
The previous results focus on the relation between analyst gender and market reactions to innova-
tive recommendations using an innovation index. The findings show that innovative recommen-
dations are associated with larger market reactions but there is no gender difference in market
reactions to innovative recommendations, except when recommendations are unfavorable. If the
documented effect is robust, I should observe similar patterns for each of the three criteria used
to characterize innovation in recommendations: (1) recommendation boldness, measured by the
absolute distance from analyst consensus (Bold), (2) magnitude of the recommendation revision,
measured as the absolute value of recommendation change relative to the analyst’s own prior rec-
ommendation on the same stock (Diverge), (3) recommendation gap, measured as the number
of days between the current recommendation and the last recommendation by any other analyst
available for the same stock (Lead). To test this, I rerun the baseline model using each of the three
innovation variables respectively, instead of the innovation index.
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〈 Insert Table 4.6 about here 〉
Table 4.6 reports the coefficient estimates for each of the three criteria as the response vari-
able respectively. The coefficients of variables Bold and Diverge are significantly positive across
all of the four model specifications. The findings confirm that recommendation revisions that
are away from the analyst consensus and those that diverge much from the analyst’s own prior
revision trigger larger abnormal stock returns and trading volumes. However, Bold and Diverge
recommendations issued by female analysts do not differ from those issued by male analysts in
terms of market reactions. In contrast, and to some extent surprisingly, Lead recommendations are
associated with significantly less market reactions. It implies that investors find recommendations
ahead of other recommendations less credible.
4.5 Robustness Tests
The main concern is that recommended firms are not randomly distributed to financial analysts.
The lack of gender difference in innovative recommendations may therefore result from gender
heterogeneity in stock coverage. The following robustness tests are mainly aimed at mitigating
endogeneity resulting from potential biases in firm coverage. In this section, I discuss the three
methods used to address the endogeneity concerns.
4.5.1 Heckman model
First, I use the two-stage procedure of Heckman (1979). In a first stage, consistent estimates of the
αs are obtained from a probit regression of the dummy variable, female, on a set of independent
variables Zi. These estimates are used to compute the inverse Mills ratios (IMR). In a second
stage, the market reaction equation is estimated with an OLS estimation, the inverse Mills ratio
being included as an additional explanatory variable. The probit regression for the Heckman first
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stage model is as follows:
Femalei = α0+α1Favorablei, j,t +α2Unfavorablei, j,t
+α3BrokerSizei, j,t +α4InnoReci, j,t +α5Affiliationi, j,t
+α6SameCountryi, j,t +α7EPS supporti, j,t +α8NbFirmi, j,t +α9FirstReci, j,t
+α10FirmExperi, j,t +α11AnalystFoli, j,t +α12UndAnalystsi, j,t + εi, j,t (4.7)
My key instrumental variable is the percentage of analysts with undefined gender in the country
where the analyst is located (UndAnalysts). While this variable UndAnalysts is likely to affect the
likelihood of recommendations issued by female analysts, it is unlikely to affect market reactions
to analysts’ recommendations. The Heckman first-stage model is usually estimated using a probit
model (Lennox, Francis, and Wang 2011).
Table 4.7 reports the results for the second stage of the Heckman model using InnoRec as a
proxy for the level of innovation in recommendations. Consistent with the findings for the baseline
OLS model, the coefficients of InnoRec are significantly positive. Further, the interaction between
Female and InnoRec is not significant for either abnormal returns or abnormal turnovers. The
regression results of the Heckman model confirm that innovative recommendations are more in-
formative to investors. However, there is no evidence of any gender difference in market reactions
to innovative recommendations. The coefficient of the inverse Mill’s ratio (IMR) is marginally
significant, suggesting the existence of endogeneity in the model.
〈 Insert Table 4.7 about here 〉
4.5.2 Propensity-score matching
The alternative specification to address endogeneity concerns is the propensity score matching
method. To isolate the effect of gender heterogeneity in firm coverage, I compare female recom-
mendations against a benchmark sample of similar recommendations issued by male analysts. I
use propensity-score matching to select the benchmark sample. Matching begins with a probit
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regression of a female dummy variable on control variables presented as follows.
Femalei, j,t = β0+β1InnoReci+β2FirstReci+β3BrokerSizei, j,t +β4Favorablei, j,t
+β5Unfavorablei, j,t +β6Affiliationi, j,t +β7EPS supporti, j,t +β8NbFirmi, j,t
+β9FirmExperi, j,t +β10AnalystFoli, j,t +β11SameCountryi, j,t + εi, j,t (4.8)
Panel A of Table 4.8 reports the pooled probit regressions before and after matching for two-
way (by firm and analyst) cluster-robust standard errors. All of the determinants that significantly
predict the probability of innovative recommendations before matching become insignificant after
matching. This suggests that matching effectively reduces the differences in the observable recom-
mendation characteristics between female and male analysts and, therefore, mitigates endogeneity
issues.
I then use the propensity scores from this probit estimation and perform a nearest neighbor
match with replacement to other recommendations. This procedure ensures that a female rec-
ommendation is paired with a male recommendation with statistically the same characteristics.
I impose that the benchmark recommendation is within a distance (i.e., a caliper) of 0.01 of the
female recommendation’s propensity score. This constraint aims to guarantee similarity between
the female and male samples for the observable variables.
〈 Insert Table 4.8 about here 〉
During the sample period, the propensity-score matching generates 18,513 female-male rec-
ommendation pairs I then run a univariate regression, and a multivariate regression with control
variables on the matched sample to examine the gender differences in market reactions to inno-
vative recommendations (See Panel B of Table 4.8). In the regression with absCAR as dependent
variable, the coefficients of InnoRec are significantly positive for both partial and full models.
Moreover, the interaction between Female and InnoRec is negative but of no statistical signif-
icance with regards to stock abnormal returns. Results for regressions with CAV yield similar
conclusions. This suggests that, consistent with the findings of my baseline model, investors find
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more credible innovative recommendations but they react identically to innovative recommenda-
tions issued by analysts of different gender.
4.5.3 Restricted Samples
In a last step, to check the robustness of the results described above, I rerun the baseline model
on different sub-samples. First, I eliminate all stock recommendations issued by inactive analysts,
who issued less than five recommendations in a given year. Second, recommendation revisions
issued from United Kingdom are withdrawn from the sample. Almost one third of the recom-
mendations in the sample are issued by analysts in United Kingdom. By eliminating these rec-
ommendations, I can determine the extent to which the observed lack of gender difference in the
market impacts of innovative recommendations is driven by UK observations. Third, I exclude all
recommendations issued during the financial crisis from 2008 to 2009, in order to eliminate the
impact of the abnormality in stock market returns during the period. Fourth, I rerun the regression
models after excluding recommendations for the less covered firms, which are followed by less
than five analysts in a given year.
The results for these additional tests are presented in Table 4.9. Panel A of Table 4.9 reports
the regression results with absCAR as dependent variable. In all instances, the results are qual-
itatively similar to the baseline results obtained with the full sample. The coefficient estimates
of Female remain insignificant across the four model specifications. The coefficients of InnoRec
are significantly positive, confirming that innovative recommendations are more informative to
market investors. The interaction between analyst gender and innovative recommendations have
systematically no significant impact on stock returns.
Further, I replicate the same regressions with CAV as dependent variable. Results are reported
in Panel B of Table 4.9. The coefficients of InnoRec are significantly positive for all the four sub-
samples and the interaction between Female and InnoRec are systematically insignificant for all
sub-samples.
〈 Insert Table 4.9 about here 〉
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Consistent with the findings of the main regressions, regressions with different sub-samples
confirm that innovative recommendations are more informative and that investors do not treat with
difference innovative recommendations issued by male/female analysts. In sum, my results are
robust to alternative methods of endogeneity corrections and different samples.
4.6 Conclusion and Discussion
Motivated by behavioral patterns caused by overconfidence, I investigate in this study whether
investors discount innovation in recommendations of overconfident analysts. I posit that innova-
tion driven by overconfidence is detrimental to investors because overconfidence causes analysts
to over-estimate their forecasting ability. Therefore, innovation achieved by overconfident ana-
lysts results in recommendations that are less credible to investors. Psychology finds evidence that
men are more overconfident than women when they are involved in social activities. Following
prior studies on corporate financial decisions (Huang and Kisgen 2013) and investment decisions
(Barber and Odean 2001), I use the analyst’s gender as a proxy for overconfidence to investigate
market reactions to innovative recommendations issued by overconfident analysts.
The research sample consists of recommendation revisions issued by European analysts be-
tween January 1, 2006 and December 31, 2013. I find that abnormal returns and abnormal trading
volumes at recommendation announcements are larger for innovative recommendations, which is
consistent with the extant literature on the informativeness of recommendation changes. Further-
more, the empirical findings indicate that there is no gender difference in market reactions to stock
recommendations, regardless of the recommendations’ innovation level. This is contrary to the
findings of Kumar (2010) relating to earnings forecasts, who finds that bold forecasts issued by
female analysts trigger stronger abnormal returns than those by male analysts.
The lack of gender difference in market reactions to innovative recommendations also rejects
the hypothesis which states that markets should be skeptic about innovative recommendations of
overconfident analysts. The findings suggest that innovation driven by analyst’s overconfidence is
not detrimental to investors. The fact that my results are opposite to Huang and Kisgen (2013)’s
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findings (i.e. they find that M&As conducted by overconfident male CEOs are associated with
more negative market reactions) suggests that overconfident male analysts do not necessarily un-
derperform relative to other analysts, even though they underperform compared to their own ex-
pectations (Hilary and Menzly 2006). An alternative explanation is that the interaction between
analyst’s gender and innovation in recommendations is more complicated than the one captured in
the baseline model. In fact, the additional tests for the unfavorable recommendations find evidence
of more negative abnormal stock returns associated with innovative unfavorable recommendations
issued by female analysts. This implies that investors’ reference to analyst’s personal attributes,
such as the analyst’s gender, is conditional on the recommendation level. In case of unfavorable
recommendations, investors rely more on analysts’ personal attributes such as the gender.
Further analysis indicates that the informativeness of stock recommendations derives from a
battery of factors including recommendation levels, information environment of recommended
firms, size of brokerage house, analysts’ geographic location etc. I find that market reactions to
analyst’s initial recommendations are generally weaker than to other recommendations. Recom-
mendations revisions supported by earnings forecasts are also more informative.
This study contributes to the literature on equity analysts in several ways. First, by document-
ing that market reactions to analysts’ recommendations are significantly related to innovation in
recommendations, my analysis confirms that innovative recommendations are more informative
and useful to investors. This finding complements previous research on the determinants of rec-
ommendation informativeness. Second, this study contributes to the literature on gender issues
of financial analysts by providing evidence for the impact of gender on market reactions to stock
recommendations. Consistent with Li et al. (2013), I document no gender difference in terms of
market reactions associated with recommendations. Third, the similar market reactions to inno-
vative recommendations issued by male and by female analysts suggest that investors do not find
innovative recommendations issued by male analysts detrimental to recommendation profitability,
even if male analysts have a higher propensity to issue innovative recommendation due to higher
overconfidence. This finding complements the literature relating to overconfidence by showing
that innovation resulting from overconfidence is not systematically detrimental.
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Appendices
4.A Tables
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics for Recommendations and Analysts under Study
This table provides descriptive statistics for recommendations issued by European financial analysts during the sample
period.
Full sample Female Male %Female
Number Rec 125,908 18,386 101,442 0.146
Favorable Rec 61,600 9,322 49,364 0.151
Neutral Rec 43,583 5,943 35,229 0.136
Unfavorable Rec 20,725 3,121 16,849 0.151
Number analysts 3,554 575 2,782 0.162
Table 4.2: Sample Selection Criteria
The table presents the sample selection procedure. Criteria refers to the selection criteria imposed to the recommenda-
tion sample. NumObservations is the number of remaining recommendations after application of the criteria.
Criteria NumObservations
recommendations issued by European analysts 125,908
- recommendations with undefined gender 119,828
- duplicated recommendations 111,782
- rec by different analysts at the same date for the same firm 96,523
- recommendations around the firm news release dates 89,312
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Table 4.3: Univariate Tests for Gender Differences in Recommendation Characteristics
The table reports gender differences in terms of innovative recommendations and market reactions associated with
recommendation revisions. InnoRec is a binary variable that is equal to one if stock recommendation is labeled as
“innovative". absCAR refers to the absolute value of the three-day cumulative abnormal returns around the recom-
mendation announcement date. CAV is the three-day cumulative abnormal trading volume around the recommendation
announcement date. Difference (Male-Female) reports the difference between the statistics for male analysts and those
for female analysts. *** , ** , and * denote two-tailed significance of t-test at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively
Full Sample Female Rec Male Rec Difference (Male-Female)
InnoRec 0.169 0.145 0.173 0.028∗∗∗
absCAR 0.035 0.033 0.035 0.002∗∗∗
CAV 0.419 0.397 0.423 0.026
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Table 4.4: Market Reactions to Innovative Recommendations
The table reports the results for the OLS regressions conducted for market reactions to innovative stock recommenda-
tions. The dependent variables are the absolute value of three day cumulative abnormal returns (absCAR) and three-day
cumulative abnormal trading volume (CAV), respectively. Female is a binary variable that equals one if the recommen-
dation is issued by a female analyst, zero otherwise. InnoRec is an indicator variable that equals one if the recommen-
dation is classified as “innovative", zero otherwise. FirstRec is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the recommendation
is the first recommendation made by the analyst for recommended firm j, zero otherwise. Affiliation is a binary variable
that equals one if the recommendation is issued by an analyst employed by a brokerage house that worked for the rec-
ommended firm as a book-runner or lead-manager for an IPO (initial public offering) or SEO (second equity offering)
during the five-year preceding the recommendation. SupportEPS is an indicator variable equal to one if the analyst’s
recommendation occurred within ten days around the announcement date of the EPS forecast for the same firm, zero
otherwise. Favorable is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the recommendation is either labeled as “Strong Buy" or
“Buy", zero otherwise. Unfavorable is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the recommendation is either labeled as
“Under-perform" or “Sell", zero otherwise. SameCountry is a binary variable that equals 1 if the recommendation is
issued by an analyst located in the same country as the recommended firm, zero otherwise. BrokerSize is the number of
analysts working for the brokerage house employing the analyst i during the year of the recommendation. AnalystFol is
the number of analysts covering the recommended firm during the year of the recommendation. FirmExper is measured
as the number of years between the analyst’s first recommendation recorded by I/B/E/S and the current recommen-
dation. NbFirms is the number of firms covered by the analyst during the year of the recommendation revisions. All
variables are winsorized at their 0.5 and 99.5 percentile levels. The independent variables (except the dummy variables)
are standardized. The standard errors for the coefficient estimates are shown in parentheses below the estimates.
Dependent variable:
absCAR CAV
Partial Model Full Model Partial Model Full Model
OLS OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female −0.024∗∗ −0.016 −0.028∗∗ −0.017
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
InnoRec 0.093∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
Female*InnoRec 0.021 0.015 0.028 0.022
(0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032)
FirstRec −0.120∗∗∗ −0.068∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010)
Affiliation −0.007 −0.025
(0.027) (0.029)
Favorable −0.001 0.026∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009)
Unfavorable 0.068∗∗∗ −0.014
(0.013) (0.012)
BrokerSize 0.036∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004)
AnalystFol −0.050∗∗∗ −0.043∗∗∗
Continued on next page
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Table 4.4 – Continued from previous page
Dependent variable:
absCAR CAV
Partial Model Full Model Partial Model Full Model
OLS OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(0.013) (0.013)
SameCountry 0.081∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011)
EPS support 0.033∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008)
FirmExper −0.018∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005)
NbFirms 0.007 −0.005
(0.005) (0.005)
Observations 65,196 65,196 64,007 64,007
R2 0.001 0.007 0.001 0.005
Adjusted R2 -0.079 -0.073 -0.080 -0.075
SE cluster Analyst Analyst Analyst Analyst
Fixed effects Firm Firm Firm Firm
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 4.5: Market Reactions to Innovative Recommendations: Conditional on Recommendation
Levels
The table reports the results for the regressions conducted for innovative recommendations of three different categories:
favorable, neutral, unfavorable recommendations. The dependent variables are CAR in Panel A and CAV in Panel B.
Definitions of all independent variables are the same as those defined in Table 4.4. All variables are winsorized at their
0.5 and 99.5 percentile levels. The independent variables (except the dummy variables) are standardized. The standard
errors for the coefficient estimates are shown in parentheses below the estimates.
Panel A of Table 4.5
Dependent variable:
CAR
OLS OLS OLS
Favorable Rec Neutral Rec Unfavorable Rec
(1) (2) (3)
Female −0.023 −0.004 0.016
(0.019) (0.024) (0.038)
InnoRec 0.139∗∗∗ −0.074∗∗ −0.097∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.034) (0.027)
Female*InnoRec 0.031 −0.030 −0.131∗∗
(0.050) (0.088) (0.064)
Affiliation 0.034 −0.038 −0.062
(0.039) (0.049) (0.080)
FirstRec −0.038∗∗ 0.004 0.009
(0.015) (0.020) (0.027)
BrokerSize 0.045∗∗∗ −0.015∗ −0.055∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.009) (0.013)
NbAnalyst −0.048∗∗∗ −0.004 0.047
(0.019) (0.022) (0.034)
SameCountry 0.027 −0.009 −0.052∗
(0.017) (0.022) (0.030)
EPS support 0.037∗∗∗ −0.035∗∗ −0.065∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.016) (0.023)
FirmExper 0.024∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗ −0.034∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.008) (0.012)
NbFirm −0.012 −0.006 0.015
(0.007) (0.009) (0.012)
Observations 31,323 22,007 11,866
R2 0.007 0.001 0.009
Adjusted R2 -0.149 -0.211 -0.267
SE cluster Analyst Analyst Analyst
Continued on next page
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Dependent variable:
CAR
OLS OLS OLS
Favorable Rec Neutral Rec Unfavorable Rec
(1) (2) (3)
Fixed effects Firm Firm Firm
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Panel B of Table 4.5
Dependent variable:
CAV
OLS OLS OLS
Favorable Rec Neutral Rec Unfavorable Rec
(1) (2) (3)
Female −0.030 −0.024 −0.001
(0.018) (0.023) (0.041)
InnoRec 0.043∗∗ −0.045 0.060∗∗
(0.018) (0.036) (0.025)
Female*InnoRec 0.053 0.071 0.034
(0.049) (0.111) (0.063)
Affiliation −0.035 −0.023 −0.051
(0.045) (0.049) (0.075)
FirstRec −0.068∗∗∗ −0.052∗∗∗ −0.064∗∗
(0.015) (0.019) (0.028)
BrokerSize 0.030∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗ 0.028∗∗
(0.007) (0.009) (0.012)
NbAnalyst −0.008 −0.094∗∗∗ −0.056
(0.020) (0.024) (0.036)
SameCountry 0.042∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗
(0.015) (0.021) (0.027)
EPS support 0.088∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.015) (0.022)
FirmExper 0.022∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗ 0.008
(0.007) (0.009) (0.012)
NbFirm −0.004 −0.010 −0.026∗∗
(0.007) (0.009) (0.012)
Observations 30,714 21,643 11,650
R2 0.006 0.005 0.006
Adjusted R2 -0.152 -0.206 -0.275
SE cluster Analyst Analyst Analyst
Fixed effects Firm Firm Firm
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 4.6: Market Reactions for Each of the Three Criteria of Innovation
The table reports the results for the OLS regressions of market reactions to stock recommendations characterized as
Bold, Diverge, and Lead. The dependent variables are absCAR and CAV, respectively. All variables are winsorized at
their 0.5 and 99.5 percentile levels. The independent variables (except the dummy variables) are standardized.
Dependent variable:
absCAR CAV
Partial Model Full Model Partial Model Full Model
OLS OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female −0.021∗ −0.016 −0.023∗ −0.014
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Diverge 0.018∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Lead −0.014∗∗∗ −0.018∗∗∗ −0.045∗∗∗ −0.050∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Bold 0.064∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006)
Female*Diverge 0.002 0.001 −0.004 −0.006
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Female*Lead −0.021∗∗ −0.021∗∗ −0.018 −0.020
(0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012)
Female*Bold −0.011 −0.017 0.011 0.006
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
FirstRec −0.058∗∗∗ 0.016
(0.012) (0.012)
Affiliation −0.001 −0.019
(0.026) (0.028)
Favorable −0.002 0.023∗∗
(0.009) (0.009)
Unfavorable 0.051∗∗∗ −0.039∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.014)
BrokerSize 0.040∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005)
NbAnalyst −0.071∗∗∗ −0.084∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.014)
SameCountry 0.076∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010)
EPS support 0.025∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.008)
FirmExper −0.018∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗
Continued on next page
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Dependent variable:
absCAR CAV
Partial Model Full Model Partial Model Full Model
OLS OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(0.005) (0.005)
NbFirm 0.007 −0.004
(0.005) (0.005)
Observations 66,245 66,245 64,992 64,992
R2 0.006 0.009 0.007 0.011
Adjusted R2 -0.075 -0.071 -0.074 -0.070
Fixed effects Firm Firm Firm Firm
SE cluster Analyst Analyst Analyst Analyst
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 4.7: Market Reactions to Innovative Recommendations: Heckman Model
The table reports regression results using the Heckman two-stage model to account for endogeneity in analyst coverage.
The dependent variables are absCAR and CAV, respectively. IMR refers to the inverse Mill’s ratio. Definitions of other
independent variables are the same as those defined in Table 4.4. All variables are winsorized at their 0.5 and 99.5
percentile levels. The independent variables (except the dummy variables) are standardized. The standard errors for the
coefficient estimates are shown in parentheses below the estimates.
Dependent variable:
absCAR CAV
Partial Model Full Model Partial Model Full Model
OLS OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female −0.018 −0.016 −0.020 −0.017
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
InnoRec 0.096∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
Female*InnoRec 0.018 0.015 0.024 0.022
(0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032)
IMR 0.029∗∗∗ −0.027∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.012
(0.005) (0.016) (0.005) (0.016)
FirstRec −0.124∗∗∗ −0.066∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.011)
Affiliation −0.053 −0.004
(0.038) (0.039)
Favorable −0.014 0.032∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.012)
Unfavorable 0.056∗∗∗ −0.008
(0.014) (0.014)
BrokerSize 0.050∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗
(0.010) (0.010)
AnalystFol −0.049∗∗∗ −0.044∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.013)
SameCountry 0.071∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.012)
EPS support 0.059∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.018)
FirmExper −0.017∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005)
NbFirms 0.015∗∗ −0.009
(0.007) (0.007)
Observations 65,196 65,196 64,007 64,007
Continued on next page
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Dependent variable:
absCAR CAV
Partial Model Full Model Partial Model Full Model
OLS OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
R2 0.002 0.007 0.002 0.005
Adjusted R2 -0.078 -0.073 -0.078 -0.075
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 4.8: Market Reactions to Innovative Recommendations: Propensity Score Matching
The table reports the results for OLS regressions of the market reactions to innovative stock recommendations using
propensity score matching. The dependent variables are absCAR and CAV, respectively. All variables are winsorized
at their 0.5 and 99.5 percentile levels. The independent variables (except the dummy variables) are standardized. I first
run a probit regression to pair each female recommendation with male recommendations with statistically the same rec-
ommendation characteristics. I report in Panel A the regression results before and after I match stock recommendations
based on the propensity scores. I then run a univariate regression and a multivariate regression for market reactions to
stock recommendations (results in Panel B).
Panel A of Table 4.8
Dependent variable:
Female
Before matching After matching
Probit Probit
(1) (2)
InnoRec −0.134∗∗∗ −0.013
(0.040) (0.048)
FirstRec −0.006 −0.022
(0.046) (0.043)
Affiliation 0.195 0.042
(0.126) (0.144)
Favorable 0.050 0.027
(0.037) (0.040)
Unfavorable 0.096∗∗ 0.037
(0.049) (0.054)
BrokerSize −0.046 −0.0001
(0.039) (0.001)
AnalystFol −0.007 0.002
(0.029) (0.004)
SameCountry 0.050 0.010
(0.072) (0.083)
supportEPS −0.122∗∗∗ −0.027
(0.045) (0.048)
FirmExper −0.006 −0.007
(0.028) (0.016)
NbFirms −0.023 0.005
(0.069) (0.005)
Constant −1.004∗∗∗ 0.016
(0.070) (0.114)
Observations 63,914 18,531
Continued on next page
4.A. TABLES 185
Table 4.8 – Continued from previous page
Dependent variable:
Female
Before matching After matching
Probit Probit
(1) (2)
Akaike Inf. Crit. 55,027.120 25,555.130
SE cluster Firm+Analyst Firm+Analyst
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Panel B of Table 4.8
Dependent variable:
absCAR CAV
Partial Model Full Model Partial Model Full Model
OLS OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female −0.023 −0.011 −0.034∗ −0.018
(0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019)
InnoRec 0.142∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.055∗ 0.051
(0.035) (0.035) (0.033) (0.034)
Female*InnoRec −0.031 −0.039 0.023 0.011
(0.048) (0.047) (0.045) (0.045)
FirstRec −0.101∗∗∗ −0.065∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.020)
Affiliation −0.019 −0.030
(0.046) (0.052)
Favorable −0.004 0.011
(0.016) (0.018)
Unfavorable 0.092∗∗∗ −0.048∗
(0.025) (0.025)
BrokerSize 0.049∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.008)
AnalystFol −0.015 −0.042∗
(0.024) (0.025)
SameCountry 0.081∗∗∗ 0.037∗
(0.022) (0.022)
EPS support 0.040∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.018)
FirmExper −0.016 0.021∗∗
(0.010) (0.010)
NbFirms 0.027∗∗∗ −0.001
(0.009) (0.010)
Observations 18,531 18,531 18,531 18,531
R2 0.002 0.009 0.001 0.007
Adjusted R2 -0.217 -0.210 -0.219 -0.212
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 4.9: Market Reactions to Innovative Recommendations: Restricted Samples
The table reports results from different restricted samples. I run the baseline model for 1) recom-
mendations issued by active analysts; 2) recommendations issued by analysts not located in the
United Kingdom; 3) recommendations issued out of the financial crises period; 4) recommenda-
tions issued for well covered firms. In Panel A, I report the results with absCAR as dependent
variable. The results for CAV are presented in Panel B. To make the table easier to read, coeffi-
cients and standard errors for control variables are not given in this table.
Panel A of Table 4.9
Dependent variable:
absCAR
Active noUK noCrise Followed
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female −0.008 −0.018 0.002 −0.017
(0.013) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013)
InnoRec 0.057∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.016) (0.016) (0.014)
Female*InnoRec 0.022 0.051 0.007 0.027
(0.036) (0.039) (0.041) (0.035)
Observations 54,842 41,879 45,443 56,183
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.007 0.008 0.006 0.007
Adjusted R2 -0.083 -0.071 -0.101 -0.059
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Panel B of Table 4.9
Dependent variable:
CAV
Active noUK noCrise Followed
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female −0.017 −0.030∗∗ −0.010 −0.023∗
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014)
InnoRec 0.047∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013)
Female*InnoRec 0.027 0.016 0.027 0.025
(0.036) (0.039) (0.039) (0.035)
Observations 54,842 41,879 45,443 56,183
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.006
Adjusted R2 -0.084 -0.073 -0.102 -0.061
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Chapter 5
General Conclusion
5.1 Main Findings and Contributions
Based on a panel of stock recommendations drawn from the I/B/E/S database, this dissertation
concentrates on examining gender issues for financial analysts. The empirical findings bring im-
plications to both academics and practitioners from three novel perspectives.
The first essay investigates whether and how differences in national cultures affect female
representation among financial analysts. I find that women represent on average 16.15% of all
financial analysts, which suggests an under-representation of female financial analysts for Euro-
pean countries, comparable to what was documented in the United States by prior studies (Green,
Jegadeesh, and Tang 2009; Kumar 2010). Furthermore, and maybe more importantly, female rep-
resentation varies significantly across the countries under study. I find that national culture is a
strong determinant of female representation among financial analysts in Europe. All other things
equal, the lowest female representation is observed in Nordic countries, countries that have the
lowest tolerance for unequal power distribution (Hofstede 2001).
The contribution of the first study is twofold. First, prior literature about female financial
analysts, which is limited, is exclusively based on data collected in the United States. By providing
gender observations for European financial analysts, this essay extends the scope of studies related
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to gender concerns in the financial analyst industry to countries outside the United States. Second,
to my knowledge, the impact of culture on gender diversity among financial analysts has never
been explicitly investigated. I contribute to the literature on the economic relevance of cultural
values by highlighting how national cultures impact female representation of financial analysts in
European countries.
In the second study, I turn my attention to innovative recommendations issued by financial
analysts. The second essay examines gender difference in innovation of investment recommen-
dations. This study finds that male analysts are more likely to issue innovative recommendations
than female analysts. Recommendation revisions of male analysts are more away from the analyst
consensus, more significantly revised relative to their own prior recommendation and more ahead
in time of other recommendations for the same stock. The lower innovation in female analysts’
recommendations suggests that analysts’ innovation in recommendations is overall more driven
by overconfidence, which is characteristic of men, than by superior forecasting ability, which also
leads to innovation in recommendations but is mostly characteristic of female analysts.
The contribution of the second study is both methodological and practical. First, I provide a
comprehensive measurement of innovation in stock recommendations by creating an innovation
index. This study, therefore, contributes to the literature by a new research methodology to iden-
tify innovative recommendations. Second, by providing evidence for gender difference in issuing
innovative recommendations, this study helps enhance the understanding of gender-based behav-
ioral patterns in analysts’ recommendations. The empirical findings shed light on the mechanisms
behind analysts’ innovation in recommendations by showing that innovation in recommendations
is more led by analysts’ overconfidence rather than superior forecasting ability.
In the third study, I attach importance to market reactions to innovative recommendations. I
find that market reactions to innovative recommendations are stronger than those to non-innovative
recommendations. Furthermore, recommendations of female analysts produce similar abnormal
stock returns and trading volumes as those of male analysts, regardless of the innovation level
in recommendations. Therefore, there is no evidence of gender difference in market reactions to
innovative recommendations, suggesting that investors do not discount innovation of overconfident
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analysts because they do not see overconfidence as being detrimental to analysts’ job performance.
This study is an extension of the second essay which documents evidence for male analysts’
higher propensity to issue innovative recommendations. This study contributes to the literature
on equity analysts in several ways. First, by documenting that market reactions to analysts’ rec-
ommendations are significantly related to innovation in recommendations, my analysis confirms
that innovative recommendations are more informative and credible to investors. This finding
complements previous research on the determinants of recommendations’ informativeness. Sec-
ond, market reactions to innovative recommendations of the same magnitude for both male and
female analysts suggest that investors do not find that innovative recommendation issued by male
analysts are less credible, despite male analysts’ relative overconfidence. This empirical find-
ing complements the literature related to overconfidence by showing that, even though driven by
overconfidence, innovation is not detrimental, notably to investors regarding financial analysts.
Taken together, this dissertation provides a novel picture of gender issues among financial
analysts by 1) shedding light on the impacts of culture on female representations of financial
analysts; 2) providing empirical evidence for gender difference in innovation in the settings of
stock recommendations; 3) investigating investors’ perception of innovative recommendations by
overconfident analysts.
5.2 Limits and Future Research
This dissertation complements prior literature on the role of financial analysts in capital markets
and the impact of gender on financial analysts. However, some limitations could be overcome
in future research. I conclude this dissertation with a final discussion about several limits of my
research and possible directions for future research.
First, my empirical analyses rely on the analysts’ gender. Lacking of reliable information
sources, I determined gender using each analyst’s first name. This methodology suffers from one
limit: I cannot determine the gender of analysts with unisex first name, such as “Alex", “Leslie".
This may result in a selection bias in the research sample because all analysts with unisex first
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names are excluded from the study.
Second, I find, in the second study, that male analysts issue more innovative recommendations
due to their relative overconfidence. In this research, overconfidence is proxied by a fixed charac-
teristic: the analyst’s gender. However, prior literature suggests a short-term dynamic in analysts’
overconfidence. An analyst becomes overconfident in his ability after a series of good predictions
(Hilary and Menzly 2006). Overconfidence leads him to perform poorly and the subsequent poor
performance reduces his overconfidence. Therefore, future research should take this dynamic cy-
cle into consideration by exploring the relationship between analyst’s past performance, gender
and innovation in recommendations.
Third, empirical findings of the third essay suggest that market does not discount innovative
recommendations issued by overconfident analysts. I use the analyst’s gender as a proxy for over-
confidence. An important direction for future research is to measure analysts’ overconfidence
directly. In the study on the relationship between investors’ overconfidence and portfolio diversi-
fication, Goetzmann and Kumar (2008) propose an index to measure overconfidence by capturing
investors who trade the most but attain the worst performance. The index is set to one for an
investor if she belongs to the highest portfolio turnover quintile and the lowest risk-adjusted per-
formance quintile. A similar measurement of overconfidence for financial analysts may deserve
further investigation.
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Résumé:
Cette thèse de doctorat comprend trois essais relatifs au genre des analystes financiers. Les résul-
tats empiriques de la première étude attestent d’une sous-représentation des femmes analystes et
confirment que la culture nationale exerce un impact important sur la représentation des femmes
chez les analystes financiers dans les pays européens étudiés. La deuxième étude montre que les
analystes hommes sont plus susceptibles de formuler des recommandations innovantes que les
analystes femmes, du fait d’une plus forte confiance en leur jugement. Enfin, les conclusions de
la troisième étude montrent que les recommandations innovantes déclenchent des réactions plus
fortes de la part des investisseurs, mais on ne note aucune différence de genre dans les réactions du
marché à ces recommandations innovantes. Les conclusions empiriques de cette thèse complètent
la littérature sur les analystes financiers, et plus particulièrement sur l’impact du genre dans la
prise de décisions financières.
Mots-clés: culture, genre, analystes financiers, recommandations des actions
Abstract:
This PhD dissertation consists of three essays relating to gender concerns among financial ana-
lysts. The empirical results of the first study provide evidence for under-representation of female
analysts and confirm that national culture exerts a material impact on female representation among
financial analysts across European countries under study. In the second study, I document evidence
that male analysts are more likely to issue innovative recommendations than female analysts, due
to their relative overconfidence. Finally, the findings of third study suggest that innovative recom-
mendations trigger larger market reactions but there is no gender difference in market reactions to
innovative recommendations. The empirical findings of my dissertation complement prior litera-
ture on financial analysts, more specifically, gender-based difference in financial market decision
making.
Keywords: culture, gender, financial analysts, stock recommendations
